Perceptions of intergroup bias : the roles of social projection and meta-stereotypes by MacInnis, Cara C.
Perceptions of intergroup bias: The roles of social projection and meta-stereotypes 
by 
Cara C. MacInnis 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Arts 
Department of Psychology 
BROCK UNIVERSITY 
St. Catharines, Ontario 
August 2009 
© Cara C. MacInnis 2009 
Abstract 
Underlying intergroup perceptions include processes of social projection (perceiving 
personal traitslbeliefs in others, see Krueger 1998) and meta-stereotyping (thinking about 
other groups' perceptions of one's own group, see Vorauer et aI., 1998). Two studies 
were conducted to investigate social projection and meta-stereotypes in the domain of 
White-Black racial relations. Study 1, a correlational study, examined the social 
projection of prejudice and 'prejudiced' meta-stereotypes among Whites. Results 
revealed that (a) Whites socially projected their intergroup attitudes onto other Whites 
(and Blacks) [i.e., Whites higher in prejudice against Blacks believed a large percentage 
of Whites (Blacks) are prejudiced against Blacks (Whites), whereas Whites low in 
prejudice believed a smaller percentage of Whites (Blacks) are prejudiced]; (b) Whites 
held the meta:..stereotype that their group (Whites) is viewed by Blacks to be prejudiced; 
and (c) prejudiced meta-stereotypes may be formed through the social projection of 
intergroup attitudes (result of path-model tests). Further, several correlates of social 
projection and meta-stereotypes were identified, including the finding that feeling 
negatively stereotyped by an outgroup predicted outgroup avoidance through heightened 
intergroup anxiety. 
Study 2 replicated and extended these findings, investigating the social projection 
of ingroup favouritism and meta- and other-stereotypes about ingroup favouritism. These 
processes were examined experimentally using an anticipated intergroup contact 
paradigm. The goal was to understand the experimental conditions under which people 
would display the strongest social projection of intergroup attitudes, and when 
experimentally induced meta-stereotypes (vs. other-stereotypes; beliefs about the group 
11 
preferences of one's outgroup) would be most damaging to intergroup contact. White 
participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions and received (alleged) 
feedback from a previously completed computer-based test. Depending on condition, this 
information suggested that: (a) the participant favoured Whites over Blacks; (b) previous 
White participants favoured Whites over Blacks; (c) the participant's Black partner 
favoured Blacks over Whites; (d) previous Black participants favoured Blacks over 
Whites; (e) the participant's Black partner viewed the participant to favour Whites over 
Blacks; or (£) Black participants previously participating viewed Whites to favour Whites 
over Blacks. In a defensive reaction, Whites exhibited enhanced social projection of 
personal intergroup attitudes onto their ingroup under experimental manipulations 
characterized by self-concept threat (i.e., when the computer revealed that the participant 
favoured the ingroup or was viewed to favour the ingroup). Manipulated meta- and other-
stereotype information that introduced intergroup contact threat, on the other hand, each 
exerted a strong negative impact on intergroup contact expectations (e.g., anxiety). 
Personal meta-stereotype manipulations (i.e., when the participant was informed that her/ 
his partner thinks s/he favours the ingroup) exerted an especially negative impact on 
intergroup behaviour, evidenced by increased avoidance of the upcoming interracial 
interaction. In contrast, personal self-stereotype manipulations (i.e., computer revealed 
that one favoured the ingroup) ironically improved upcoming intergroup contact 
expectations and intentions, likely due to an attempt to reduce the discomfort of holding 
negative intergroup attitudes. Implications and directions for future research are 
considered. 
III 
Acknowledgements 
First, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Gordon Hodson for his guidance, 
encouragement, and support throughout this process. I am truly grateful for his patience 
and dedication to this complex and (at times) arduous project. His insight and expertise 
have been invaluable. Second, I would like to thank the members of my supervisory 
committee, Dr. Nancy DeCourville and Dr. Carolyn Hafer, for their helpful feedback and 
advice. I would also like to than my external examiner Dr. Sandra Bosacki for her helpful 
insight. Third, I would like to thank my colleagues Kimberly Costello and Alex Hatry for 
their friendship and ability to field my various questions about the thesis writing process. 
Additionally, I sincerely thank Kirk Stokes for the time he dedicated to programming 
Study 2. I would also like to thank Norton for his continuous support, and help with my 
endless practice presentations. Finally, I thank my family for sending me their 
encouragement from afar on a daily basis. 
IV 
Table of Contents 
Introduction................................................................................ ... 1 
Social Proj ection....................................................................... ... 1 
Issues of Concern.................................................................. 3 
Projection in the Context of Intergroup Relations.......................... .•. 10 
Negative Impact of Projecting Intergroup Attitudes....................... .... 14 
Meta-stereotyping........................................................................ 17 
Issues of Concern.................................................................. 18 
Meta-stereotypes in the Context of Intergroup Relations.................. ... 24 
Negative Impact of Meta-stereotypes....................................... ..... 27 
The Current Research............................................................................................. 31 
Study 1....................................................................................................................... 32 
H ypotheses........................................................................................................... 32 
Projection.................................................................................................... 32 
Meta-stereotypes ......................................................................................... 33 
Relation between Projection of Intergroup Attitudes and Prejudiced 
Meta-stereotypes ......................................................................................... 33 
Potential Correlates.................................................................................... 36 
Method................................................................................................................. 43 
Results.................................................................................................................. 47 
Preliminary Analyses and Descriptive Statistics........................................ 47 
Projection.................................................................................................... 49 
Meta-stereotypes......................................................................................... 51 
v 
Relation between Projection of Intergroup Attitudes and Prejudiced 
Meta-stereotypes •••••.••..•••••••••••••••••••••••...••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••... 52 
Correlates of Projection and Meta-stereotypes .•.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 56 
Exploratory Mediation Analyses •••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•..•••..••.•••••••••• 58 
Discussion •...•.•••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••.•.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 61 
Study 2 ..•...••..•........•..••...•...•...•..••...•....••.....•.....••••...••.........•..••..•.•..••..•...•.......•...•....•.. 66 
Replication Hypotheses ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••...•••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 68 
Experimental Hypotheses Overview •••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•.••••••••••••••••••...•..••••.•....•..••• 69 
Overview of Experimental Manipulations •••••••.•.•••...•.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 71 
Experimental H ypoth.eses ••••••••••••...•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..••••••••••••..•••••••••••••••••• 73 
Projection •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..••..••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 73 
Anticipated Intergroup 'Contact Reactions ................................................ . 80 
Exploratory Investigations ••...••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••. 87 
Method •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••....••...•...•...•..•.••..••.••••••••••••••••••••• 88 
Results •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•.•.•.••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 96 
Preliminary Analyses and Descriptive Statistics •••••••••••..•...••••••••••••••••••••••• 96 
Correlations among Key Variables ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.••..•• 100 
Differences among Conditions on Key Pre-manipulation Variables .•.••••••• 100 
Results Testing the Replication of Study 1 ................................................. . 108 
Manipulation Check ••••••••••••••••••....•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 113 
Projection •••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••• 114 
Anticipated Intergroup Contact Reactions ................................................ . 124 
Exploratory Analyses ••••••••..•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•...••.••.••.•• 133 
Discussion ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••.••••••.••••••••••••••• 136 
VI 
Projection Findings ..••. e ••••••••• e •••••• e •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 137 
Anticipated Intergroup Contact Findings .......•..•••.•.....••.•••.•.•...................•. 140 
Self-Concept Threat Reaction ••••....... "" ..... ee ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 142 
Study 2 Conclusions •••••.. e •• ee •••••••••••••••••••••• """ •••••••••••••••••• e •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 145 
General Discussion ................................. e •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• " •••• " •••••••••••• «1 ••••••••••••• 147 
L imi tati ons •••••••• a ••••••••••••••••••• e •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• II •••• •••• ••• e ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 149 
Directions for Future Research ....•...................••.......••..••.............•••......................•...• 151 
Cone lusioneee •• eo •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• " ••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••• 153 
References ...•.••••.•• ee ••••••• e ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• & ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 19 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ee •••• 155 
Appendices .••...••.•••...••.•••.•••.•••..•..••. e •••••••••••••••• e •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• " •• o ••••• ., •• " •••••••••••••••• 168 
Vll 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Key Continuous Variables (Study 1).......... 50 
Table 2. Correlations Depicting the Relation between Projection and Meta-
stereotypes (Study 1 ).............................................................................. 53 
Table 3. Projection and Meta-stereotype Correlates (Study 1)..................... 57 
Table 4. Experimental Conditions (Study 2). 0 0 •• 0.0 .......... eo e. 0 ... 0.0 •••••••• 0. 0.. 70 
Table 5. Potential Models Regarding Projection Outcomes (Study 2) .... 0 •• 0' ••• 75 
Table 6. Potential Models Regarding Anticipated Intergroup Contact 
Reactions Outcomes (Study 2) ...... 0 0 o. e .......... 0 •• 0 ...... e •••• e .. eo.. ••••• 83 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Key Continuous Variables, Collapsed across 
Conditions (Study 2) ... 0 ••••• 0 •••••• e. 00 ••••• 0 •• e ...•.........•.. e ..•. 0 ••• e.... 98 
Table 8. Frequency Statistics for Key Categorical Variables, Collapsed across 
Conditions (Study 2) ........ 0 •••• 00 •••••••••••••• 00 ••••••••• e 0.0.0 ••• 00. e •• o ••• 101 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Key Post-Manipulation Variables within 
Experimental Conditions (Study 2) ... 0 .............................. 0 ••••• 0. 102 
Table 10. Frequency Statistics for Key Post Manipulation Categorical 
Variables, within Experimental Condition (Study 2)...................... 104 
Table 11. Correlations among Key Pre-Manipulation Variables Collapsed 
across Condition (Study 2) .................................. e ..... e........... 105 
Table 12. Correlations among Key Post-Manipulation Variables Collapsed 
across Condition (Study 2) ......... e •••• 0" 0 •• 0 •••••••••••••• 0. eo •••••••• o.... 106 
Table l3. Post-Manipulation Projection Partial Correlations (correlations 
between self-rated ingroup favouritism and ratings of in group's 
ingroup favouritism (degree)) within Experimental Condition, 
Controlling for Pre-Manipulation Projection (Study 2)................... 115 
Table 14. Mean Differences in Projection Index from Pre- to Post-
Manipulation, within Experimental Condition (Study 2).................. 117 
Table 15. Regression Analyses: Condition (using coding predictors) Predicting 
Post-manipulation Projection (Study 2)..................................... 121 
Vlll 
Table 16. Regression Analyses: Condition (using coding predictors) Predicting 
Contact-Specific Intergroup Anxiety and Anticipated Quality of 
Interaction Ratings (Study 2) .••........ e. 0 •••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 0 •••••• e. 127 
Table 17. Regression Analyses: Condition (using coding predictors) Predicting 
Personalized Meta-Stereotypes (Study 2) .........• 0. e •••••• o ••• 0 e. 0..... ... 130 
Table 18. Regression Analyses: Condition (using coding predictors) Predicting 
Contact-Specific Outgroup Avoidance (Study 2).......................... 132 
Table 19. Regression Analyses: Condition (using effect coded predictors) 
Predicting General Prejudice Justification and Ingroup Identification 
(Study 2) ............................ 8111 ••••••• 118 •• 8 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• e... 135 
IX 
Figure 1. 
Figure 2. 
List of Figures 
Hypothesized relationship between projection of intergroup attitudes 
and prejudiced meta-stereotypes among Whites........... .•••.......•.•..... 35 
Results of path model testing the hypothesized relation between 
meta-stereotypes of ingroup and the projection of intergroup 
attitudes (Study 1) ...• 0 ...................... 0 ........... 0.0 ... 0.......... .... 55 
Figure 3a. Tests of direct and indirect effects of negativity of meta-stereotype 
of self as individual on out group avoidance via intergroup anxiety 
(Study l) ...... e ......................... e .. a ............ e...................... 60 
Figure 3b. Tests of direct and indirect effects of negativity of meta-stereotype 
of ingroup on avoidance of outgroup via intergroup anxiety (Study 
1) .......................... 0 •• "'8 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• " ••••• 8 •••••••••• 60 
Figure 4a. Results of path model testing the hypothesized relation between 
meta-stereotypes of ingroup (percent measure) and the projection of 
intergroup attitudes (Study 2)......... ......... ... ........................... 111 
Figure 4b. Results of path model testing the hypothesized relation between 
meta-stereotypes of in group (degree measure) and the projection of 
Figure 5. 
intergroup attitudes (Study 2) ..... 0 ............ 00 .. 0......................... 111 
Differences in self and ingroup's ingroup favouritism ratings from 
pre- to post-manipulation in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition 
(Study 2) ............. , .. 8 ........................ e ••••••••••••••• 0............... 118 
x 
Appendix A 
Appendix B.l 
Appendix B.2 
Appendix B.3 
Appendix B.4 
Appendix B.5 
Appendix B.6 
Appendix B.7 
Appendix B.8 
Appendix B.9 
Appendix B.l 0 
Appendix B.Il 
Appendix B.l2 
Appendix B.13 
Appendix C.l 
Appendix C.2 
Appendix C.3 
Appendix C.4 
Appendix C.5 
Appendix C.6 
Appendix C.7 
Appendix C.8 
List of Appendices 
Glossary of Terms .... o •••• 0 ••••••••• 0 ••••• 0 •••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 
Study 1 Brock University Ethics ApprovaL ........•....... 0 ••••••••• 
Study 1 Informed Consent Form ................... 0 .... 0 ............ . 
Study 1 Proj ection Materials ...... 0 •••••• e ••••• e •••••••••• e ........... . 
Study 1 Meta-stereotype Materials ......•..•.. eo e e. e e. 0 •••••• eo ••••••• 
Study 1 Prejudice Relevant Materials .... 0 •••• 0 •••••••••••••• eo ...... . 
Study 1 Ingroup Identification scale .•......... 0 .......... e •••• e •• eo •• 
Study 1 Social Dominance Orientation Scale ....................... . 
Study 1 Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale. e .......... eo .......... . 
Study 1 Prejudice Justification Materials ............ e e ....... 0.0 ••••• 
Study 1 Intergroup Anxiety Scale .................................... . 
Study 1 Outgroup Avoidance Scale .................................. . 
Study 1 Demographics ..... III ......... 110"8 •••••• " ....... <!Ie e e •• e .......... " ••• ., ••• 
Study 1 Debriefing Form ..•...•......•.•.....•.. 0 •••••••••••••••• 0" ... . 
Study 2 Brock University Ethics Approval.. .....• o ........... 0 .... .. 
Study 2 Informed Consent Form ..................•...• 0 ••••••••••••••• 
Study 2 Pre-manipulation Demographics ........................... . 
Study 2 Pre-manipulation Prejudice Relevant Materials .......... . 
Study 2 Pre-manipulation Projection Materials. e •••••••••• eo 0 •••••• 
Study 2 Pre-manipulation Big Five Inventory .... e ................ .. 
Study 2 Pre-manipulation Meta-stereotype Measures ............ .. 
Study 2 Pre-manipulation Other-stereotype Measures .... o ........ . 
Xl 
168 
171 
172 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
182 
183 
184 
185 
186 
187 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
Appendix C.9 Study 2 Manipulation Phase Messages............................... 195 
Appendix C.l 0 Study 2 Post-manipulation Contact Specific Intergroup Anxiety 
and Contact Specific Outgroup Avoidance Scales.................. 197 
Appendix C.II Study 2 Post-manipulation Personalized Meta-stereotype 
Measures ... II '" "' •• "' •••• 118"'. '" "' ••• II "' •• '" "' •• "' •••• "'. "' •• "' .. "' ••••• "'. e '" a",. e "'. '" "' •• "' •• 01 198 
Appendix C.12 Study 2 Post-manipulation Personalized Other-stereotype 
Measure. '" II. e '" '" '" "' ... "'. '" "' ••••• e .... '" II "' •• "' •• III. "'. ae '" I) "' •••••• It. "' ... '" "'. '" "'. IS '" '" S. 8.. 199 
Appendix C.l3 Study 2 Post-manipulation Quality of Interaction Measures...... 200 
Appendix C.14 Study 2 Post-manipulation Projection Measures................. ... 202 
Appendix C.I5 Study 2 Post-manipulation Ingroup Identification Scale........... 203 
Appendix C.l6 Study 2 Post-manipulation Prejudice Justification Scale........ ... 204 
Appendix C.l7 Study 2 Post-manipulation Behavioural Avoidance Measure.. .... 205 
Appendix C.18 Study 2 Suspicion Check Measure.................................... 206 
Appendix C.19 Study 2 Manipulation Check Measure................................ 207 
Appendix C.20 Study 2 Written Debriefing Form..................................... 208 
Appendix C.2I Study 2 Verbal Debriefing Script...................................... 210 
Appendix D Effect Coding Scheme................................................... 211 
Appendix E Contrast Coding Schemes.............................................. 213 
xu 
Perceptions of intergroup bias: The roles of social projection and meta-stereotypes 
A central theme of social psychology concerns how individuals are affected by 
those around them. Perceived thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of other people can 
affect the way one thinks, feels, and behaves. These characteristics of others are 
sometimes obvious, but they are often inferred or estimated. One domain in which this is 
particularly relevant is intergroup relations. One's perceptions regarding the beliefs of 
both the ingroup and outgroup can have an impact on intergroup relations. Underlying 
intergroup perceptions include processes of social projection (perceiving personal 
traitslbeliefs in others, see Krueger 1998, for review) and meta-stereotyping (thinking 
about other groups' perceptions of one's own group, see Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 
1998). These processes are quite influential in the context of intergroup relations. It is 
possible that the projection of intergroup attitudes and the meta-stereotype that one's 
group is viewed to hold negative intergroup attitudes lead to beliefs damaging to positive 
intergroup relations, and that meta-stereotypes especially can lead to negative intergroup 
contact. Damaging intergroup beliefs and negative intergroup contact can both perpetuate 
prejudice. The current research investigated the social projection of intergroup attitudes 
and the meta-stereotype that one (or one's group) holds negative intergroup attitudes (i.e., 
is prejudiced) in the context of White-Black racial relations. 
Social Projection 
Social projection refers to the tendency for people to perceive that others share 
their thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (see Krueger 1998, 2000, for reviews). The term 
was initially coined by Allport (1924), but current research on the topic began with Ross, 
Greene and House's (1977) studies on false consensus: one's belief that hislher response 
1 
is relatively common whereas alternatives are not. To illustrate, a person who agrees to 
wear a sandwich board displaying the word 'repent' is more likely to assume a large 
percentage of others would similarly agree to the task, whereas a person who does not 
agree to wear the board is more likely to assume a large percentage of others would 
refuse as well (Ross et al., 1977). Social projection may be a heuristic used by people to 
make predictions about others based on the self, thus providing a convenient "window 
into the social world" (Robbins & Krueger, 2005, p.32). People have been shown to 
socially project attitudes in various domains including politics (Granberg & Brent, 1983; 
Regan & Kilduff, 1988), economics (Kahneman & Snell, 1992), and communications 
(Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Nickerson, 1999). Several meta-analyses have 
found social projection effects to be significant and replicable, with medium to large 
effect sizes (Mullen et at, 1985; Mullen & Hu, 1988; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). 
2 
Although Allport initially introduced the concept of social projection, 'projection' 
was originally a psychodynamic term. Freud (191111958) conceptualized projection as a 
defensive reaction to reduce threats to one's self. In psychodynamic terms, projection 
refers to an unconscious process whereby undesirable thoughts, feelings, and attitudes are 
denied in the self and attributed to others as a mechanism to reduce the anxiety attached 
to such thoughts, feelings, and attitudes. One difference between this conceptualization 
and more contemporary notions of 'social projection' is that for the latter, the attributes 
projected may be desirable (e.g., happiness, see Feshbach, 1963), neutral (e.g., a 
preference for white bread vs. brown bread, see Ross et al., 1977), or undesirable (e.g., 
prejudiced attitudes, as the current research investigates). Another difference is that this 
process is not necessarily unconscious, though aspects of it may be. Also, the 
3 
characteristics projected are not necessarily denied as the psychodynamic approach 
alleges (e.g., it is not likely that one would deny a preference for brown bread). 
Nonetheless, Freud's early theorizing has clearly influenced contemporary thinking about 
perceived traits in others. The current research examined the social projection of two 
types of intergroup attitudes, anti-outgroup bias (Study 1) and pro-ingroup bias (or 
"ingroup favouritism"; Study 2). 
Issues of Concern 
There are several issues of concern present in the social projection literature. A 
brief coverage of several of these issues follows. Because the social projection literature 
is so vast, the major focus is on points relevant to the current research. 
Conceptualization of projection. Researchers vary in their conceptualization of 
projection, and hence, their means of measuring the construct. The classic 
operationalization ofprojection (known as the standard social projection paradigm, see 
Marks & Miller, 1987) involves a dichotomous measure of the attitude I of interest, where 
participants categorically indicate whether they do or do not endorse the attitude (yes 
versus no), followed by an estimate of the percentage of target group members possessing 
the attitude position. To measure projection, it is examined whether those indicating 
"yes" (versus "no") report that a higher percentage of the population endorses the 
personal attitude. This method has been well established as the standard by which to 
measure projection (see Mullen et aI., 1985). One problem with this paradigm is the use 
of a dichotomous measure. This forced-choice procedure results in a loss of variance in 
participants' attitudes. Ames (2004b, Study 3) introduced a continuous measure of 
1 The standard social projection paradigm may be used to examine the projection of beliefs or other 
attributes as well, but attitudes are the focus of the present investigation. 
4 
participants' attitudes to capture this otherwise lost variance, which conveniently allows 
for difference-score measures of projection. The current research employed the standard 
social projection paradigm to provide evidence ofprojection, but also added a continuous 
attitude acknowledgement measure, in keeping with Ames (2004b). This allows for the 
examination of correlations and difference scores, and more fully captures the projection 
phenomenon. 
Ingroup versus outgroup projection. One major theme in the projection literature 
is the issue of ingroup versus outgroup projection. It is reasonable to assume that 
projection to others is strongest when the target is perceived as similar to the person 
doing the projecting. Thus, most research on social projection has addressed ingroup 
projection; only more recently has outgroup projection been examined (e.g., Riketta, 
2006; Riketta & Sacramento, 2008; Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Stathi & Crisp, 2008). 
Researchers have identified several possible models of outgroup social projection. The 
first is that people project to outgroups as they typically do to ingroups (i.e., they assume 
that outgroup members share their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviours), which has 
been labeled both "assimilation" projection (Spears & Manstead, 1990) and the 
"induction hypothesis" (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). The second approach to outgroup 
projection is that people perceive low consensus for their thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours in the outgroup, which has been labeled both "contrast" projection (Spears & 
Manstead, 1990), and the "differentiation hypothesis" (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). The 
final approach, labeled the "null hypothesis" (Robbins & Krueger, 2005), states that 
projection to outgroups does not occur. Evidence has been cited supporting the 
assimilation/induction (Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Riketta, 2006; Riketta & Sacramento, 
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2008; Spears & Manstead, 1990), contrast/differentiation (Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson and 
Copper, 1992), and null (Clement & Krueger, 2002) outgroup projection hypotheses. 
These inconsistent outcomes reflect a need for further research. Generally though, most 
research supports the possibility of assimilative (but weaker than to ingroup) projection to 
outgroups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). However, the issue is not fully resolved. The 
current study examined both ingroup and outgroup projection of intergroup attitudes. 
Accuracy of projection. In their classic studies of social projection, Ross et al. 
(1977) regarded projection as erroneous. In fact, they termed the process ''false 
consensus." Projection was initially considered, and still is by many (e.g., see de la Haye, 
2000; Strube & Rahimi, 2006), a flawed and irrational way of thinking, in that "not 
everybody can be right" (Krueger, 1996, p. 537). More recent theorizing conceptualizes 
projection less as an irrational process and more as a reasonable form of inductive 
reasoning (Dawes, 1989, 1990; Hoch, 1987; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). From this 
perspective, information about one's self is considered the best source to use when 
estimating information about others. This may be because an individual's attitudes are 
less likely to be uncommon than they are to be common. That is, if most people hold a 
given attitude, the probability is greater than chance that a randomly selected person will 
hold that attitude (see Krueger, 1996, for a detailed explanation). In terms of probability, 
if a large percentage of one's ingroup holds (or does not hold) a certain attitude, it is 
likely that an individual group member holds (or does not hold) that attitude as well 
(Dawes, 1989). When this individual estimates that a large percentage of the population 
(usually the ingroup) endorses this attitude, hislher consensus estimate is therefore more 
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likely to be true than false. This explanation is specific to ingroup projection for the most 
part. 
Some researchers address the issue of the accuracy of consensus estimates by 
interpreting false consensus as a type of social projection (e.g., Bauman & Geher, 2002). 
Others disregard the issue and use the terms "social projection" and "false consensus" 
interchangeably (e.g., Judd, Park, Yzerbet, Gordijn, & Muller, 2005). Still others resolve 
this issue by acknowledging a "truly" false consensus effect (Krueger, 1998; Krueger & 
Clement, 1994; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993) measured in such a way that it is clear that the 
consensus estimates are indeed false. Whereas the term "social projection" does not 
assume accuracy or inaccuracy in consensus estimates, the "truly false consensus effect" 
involves inaccuracy. The current research uses the term "social projection" rather than 
"false consensus" to refer to perceived congruence between self and others, broadly 
defined. I do not assume that consensus estimates are accurate or inaccurate; both 
possibilities are acknowledged. The focus of the present research did not concern 
projection accuracy, but simply understanding the projection of intergroup attitudes and 
when it occurs most strongly. 
Motivated versus un-motivated projection. There is some disagreement regarding 
the reasons people project. Some researchers explain social projection as a simple passive 
form of induction whereby an individual uses the self as a sample to infer information 
about others (e.g., Dawes, 1989, 1990; Hoch, 1987, Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). Krueger 
(1998), a preeminent projection researcher, largely conceptualizes projection as a non-
motivated process. Other researchers hold that projection, especially ingroup projection, 
is a motivated process. It has been suggested that people may project in order to feel that 
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they are nonnal (e.g., Shennan, Chassin, Presson, & Agostinelli, 1984; Shennan, 
Presson, & Chassin, 1984), or that they "belong" (e.g., Pyszczynski et al.,1996). 
Essentially, the idea here is that one rates others to be similar to the self in order to 'fit in ' 
with one's group. 
Another motivational explanation for projection is that people project personal 
attributes onto others when they feel threatened, projecting in order to validate their 
potential flaws or shortcomings (e.g., Campbell, 1986). Newman and colleagues (see 
Newman & Caldwell, 2005; Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997) introduce 'defensive 
proj ection', the proj ection of traits one wishes to deny in the self. Their model states that 
when one tries to deny or suppress certain traits, this leads to an ironic focus on these 
traits which are then readily ascribed to others. This is consistent with the previously 
mentioned psychodynamic view of projection, by which people project undesirable 
characteristics onto others to avoid the anxieties associated with possession of the 
characteristics. However, by examining the projection oftraits "one wishes to deny", 
Newman and colleagues minimize criticisms leveled at traditional psychodynamic 
projection (e.g., Freud, 191111958) regarding the questions of whether the 'projector' 
must possess and be aware of the projected trait (see Holmes, 1968, 1978). These criteria 
do not have to be met for Newman et al.' s (1997) defensive projection. Despite this 
discrepancy, Newman et al. (1997) assert that their conceptualization would be 
recognized by psychodynamic theorists as consistent with their theory of projection. 
A related fonn of projection is 'attributive projection' (see Bramel, 1962, 1963; 
Holmes, 1968, 1978). With this fonn of projection, though, threatening traits are not 
denied. People are aware of the trait(s), and hence readily attribute it to others (especially 
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liked others, such as ingroup members) to reduce cognitive dissonance (e.g., Aronson, 
1968; Festinger, 1957). Sharing such characteristics with positively evaluated others may 
reduce the anxiety of being the sole possessor of an undesirable trait. The issue of 
projection motivation remains unresolved, and was addressed by the current research in 
Study 2. 
Direction of projection. Projection, as most commonly conceived, is a process of 
assuming that others are similar to one's self. However, because most data on projection 
are correlational, an opposing explanation is possible: people may assume that the self is 
similar to the group, especially the ingroup (i.e., people respond how they expect the 
group to respond). This possibility is termed "introjection" (Krueger, 2002). Proponents 
of social identity theory and self-categorization theory emphasize the importance of 
group memberships to one's identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & 
McGarty, 1994), and would presumably interpret projection in terms of introjection. 
Indeed, Krueger (2002) notes that introjection is an important part of the well-supported 
self-categorization theory. The self-stereotyping hypothesis, one of self-categorization 
theory's key principles, states that people assign to themselves and others the typical 
characteristics of their ingroup when social influence is salient, so that they become 
psychologically interchangeable with other ingroup members (Brown & Turner, 1981). 
Indeed, one paper from this group of researchers is even entitled "Knowing what to think 
by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, 
conformity and group polarization" (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 
1990). 
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Though the introjection hypothesis has its advocates, research has suggested that 
projection from self to group may be the more viable explanation of similarity ratings 
between self and group. For instance, response latency studies find that self-referent 
information is retrieved before consensus estimates (supporting the activation sequence 
required for the projection, see Cadinu & De Amicis, 1999). In addition, others have 
found correlations between fictitious information describing participants and participants' 
consensus estimates of these characteristics (Krueger, 2002), and that projection occurs in 
minimal group paradigms, where participants are assigned to arbitrary laboratory groups 
(Allen & Wilder 1979; Krueger & Clement, 1996). Krueger (2002) concludes that 
attempts to illustrate pure introjection, without evidence of projection contaminating the 
effects, have been weak or unreplicated (see Krueger, Acevedo & Robbins, 2006, for 
review). 
Advocates of self-categorization theory challenge arguments supporting the. 
projection hypothesis and provide evidence contradicting this position, though results are 
inconsistent. For example, some researchers have found that giving participants 
information regarding actual group consensus will change their original self-relevant 
responses to be more in line with the ingroup (Haslam et aI., 1996; Stang or, Sechrist, & 
Jost, 2001), supporting the introjection hypothesis. Others have found such effects only 
for those with ambivalent attitudes (Hodson, Maio, & Esses, 2001). Moreover, others 
have found that such information does not change participants' original responses (Alicke 
& Largo, 1995; Krueger & Clement, 1994), refuting the introjection hypothesis. These 
differences may be due to the very different contexts of these studies: sandwich-board-
wearing (Krueger & Clement, 1994), performance on a 'social sensitivity' test (Alicke & 
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Largo, 1995), or intergroup stereotyping (Haslam et aI., 1996; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 
2001), highlighting a need for further research. Perhaps introjection is a genuine 
phenomenon in the context of consensus estimates regarding intergroup attitudes and 
beliefs, which are group-relevant by definition. This issue was addressed by the current 
research. 
Projection in the Context of Intergroup Relations 
A major portion ofthe current research examined the extent to which people 
socially project their intergroup attitudes. Specifically, Study 1 examined the projection 
of anti-outgroup prejudice, and Study 2 explored the projection of ingroup favouritism. 
As mentioned above, it is well established that people project mundane attitudes (e.g., 
bread preferences, see Ross et aI., 1977). There is also evidence that people project 
specific intergroup beliefs, or their beliefs regarding the characteristics of certain groups, 
such as 'ignorant' or 'aggressive' (see Krueger, 1996, and discussion below). One 
interesting area where there is limited research though, is the social projection of 
intergroup attitudes (e.g., prejudice). The current research builds on the previous 
investigations of mundane attitudes and specific intergroup beliefs by examining the 
projection of general intergroup attitudes (prejudice and ingroup favouritism). A brief 
review of the available literature on projection in the context of intergroup relations 
follows. 
Krueger (1996) conducted a study in which Black and White participants rated 
Blacks and Whites generally on several attributes including aggressive, athletic, lazy, and 
practical. Participants rated both groups on the attributes according to their own beliefs, 
cultural stereotypes, and from the perspective of the racial group to which they did not 
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belong. It was found that people thought their personal beliefs regarding Whites or 
Blacks were common in their culture. This congruence between ratings of self and culture 
at large within each racial group demonstrated social projection. Importantly, Krueger 
established that people tend to socially project intergroup beliefs. Similarly, Strube and 
Rahimi (2006) conducted a study in which White university students rated the percentage 
of Blacks who possessed 16 traits according to their own and fellow students' beliefs. A 
positive average partial correlation between participants' own responses and judgments 
of other participants' responses, controlling for other participants' actual responses, 
indicated social projection of intergroup beliefs (e.g., poor, violent) as well. 
Judd et al. (2005) conducted several studies on this topic, involving a number of 
target groups. Although Judd et al. (2005) claim to provide evidence of the projection of 
intergroup bias, upon further examination, it appears the authors found evidence of the 
projection of intergroup beliefs.2 Across the studies, participants provided their own 
perceptions, their respective outgroup's perceptions, and their ingroup's (Studies 2 & 3 
only) perceptions of several types of group evaluations.3 Correlations obtained between 
own beliefs and perceived others' beliefs provided evidence that the beliefs investigated 
in each respective study were socially projected to ingroups (Studies 2 & 3) and 
outgroups (all studies, discussion to follow). 
2 Judd et al. (2005) examined the projection of 'feature based group attribute evaluations'(i.e., 'To what 
extent does group X have high SAT math scores), 'group stereotypicality evaluations', which measured the 
extent to which more stereotypical than counter-stereotypical traits or attributes are ascribed to a group, 
'group similarity evaluations' (i.e., 'To what extent are all members of group X similar'), and global 
evaluations of groups (i.e., 'to what extent do you like versus dislike most members of group X'). For 
simplicity, when describing Judd et aI's (2005) work, I will simply refer to the projection of these 
evaluations as the projection of 'intergroup beliefs'. 
3 The types of group evaluations included: feature-based group attribute evaluations (all studies), group 
stereotypicality evaluations (all studies), group similarity evaluations (Studies 2 & 3) and global 
evaluations of groups (Study 3), see Footnote 2 for examples of these types of evaluations. 
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Evidence of outgroup projection of intergroup beliefs has also been obtained. In 
addition to finding that both Whites and Blacks projected their beliefs regarding the racial 
characteristics of the outgroup onto their culture at large, Krueger (1996) found that 
Whites' personal beliefs were correlated with cultural stereotypes perceived to be held by 
the outgroup (i.e., how Whites predicted Blacks would rate cultural stereotypes). For 
Black participants though, correlations between personal beliefs and cultural stereotype 
ratings attributed to Whites were close to zero. In other words, there was evidence of 
outgroup projection by Whites but not by Blacks. Judd et al. (2005) also found evidence 
of outgroup projection in their studies. They found projection of intergroup beliefs (see 
Footnote 2) on the behalf of Whites to several different outgroups (Asians, Hispanics, 
and Blacks) and vice versa, and projection of intergroup beliefs to both ingroups and 
outgroups in sex- and Nationality- defined groups. These studies provided evidence of 
outgroup projection in an intergroup domain. 
Judd et al. (2005) made an important distinction with respect to outgroup 
projection in an intergroup domain. They distinguished between outgroup projection at 
the level of specific category versus the level of intergroup target category. Judd et al. 
(2005) found the projection of specific evaluations (feature-based group attribute 
evaluations, group stereotypicality evaluations, and group similarity evaluations, see 
Footnote 2 for examples) occurred at the level of specific category, whereas the 
projection of global evaluations of groups (similar to the projection of group favouritism 
investigated by the current research) occurred at the level of intergroup target category 
(See Appendix A for a glossary of these and other terms). In Judd et al.' s (2005) work, 
projection at the specific category level involved a correlation between own and other's 
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evaluative ratings, such that the more I (for example) like Whites (my ingroup) [i.e., 
ingroup favouritism] the more I believe my outgroup (Blacks) likes Whites [i.e., outgroup 
favouritism]. In other words, the more positively I rate my ingroup, the more positively I 
believe my outgroup rates my ingroup (their outgroup) as well; thus, I am projecting my 
evaluation of my specific category, 'Whites', onto the outgroup. In contrast, projection at 
the level of intergroup target category involves a correlation between own and other's 
evaluative ratings, such that the more I like my ingroup (Whites), the more I believe my 
outgroup (Blacks) likes their ingroup (Blacks). Here, the more positively I rate my 
ingroup, the more positively I believe my outgroup rates their own ingroup, showing 
evidence of projecting an evaluation of an intergroup target category. This distinction is 
important with regard to outgroup projection in an intergroup context. 
These studies indicate that, in addition to ordinary beliefs and attitudes (e.g., 
liking of ice-cream), perceptions of intergroup characteristics can also be socially 
projected. These studies involved the projection of intergroup beliefs (e.g., intelligence), 
but the current research focuses on more general intergroup attitudes or orientations 
(e.g., anti-outgroup prejudice, ingroup favouritism). The projection of intergroup attitudes 
not only differs from previous research regarding the projection of intergroup beliefs, but 
it also differs considerably from most projection literature, which often deals with 
mundane attitudes (e.g., toward brown bread, sign wearing). The current research 
examines the projection of intergroup attitudes to ingroups and outgroups. Specifically, 
do Whites socially project perceptions of anti-outgroup prejudice (Study 1) or ingroup 
preferences (Study 2) onto Whites (and/or Blacks)? 
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This possibility was examined in an unpublished study by Hodson, Dovidio, and 
Gaertner (2000). The authors found that White participants' ratings ofthe intergroup 
attitudes held by Whites directly corresponded with participants' own responses. In other 
words, Whites high in racial bias estimated a large percentage of Whites were biased as 
wen, whereas those low in racial bias estimated a low percentage of Whites held racial 
biases. A similar pattern was found regarding Whites' projection of intergroup attitudes 
onto Blacks, demonstrating evidence of outgroup projection. Thus, people projected their 
intergroup attitudes in the same way that people project more mundane attitudes (e.g., 
bread preferences) and intergroup beliefs (e.g., 'Blacks are aggressive'). The current 
research attempted to replicate this finding and more deeply explore its implications. 
Negative Impact of Projecting Intergroup Attitudes 
Although top projection researchers view projection as a useful social tool for 
making inferences about others, projection has the potential to be problematic, especially 
the projection of intergroup attitudes (e.g., being prejudiced). The projection of negative 
intergroup attitudes may be used as a way to justify prejudicial beliefs or attitudes, 
maintaining and exacerbating prejudice. Prejudiced people will have little incentive to 
reduce their personal biases if they think most people are biased. Projection may serve as 
a means to justify possession of the socially unacceptable intergroup attitude 
'prejudiced'. In recent years, self-reports of racial prejudice have declined (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 1998; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997) seemingly showing a tum 
toward more egalitarian values. Despite widespread social norms of egalitarianism in 
Western society, prejudice nevertheless exists. Contemporary forms of prejudice include 
modem racism (McConahay, 1986), aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; 
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Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2004), and symbolic racism 
(Sears, 1988). These forms of prejudice, more subtle than traditional prejudice, 
nonetheless remain problematic. It has been established that people are motivated to 
control or conceal prejudice (e.g., Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Legault, Green-Demers, Grant, 
& Chung 2007; Plant & Devine, 1998), which is evident by the subtle forms of prejudice 
referenced above. This illustrates an awareness that overt prejudice is not readily 
endorsed by society, which begs the question: how do people living in an apparently 
egalitarian society justify their highly prejudicial attitudes and manage to look favourably 
upon the self, as people prefer to do (see Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988)? It is 
possible that social projection of intergroup attitudes is associated with prejudice 
justification. If one projects one's racial attitude, one may feel more comfortable in 
holding it. That is, if it is believed that others hold an attitude similar to the self, the 
attitude may be normalized. 
As mentioned above, Hodson et al. (2000) found that Whites' ratings of the racial 
beliefs of Whites in the population corresponded with participants' own racial beliefs. 
This study also reported a particularly unsettling finding. Those who perceived high 
consensus for their negative racial attitudes also indicated that they justified their racial 
attitudes based on the attitudes of other Whites. Those who held negative racial attitudes 
therefore may have used the perceived beliefs of their ingroup members to validate such 
biases. It is similarly possible that people may use the perceived beliefs of the outgroup 
(i.e., outgroup projection) to validate their own beliefs. Therefore, when people believe 
that others agree with their own racial attitudes (i.e., when people project their intergroup 
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attitudes), these shared attitudes are perceived to be normative and acceptable, which can 
rationalize and maintain prejudice. 
Experimental manipulations of racial attitude consensus have led people to 
maintain and act upon negative prejudicial attitudes. For instance, Sechrist and Stangor 
(2001) required White participants to complete a measure of prejudice toward Blacks. 
Following this, participants were given information that either a large or small percentage 
of their peers shared their responses on the questionnaire. It was found that when highly 
prejudiced Whites were given consensus information stating that a high (versus low) 
percentage of their peers agreed with their prejudicial beliefs, these individuals sat farther 
away from a Black person and ascribed more unfavourable traits to Blacks. In contrast, 
low prejudice participants sat closer to a Black person when they were given information 
that a high percentage of their peers shared their beliefs, and ascribed more favourable 
traits to Blacks than those who did not have their beliefs validated in this way. Therefore, 
when people believe that their intergroup attitudes are commonly held by members of 
their group, these attitudes are maintained and acted upon, both behaviourally and 
cognitively. Other studies have found evidence that group consensus estimates can affect 
individuals' attitudes (e.g., Haslam et al., 1996; Stangor et al., 2001; Wittenbrink & 
Henly, 1996), but Sechrist and Stangor's (200l) coverage of the effect of consensus 
information consistent with one's own responses on behaviours/cognitions is key. Thus, 
estimating that others hold attitudes similar to one's own (i.e., if one projects) can be 
quite dangerous, especially when these are negative intergroup attitudes. 
Thus, projection of intergroup attitudes can essentially give people an 'excuse' to 
be prejudiced. This idea is consistent with research stating that people release their 
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prejudices only when means through which to justify their prejudice are present (e.g., the 
perceived support of others; Crandall & Eshelman, 2003). This "everybody knows it's 
true" (Strube & Rahimi, 2006) phenomenon may be unmotivated or motivated; the 
current research addressed this issue. 
Meta-stereotyping 
In addition to social projection, the current research investigated meta-
stereotyping. These two processes are rarely studied simultaneously, but it is useful to do 
so in the context of intergroup relations, as both reflect important intergroup perceptions, 
and meta-stereotypes may be formed through outgroup social projection. Social 
projection involves inferring the general beliefs of the ingroup (and to a lesser extent the 
outgroup); meta-stereotyping, in contrast, involves inferring the beliefs of the outgroup 
about one's group or one's self. 
Meta-stereotypes are beliefs concerning perceived stereotypes held by outgroup 
members about one's own group (Vorauer et al., 1998). To illustrate, heterosexual White 
Canadians might believe they are perceived to be selfish by Aboriginals, polite by 
Americans, and uptight by homosexuals (Vorauer et al., 1998). Meta-stereotypes are a 
specific form of meta-perception. The term meta-perception refers to the impressions 
people believe they make on others. Most research on meta-perceptions has centered on 
interpersonal situations; only recently has meta-perception research been extended to the 
intergroup context (e.g., see Klein & Azzi, 2001; Mendez, Gomez, & Tropp, 2007; 
Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; Vorauer et al., 1998). In their review of meta-perception 
research, Frey and Tropp (2006) discuss several techniques by which meta-perceptions 
are formed (adapted from Ames's (2004a) 'mind reading' tools). One of these techniques 
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involves 'relying on stereotypes.' This technique is particularly relevant in intergroup 
contexts. Vorauer et al. (1998) suggest that "meta-stereotypes guide individuals' meta-
perceptions during the course oftheir interactions with outgroup members" (pp. 917-
918). Group members are generally aware of the stereotypes ascribed to their group (e.g., 
Frey & Tropp, 2006; Klien & Azzi, 2001), and may expect to be viewed in terms ofthese 
stereotypes, especially during intergroup interactions (e.g., Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & 
Roy, 2000; Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001; Vorauer et al., 1998). The current research focused 
on the meta-stereotype that Whites believe they are viewed to hold negative intergroup 
attitudes (i.e., be prejudiced) by Blacks. Specifically, the current research examined the 
meta-stereotype that one or one's group holds an anti-outgroup bias (Study 1) and the 
meta-stereotype that one (or one's group) holds a pro-ingroup bias, or favours the ingroup 
(Study 2). Whereas other theorists have used the term "meta-stereotype" to refer to 
perceptions of many different attributes (e.g., Vorauer et al., 1998), in the present 
research this term refers to meta-stereotypes about being prejudiced. 
Issues of Concern 
Like social projection, there are several issues of concern present in the meta-
stereotype literature. A brief coverage of several of these issues follows, with the focus 
upon those issues relevant to the current research. 
Measurementiconceptualization of meta-stereotypes. Vorauer et al. (1998), who 
conducted the first major study of meta-stereotypes, measured meta-stereotypes using 
diagnostic ratios. The diagnostic ratio method (Martin, 1987; McCauley & Stitt, 1978; 
McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980; Stephan et al., 1993) normally involves a ratio oftarget 
ratings of the percentage of specific group members holding an attribute over baseline 
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ratings of the percentage of people in general holding the attribute. Attributes with a 
diagnostic ratio significantly different from 1 (higher or lower) are considered to be part 
of the stereotype of the group of interest. Vorauer et al. (1998) modified the typical 
diagnostic ratio method to create greater psychological reality for participants. In their 
studies, "the target ratings involved estimating Aboriginal Canadians' beliefs about the 
percentage of White Canadians possessing each of a series of traits. The baseline ratings 
involved estimating Aboriginal Canadians' beliefs about the percentage of Aboriginal 
Canadians possessing each of the traits"(Vorauer et aI., 1998, p. 920). Using this method, 
Vorauer et al. (1998) obtained a diagnostic ratio of 10.26 for the trait 'prejudiced'. 
However, Vorauer et al. 's (1998) work differed from the current research in 
several ways. In particular, Vorauer and colleagues were attempting to determine which 
of a large number of attributes were included in the meta-stereotype Whites' believed to 
be ascribed to them by Aboriginals. The current research however, focuses upon a single 
attribute (anti-outgroup prejudice or ingroup favouritism). The diagnostic ratio method 
can be a useful measure to determine the inclusion of an attribute in a meta-stereotype 
(e.g., Vorauer et aI., 1998). However, the focus of the current research was to examine 
meta-stereotypes referring to one specific attribute, not to determine which of many 
attributes was part of a global meta-stereotype. The diagnostic ratio method then, was 
unnecessary and not suitable for the purposes of the current research (i.e., to examine a 
"piece" of a meta-stereotype likely consisting of many attributes). Thus, the current 
research did not use the diagnostic ratio method (see also Mendez et aI., 2007), but rather 
measured meta-stereotypes by examining mean meta-stereotype ratings given on 
response scales. In addition to being more suitable for the current purposes, this method 
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is less contaminated by perceptions about other groups than the diagnostic ratio method. 
Self versus group. When referring to meta-stereotypes, an important distinction to 
be made is the distinction between meta-stereotypes applying to one's group, and meta-
stereotypes applying to one's self. Meta-stereotypes by definition refer to beliefs held 
about one's group, "a person's beliefs regarding the stereotype that out-group members 
hold about his or her own group" (emphasis added; Vorauer et aI., 1998, p.917). This is 
what is most commonly referred to by the word "meta-stereotype." However, one can 
also interpret the stereotype an out-group holds about the self personally. So-called 
"meta-stereotypes of self' can be examined in two ways, which largely depend on 
wording. The first type is the stereotype one believes an outgroup holds about him/her 
personally as a member of hislher ingroup (i.e., what stereotypes might a Black person 
hold about you personally, as a White person?). The second type is the stereotype one 
believes an outgroup holds about him/her personally as an individual rather than a group 
member (Mendez et aI., 2007) (i.e., what stereotypes might a Black person hold about 
you personally?). Although the differences between these two types of self-meta-
stereotypes are slight, it is possible that they operate differently (as suggested by Mendez 
et aI., 2007), and both were investigated by the current research. Thus, meta-stereotypes 
can be beliefs regarding stereotypes held by an outgroup about an ingroup, an individual 
as a group member, or an individual independently. Mendez et aI. (2007) call for research 
on the distinction between these differing types of meta-stereotypes. 
For clarity purposes, in keeping with Mendez et aI. (2007), I will describe: (a) 
'meta-stereotype of in group , as meta-stereotypes referring to the ingroup; (b) 'meta-
stereotype of self as ingroup member' as meta-stereotypes referring to individuals as 
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group members; and (c) 'meta-stereotype of self as individual' as meta-stereotypes 
referring to individuals, independent of group membership (see Appendix A). It has been 
found that meta-stereotypes of the ingroup tend to be similar to meta-stereotypes of self 
as ingroup member in that those who hold a negative meta-stereotype of the ingroup tend 
to also hold a negative meta-stereotype of the self as ingroup member (Mendez et aI., 
2007). This finding needs to be further investigated, though. Meta-stereotypes of self as 
individual have not been investigated in any studies of which I am aware. Mendez et al. 
(2007) predict that meta-stereotypes of self as individual would likely be similar to meta-
stereotypes of self as ingroup member, but recognize that differences are possible. The 
current research investigated and compared meta-stereotype of ingroup and meta-
stereotype of self as individual in Study 1, and in Study 2 investigated and compared all 
three types of meta-stereotypes mentioned. 
Another important distinction is that meta-stereotypes may consist of the 
perceived beliefs held by an entire out-group, or by a single out-group member. During a 
one-on-one intergroup interaction, the perceived beliefs of only one out-group member 
are typically inferred. Vorauer et al. (1998) refer to meta-stereotypes regarding one 
specific out-group member's perceived beliefs as 'personalized meta-stereotypes'. 
Personalized meta-stereotypes can be anyone of the three types mentioned above (meta-
stereotypes of ingroup, meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member, or meta-stereotypes 
of self as individual). Personalized meta-stereotypes tend to be different from meta-
stereotypes consisting of the perceived beliefs of an entire out-group in that the person 
rating the personalized meta-stereotype will (or perceives s/he will) actually interact with 
the out-group member whose thoughts slhe is inferring, and be better able to infer andlor 
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influence this out-group member's beliefs (see Vorauer et aI., 1998). The current research 
investigated both personalized meta-stereotypes (Study 2) and those based on the 
apparent beliefs of an entire out-group (Studies 1 & 2). 
Meta-stereotypes (of ingroup) as formed through outgroup projection. As 
mentioned, meta-stereotypes refer to the stereotypes that one believes an outgroup holds 
concerning one's ingroup. Previous research has suggested that in some cases, meta-
stereotypes can be formed through processes of outgroup social projection. This 
possibility is derived from Krueger's (1996) work. Recall that as part of his projection 
study, Black and White participants rated their respective ingroups on several attributes 
from the perspective of the other group. To clarify, Blacks rated the average responses 
made by Whites about Blacks, and Whites rated the average responses about Whites 
made by Blacks. Krueger found that both Blacks and Whites believed they were viewed 
more negatively by the outgroup than they actually were. Although Krueger did not label 
it as such, participants expected to be negatively stereotyped by their outgroup, otherwise 
known as a "meta-stereotype." Krueger believed this provided evidence for the outgroup 
projection of in group favouritism (at the level of intergroup target category,4 see Judd et 
aI., 2005). Although he did not find consistent evidence of ingroup favouritism on behalf 
of each group, he assumed that both groups favoured their ingroup but were not aware of 
it. Thus, Krueger asserted that because White and Black participants demonstrate ingroup 
favouritism, these participants assumed that their outgroups (Blacks and Whites, 
respectively) favoured their own ingroups (Blacks and Whites) as well. For instance, a 
White participant expected her outgroup (Blacks) to rate their outgroup (Whites) 
4 An example of intergroup target category level outgroup projection: "the more I favour my ingroup 
(Whites), the more I believe my outgroup (Blacks) favours their ingroup (Blacks)." 
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negatively because they rate their own ingroup (Blacks) positively. 
Although this explanation is compelling (albeit complex), I contend that Krueger 
did not illustrate projection of in group favouritism here due to a lack of personal ratings 
of in group favouritism on behalf of each group. Nevertheless, Krueger's explanation is 
certainly viable. It is possible that people expect their group to be viewed in terms of 
negative stereotypes by the outgroup because they themselves view the outgroup in terms 
of negative stereotypes (intergroup target category level outgroup projection, see Judd et 
aI., 2005). Another possibility is that people expect their group to be viewed in terms of 
negative stereotypes by the outgroup because they themselves view the ingroup in terms 
of negative stereotypes (specific category level outgroup projection,S see Judd et aI., 
2005). In other words, the more negatively one sees one's ingroup (e.g., Whites), the 
more negatively one expects the outgroup (e.g., Blacks) will view his/her group (e.g., 
Whites) as well. This explanation is only applicable to stereotypes that are likely to be 
ascribed to both the outgroup and the ingroup however, which is not the case for all 
stereotypes. For example, it is likely that a White person would ascribe the stereotype 
'aggressive' to Blacks, but not to Whites, given that this stereotype is commonly ascribed 
to Blacks (e.g., Devine, 1989) rather than Whites. One stereotype that does meet this 
criterion, however, is the stereotype "prejudiced." The attribute "prejudiced" is not 
unique to either group, and thus could be ascribed to Whites or Blacks. 
In the current context then, it is possible that Whites believe that Blacks view 
Whites as prejudiced (hold a 'prejudiced' meta-stereotype) because Whites believe that 
Blacks are prejudiced ("I (a White person) think Blacks (my outgroup) are prejudiced, so 
5 Example of specific category level projection: "the more I favour Whites (my ingroup) the more I believe 
my outgroup (Blacks) favours Whites". 
Blacks must think: Whites (their outgroup) are prejudiced"), representing outgroup 
projection at the level of intergroup target category (see Judd et aI., 2005), consistent 
with Krueger (1996). Or, Whites might believe Blacks view Whites to be prejudiced 
because Whites believe that Whites are prejudiced ("I think: Whites are prejudiced, so 
Blacks must think: Whites are prejudiced as well"), representing outgroup projection at 
the level of specific category (see Judd et aI., 2005). Thus, some meta-stereotypes, 
including the one investigated by the current research may develop through outgroup 
social projection. The current research examined this possibility. 
Meta-stereotypes in the Context of Intergroup Relations 
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Whereas studies of social projection take place in various domains, meta-
stereotypes are always studied in the context of intergroup relations. A brief description 
of several influential studies regarding meta-stereotyping in this context is important. The 
study performed by Krueger (1996) described previously foreshadowed meta-stereotype 
literature. As mentioned, Kruger's investigation of "projective ingroup bias" can be 
interpreted in terms of meta-stereotypes. He found that both Blacks and Whites believed 
they were viewed unfavourably in terms of the attributes rated by their outgroups, 
implying that both groups perceived that they were negatively stereotyped. This study 
served as an important stepping stone for meta-stereotype research. 
Vorauer et aI. (1998) conducted three influential studies on meta-stereotypes. In 
their fIrst study, Whites rated their beliefs regarding Aboriginals' stereotypes of Whites, 
fInding 36 stereotypes that Whites considered Aboriginals to hold about Whites. The 
major themes of these stereotypes included egocentrism, lack of feeling, high status, 
ambition, and prejudice. These results determined that Whites held a shared overall 
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negative meta-stereotype involving several traits regarding how Aboriginals perceive 
Whites. The meta-stereotype was compared to the other-stereotype (i.e., Whites' beliefs 
about Aboriginals, see Appendix A). It was found that three traits (prejudiced, 
insensitive, and disrespectful) were included in both the meta-stereotype and the other-
stereotype. The meta-stereotype was also compared to Whites' views regarding Whites. 
This examination revealed that Whites believed Aboriginals viewed Whites more 
negatively than Whites themselves viewed their group on the majority of statistically 
significant traits compared. 
In their second study, Vorauer et al. (1998) investigated meta-stereotypes in terms 
of an anticipated intergroup interaction. That is, they examined Whites' meta-stereotype 
of self as ingroup member based on the beliefs of one anticipated Aboriginal interaction 
partner. Each participant rated the expectations that their Aboriginal partner would have 
about herlhim according to her/his racial group on both open- and closed-ended 
measures. Overall, Whites indicated that they would be viewed by their Aboriginal 
partner in terms of more negative than positive traits. Also, over 50% of participants 
expected their partner would view them to be unfair, egocentric, prejudiced, selfish, 
closed-minded, and arrogant. Thus, this study determined that Whites expected to be 
viewed in terms of the meta-stereotype by an individual outgroup member. Also, it was 
found that the more participants expected to be viewed in terms of the meta-stereotype, 
the less they expected to enjoy the interaction, and the more they expected to experience 
negative emotions. Vorauer et at's Study 3, which involved the exchange of video 
messages between each participant and an Aboriginal or White participant, provided 
similar results. Results new to Study 3 indicated that highly prejudiced Whites expected 
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to be viewed more in terms of the meta-stereotype with an Aboriginal partner than a 
White partner, and that participants who felt stereotyped reported decreased self-esteem 
and self-concept clarity, illustrating that feeling personally stereotyped threatens the self-
concept. 
Vorauer et al.'s (1998) studies were the first influential studies on meta-
stereotypes. These studies established that Whites hold a negative meta-stereotype 
regarding how their group is viewed by Aboriginals, that Whites expect to be viewed in 
terms of this meta-stereotype prior to an interaction with an Aboriginal person, that 
prejudiced Whites perceive that they are stereotyped by Aboriginals, and that feeling 
personally stereotyped may lead to negative intergroup contact expectations and self-
concept threat. 
Similar to Vorauer et al. (1998), Vorauer and Kumhyr (2001) found White 
individuals (especially those high in prejudice) expect personally to be viewed negatively 
by Aboriginals. Judd et al. (2005) found that when comparing Whites' responses with 
those of several different outgroups (Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks), participants 
consistentll reported that outgroups would view the participant's ingroup more 
negatively in terms of intergroup attributes and stereotypicality than their own group, 
suggesting that participants thought that their group was negatively stereotyped by their 
respective outgroups. Mendez et al. (2007) found that Spanish nationals expected to be 
viewed by immigrants in terms of stereotypes. More specifically, they found individuals 
who held negative meta-perceptions (i.e., meta-stereotypes) of the participant's ingroup 
also held a negative meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member, and those who viewed 
themselves as prototypical members of their group held more negative meta-stereotypes. 
6 With the exception of one finding (see Judd et aI., 2005) 
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Additionally, evidence of meta-stereotypes held by minority groups has been cited by 
previous research (see Shelton, Richeson, & Vorauer, 2006). Overall, these studies 
illustrate a tendency for group members to expect to be viewed in terms of their ingroup' s 
stereotypes by outgroups. 
Negative Impact of Meta-stereotypes 
Although meta-stereotypes can be useful to people in satisfying a 'need for 
prediction' (Vorauer et aI., 1998), they do have the potential to be quite problematic. 
Similar to the projection of intergroup attitudes, holding a negative meta-stereotype about 
the perceived intergroup attitudes of one's self or one's group may also serve as a means 
to perpetuate and justify prejudice. Further, holding the meta-stereotype that one's self or 
group is viewed to be prejudiced can have a negative impact on intergroup contact, in 
turn perpetuating prejudice. 
Prejudice justification and perpetuation. Meta-stereotypes have the potential to 
justify or perpetuate prejudice. If a person believes one's self or one's group to be viewed 
negatively by a group (e.g., viewed to be highly prejudiced), one might feel that this 
justifies viewing and treating that group negatively. This meta-stereotype could also lead 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy (e.g., Hilton & Darley, 1991), whereby the person actually 
does behave in a prejudiced manner, perpetuating prejudice. Thus, prejudice can be 
viewed as a retaliation in response to the perception that one is stereotyped by a group 
("They hate us, therefore we hate them"). 
Also, meta-stereotypes induce anxiety (Vorauer et aI., 1998, see below for a more 
detailed discussion), which can encourage people to view outgroup members in 
stereotypical terms. Experiencing anxiety can interfere with information processing and 
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impair cognitive capacity (Wilder & Shapiro, 1989). Thus, people may have the ability to 
access only stereotypical information, unable to process alternatives. When people feel 
threatened, as can occur with meta-stereotypes (Shelton et aI., 2006), they are more likely 
to view the outgroup in terms of negative stereotypes (see Fein & Spencer, 1997; Kunda 
& Sinclair, 1999). This is another means by which meta-stereotypes can perpetuate 
prejudice. 
Impact on intergroup contact. Intergroup interactions are frequently negative. 
Often people expect such interactions to be anxiety-provoking (Plant, 2004; Stephan & 
Stephan, 1985, 1989) and react negatively to contact (e.g., Britt, Boniecki, Vescio, 
Biernat, & Brown, 1996; Butz & Plant, 2006; Devine, Evett, & Vasques-Suson, 1996). 
These expectations can arise out of several types of concerns, including meta-stereotypes 
and other-stereotypes. Whereas meta-stereotypes consist of one's beliefs regarding the 
outgroup's thoughts about one's self and/or group, other-stereotypes refer to one's 
perceived beliefs about the out-group (Vorauer et al., 1998), commonly referred to as 
"stereotypes." 
There is some question as to whether the most negative impact on intergroup 
interaction arises from meta-stereotypes or other-stereotypes. The current research 
focuses on the characteristic "prejudiced" which has been found to be included both in 
Whites' meta- and other-stereotypes (Vorauer et aI., 1998). People may expect intergroup 
interactions to be negative based on concerns about being viewed in a prejudiced manner 
(Butz & Plant, 2006; Shelton, 2003). In other words, they may expect to be viewed 
according to the "prejudiced" meta-stereotype. Alternatively, people may expect 
intergroup interactions to be negative based on concerns that the outgroup does not wish 
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to engage in intergroup contact (Plant & Devine, 2003; Shelton & Richeson, 2005), 
perhaps due to the other-stereotype that the out-group is "prejudiced." Vorauer et al. 
(1998) suggest (but do not experimentally test the potential) that meta-stereotypes have a 
greater influence on intergroup interactions than other-stereotypes. The current research 
addressed this important assertion. 
It may be the case that, depending on the group in question, meta-stereotypes and 
other-stereotypes differ in their impact on whether the interaction is construed negatively. 
Perhaps majority groups are most concerned with what others allegedly think of them 
(i.e., meta-stereotypes), whereas minority groups are more concerned with being a target 
of prejudice (i.e., other-stereotypes; see Shelton, 2003). Indeed, majority group members 
tend to be aware that the minority group may view them to be prejudiced (Vorauer et aI., 
1998,2000) and minority group members tend to be aware ofthe possibility that majority 
groups may view their group negatively (Miller & Meyer, 1998). Shelton (2003) found 
that Whites (majority group members) who tried to appear non-prejudiced (i.e., the 
prejudiced meta-stereotype was salient) rated their interaction with a Black person more 
negatively than Whites who were not instructed to appear non-prejudiced. Additionally, 
Blacks who were told that their White interaction partner was prejudiced (i.e., the other-
stereotype was salient) displayed more anxious nonverbal behaviour (fidgeting), but 
enjoyed the interaction more7 than Blacks not given this information. 
The current research (Study 2) compared the potential impact of meta-stereotypes 
and other-stereotypes on an anticipated intergroup interaction. It is possible that when 
people believe they are viewed negatively by a group in terms of meta- or other-
7 This finding that Blacks enjoyed the interaction more was accounted for by several explanations, the most 
plausible being that when expecting to interact with a prejudiced partner, Blacks may have employed social 
skills in an attempt to have a successful interaction (see Shelton, 2003). 
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stereotypes, this may lead to negative emotional reactions toward the outgroup and 
outgroup interactions (Vorauer et aI., 1998). These negative emotional reactions (e.g., 
intergroup anxiety) may in tum lead to outgroup avoidance, rudeness and condescension 
(Blair, Park, & Bachelor, 2003), damaging intergroup interactions and perpetuating 
prejudice. As Vorauer et al. (1998) discuss, when one feels stereotyped by an outgroup, 
avoidance of the outgroup may result due to anxiety (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 
2003; Plant & Devine, 2003). When such contact is unavoidable, interactions are likely to 
be hostile. 
It is particularly troubling that these types of meta-stereotypes can lead to 
avoidance of intergroup contact, as intergroup contact is well established as a key means 
to improve intergroup relations and reduce prejudice (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). 
When people avoid intergroup interactions based on meta-stereotypes, prejudice is 
perpetuated. Shelton and Richeson (2005) found that Whites and Blacks both wanted 
more contact with their respective outgroups but believed their outgroups did not 
reciprocate this desire. This is a prime example of the danger of meta-stereotypes: one 
may think s/he is viewed negatively by a group, and assuming that members of that group 
do not want contact with himiher, avoid members of that group, even when s/he desires 
contact. Therefore, meta-stereotypes may lead to avoidance of desired contact that could 
potentially be very beneficial for intergroup relations; this is unfortunate and ironic. 
Thus, meta-stereotypes may lead to prejudice justification, the application of 
negative stereotypes to outgroups, negative emotional reactions regarding intergroup 
contact, and the avoidance of intergroup contact, all of which are detrimental to 
intergroup relations, and can also contribute to the maintenance of prejudice. 
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THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
The current research centred on perceptions of ingroup (and outgroup) prejudice, 
and perceptions of outgroup views of ingroup prejudice. Specifically, the current research 
explored the social projection of intergroup attitudes (essentially, perceptions of being 
prejudiced or not), and the meta-stereotype of being viewed to hold negative intergroup 
attitudes (i.e., anti-outgroup bias or pro-ingroup bias) by the outgroup. As stated 
previously, few studies have jointly examined social projection and meta-stereotypes, but 
it is meaningful to do so, especially in an intergroup domain. Each reflects a means to 
infer the thoughts of others, and both can potentially have a negative impact on 
intergroup relations. This research investigates these processes in the context of White-
Black relations. 
Study 1 
Study 1 served as a preliminary investigation of social projection and meta-
stereotypes in the context of White-Black intergroup relations. It primarily investigated 
whether White Canadians: (a) project intergroup attitudes onto their ingroup (Whites) 
and/or their outgroup (Blacks); (b) hold a shared meta-stereotype that their group 
(Whites) is viewed by Blacks to be prejudiced; and (c) believe that Blacks viewed them 
personally to be prejudiced (i.e., whether they believe the meta-stereotype applies to the 
self). Study 1 also investigated: (d) the relationship between the projection of intergroup 
attitudes and prejudiced meta-stereotypes (never previously examined), and (e) several 
potential correlates of each construct. 
Hypotheses 
Projection 
It was expected that Whites would project their intergroup attitudes onto fellow 
Whites. This prediction was based in previously stated evidence that people project basic 
attitudes (see Mullen et aI., 1985) and specific intergroup beliefs (Judd et aI., 2005; 
Krueger, 1996; Strube & Rahimi, 2006). It was expected that if Whites tend to project 
specific intergroup beliefs (e.g., poor, aggressive), they would also project general 
intergroup attitudes (e.g., prejudice). This has only been established in unpublished work 
using an American sample (Hodson et aI., 2000). It also was expected that Whites would 
project their intergroup attitudes onto Blacks, given evidence that outgroup projection has 
been found to exist in intergroup domains (Hodson et aI., 2000; Judd et aI., 2005; 
Krueger, 1996). Outgroup projection was expected to be slightly weaker than ingroup 
projection (see meta-analysis on general attitudes by Robbins & Krueger, 2005). 
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Meta-stereotypes 
It was expected that Whites would hold a shared negative stereotype that they are 
viewed negatively (i.e., as prejudiced) by Blacks. This prediction was based on evidence 
that people generally expect to be viewed negatively by outgroup members (e.g., 
Krueger, 1996). Also, it has been found that Whites believe they are viewed to be 
prejudiced by Aboriginals (Vorauer et aI, 1998), and negatively in other intergroup terms 
by a number of other groups, including Blacks (Judd et aI., 2005). Thus, it was predicted 
Whites would believe this stereotype to be held by Blacks. With regard to meta-
stereotypes of self as individual, it was expected that Whites who held negative meta-
stereotypes of ingroup would also hold negative meta-stereotypes of self as individual. It 
was expected, based on the suggestion by Mendez et al. (2007), that if one believes that 
her/his group is perceived to be prejudiced, one will also expect that s/he will be 
perceived to be prejudiced. This potential has been unexplored previously. 
Relation between Projection of Intergroup Attitudes and Prejudiced Meta-stereotypes. 
As stated previously, social projection and meta-stereotypes are processes people 
use to infer the thoughts of others. It is possible that meta-stereotypes are the product of 
social projection. Previous research (e.g., Krueger, 1996) has led to the suggestion that 
meta-stereotypes may form through outgroup projection, specifically outgroup projection 
at the level of intergroup target category (see Judd et aI., 2005). I extend this suggestion 
by hypothesizing that prejudiced meta-stereotypes of ingroup are formed via both the 
ingroup and outgroup projection (both intergroup target and specific category levels) of 
intergroup attitudes. 
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As mentioned, it was expected that participants would project their intergroup 
attitudes onto their ingroup. To illustrate, the more (or less) prejudiced one views the self, 
the more (or less) prejudiced one views the ingroup, reflecting ingroup projection (e.g., "I 
[a White person] am highly prejudiced, and Whites are highly prejudiced too"). Upon 
establishing (through ingroup projection) that one's ingroup is highly prejudiced (or not), 
one may subsequently view his/her outgroup to view their ingroup as high (or low) in 
prejudice (i.e., form a meta-stereotype). This meta-stereotype rating would reflect 
outgroup projection (e.g., "The more (less) I view Whites to be prejudiced, the more 
(less) prejudiced Blacks see Whites"). 
It was also expected that paJiicipants would project their intergroup attitudes onto 
their outgroup. To illustrate, the more (or less) prejudiced one views the self, the more (or 
less) prejudiced one views the outgroup. This reflects outgroup projection (e.g., "I 
[White] am highly prejudiced, and Blacks are highly prejudiced too"). So, after 
perceiving (through outgroup proj ection) that one's outgroup is highly prejudiced (or 
not), one would then view herlhis outgroup to view their ingroup as high (or low) in 
prejudice (meta-stereotype). This reflects outgroup projection (e.g., "The more (less) I 
view Blacks [my outgroup] to be prejudiced, the more prejudiced Blacks see Whites 
[their outgroup ]"). 
Thus, it was predicted that prejudiced meta-stereotypes would be derived from 
ingroup projection and outgroup projection (at the level of specific category) of 
intergroup attitudes operating in combination with two-step outgroup projection at the 
level of intergroup target category.8 This hypothesized pattern is presented in Figure 1. 
8 This hypothesis refers only to meta-stereotypes of ingroup; the model contains only group-relevant 
perceptions which are clearly not as relevant to meta-stereotypes of self as individual. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized relationship between projection of intergroup attitudes and 
prejudiced meta-stereotypes among Whites. Path 1 represents ingroup projection, Path 2 
represents outgroup projection at the level of specific category (e.g., "Blacks see Whites 
as I see Whites"), and Paths 3 and 4 represent outgroup projection at the level of 
intergroup target category (e.g., Path 3 = "Blacks' perceptions about their outgroup are 
similar to my outgroup perceptions"; Path 4 = "Blacks perceive their outgroup as I 
perceive my outgroup). 
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Potential Correlates 
Several correlates of ingroup social projection of intergroup attitudes and the 
meta-stereotype that one's self or group is viewed to be prejudiced were examined. Many 
were examined for exploratory purposes, but several speculative hypotheses follow. 
Prejudice. Personal levels of prejudice were expected to be correlated positively 
with both the projection of intergroup attitudes and the meta-stereotype that one or one's 
group is viewed negatively in terms of intergroup attitudes. It was speculated that those 
higher in prejudice would project intergroup attitudes more strongly, as highly prejudiced 
people have the most to justify and "normalize", and would hence project their intergroup 
attitudes to a greater extent. A recent study found that projection of intergroup beliefs 
was higher for those high in social dominance orientation and right wing 
authoritarianism, two well-established correlates of prejudice (Strube & Rahimi, 2006). 
With regard to meta-stereotypes, it was thought that people who were higher in 
prejudice would expect themselves and their group to be viewed more negatively in terms 
of prejudice by the outgroup. Despite the hypothesis that this meta-stereotype was 
expected to apply overall, regardless of personal prejudice level, those higher in prejudice 
were expected to hold more negative meta-stereotypes. This contrasts with Vorauer et 
al. ' s (1998) finding that those low in prejudice held a more negative ingroup meta-
stereotype than those high in prejudice (they argue due to ingroup identification level, see 
below), but is in line with Vorauer et al.'s (1998) finding that highly prejudiced people do 
hold negative meta-stereotypes and are expected to be viewed personally by the outgroup 
in terms of negative meta-stereotypes. As mentioned above though, Vorauer et al. ' s 
(1998) research involved a meta-stereotype that was made up of a large number of 
37 
attributes, whereas the current research examines only one attribute, being prejudiced. 
Those low in prejudice may expect their group to be viewed negatively overall (i.e., rate a 
meta-stereotype referring to several attributes negatively) as Vorauer et ai. (1998) found, 
but when referring specifically to prejudiced meta-stereotypes, it is predicted that those 
more highly prejudiced will expect the self and group to be perceived this way, as would 
be expected intuitively. 
Ingroup identification. People naturally differ in their level of identification with 
their ingroup (e.g., Hodson & Esses, 2002; Hodson, Harry, & Mitchell, 2009; Spears, 
Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997), even minimal ingroups (e.g., Hodson, Dovidio, & Esses, 
2003). The extent to which one identifies with hislher ingroup is likely to have an effect 
on both projection and meta-stereotypes. As stated previously, there tends to be more 
evidence for projection of basic attitudes to the ingroup than the outgroup. People tend to 
think that they share similar perceptions with those to whom they are similar in 
characteristics such as age, sex, and ethnicity (Vorauer et aI., 1998), which may explain 
why ingroup projection tends to be stronger than outgroup projection (Robbins & 
Krueger, 2005). Thus, it is hypothesized that those who identify more (vs. less) with their 
ingroup will display stronger ingroup projection and weaker outgroup projection (for 
related findings see Smith & Henry, 1996). 
Vorauer et ai. (1998) explained their fmdings regarding prejudice level and meta-
stereotypes as a function of identification. The authors found that those low in prejudice 
held a more negative meta-stereotype and reasoned (but did not test) that this was due to 
their lack of identification with the ingroup. Less prejudiced people were thought to have 
little difficultly rating the ingroup to be perceived negatively because they presumably 
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did not identify with that group. However, Vorauer et al. (1998) did fmd that highly 
prejudiced people held negative meta-stereotypes Gust not as negative as those low in 
prejudice) and expected to be viewed personally by the outgroup in terms of negative 
meta-stereotypes. The authors suggested ingroup identification may have played a role in 
these highly prejudiced people's negative meta-stereotypes of self. This is consistent with 
the suggestion of Frey and Tropp (2006) that those who are more highly identified with 
their group will particularly expect to be personally viewed in terms of group 
membership. Similarly, Mendez et al. (2007) found that those high in prototypicality 
(those who view themselves as prototypical members of their ingroup), a construct 
related to identification, held more negative meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup member. 
It was predicted that both types of meta-stereotypes investigated (meta-stereotype 
of ingroup and meta-stereotype of self as individual) would be positively correlated with 
ingroup identification (i.e., the more one identifies with the ingroup, the more negative 
the meta-stereotype). This prediction was consistent with research presented above 
referring to meta-stereotypes of self, but not meta-stereotypes of ingroup. Regardless, this 
prediction was made regarding meta-stereotypes of in group given: (a) differences 
between the meta-stereotype investigated currently versus those investigated by Vorauer 
et al. (1998), and (b) that the hypothesis by Vorauer et al. (1998) regarding ingroup 
identification was not tested. My prediction is more intuitive, because people highly 
identified with their ingroup should be more sensitive to the meta-stereotypes the ingroup 
holds about how the outgroup views them. 
Social dominance orientation. Social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) is characterized by the support of group dominance, 
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social hierarchy, and inequality and is considered to be one of "the strongest individual-
difference predictors of prejudice" (Duckitt, 2005, p. 402). Due to its strong relation with 
prejudice, SDO was expected to relate to social projection of intergroup attitudes and 
meta-stereotypes. Strube and Rahimi (2006) found that the most projection of intergroup 
beliefs occurred for individuals with both high SDO and right wing authoritarianism. As 
noted by those authors, negative beliefs regarding outgroups are likely maintained 
through social projection, especially for those who are most disposed to prejudice. Thus, I 
also predicted that those high in SDO would be likely to display more projection of 
intergroup attitudes. There is no research available concerning the relation between meta-
stereotypes and SDO. However, on the basis of the strong relation between SDO and 
prejudice, it was expected that the relation between meta-stereotypes and SDO would be 
similar to that expected between meta-stereotypes and prejudice. Whites higher in SDO 
were expected to possess more negative meta-stereotypes. 
Right-wing authoritarianism. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 
1996, 1998) is characterized by submission to established authority, strong adherence to 
social convention endorsed by said authority, and aggression toward those who disobey 
convention. RWA is generally considered the second strongest individual-difference 
predictor of prejudice (Duckitt, 2005). Those higher in RW A demonstrate greater social 
projection of stereotypic traits (Strube & Rahimi, 2006). Thus, those higher (vs. lower) in 
RW A were expected to demonstrate more projection of intergroup attitudes. There is no 
research available concerning the relation between meta-stereotypes and RWA, but 
findings similar to those predicted for SDO were expected based on the similar relations 
between RW A and prejudice and SDO and prejudice. 
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Prejudice justification. People differ in the extent to which they view prejudice as 
justified. People may view prejudice as justified because outgroups are threatening, 
prejudice is beyond their control, or is a 'fact oflife' (Esses & Hodson, 2006; Hodson & 
Esses, 2005). People may also justify prejudice based on the beliefs of others, such as the 
perceived intergroup beliefs of ingroup members or outgroup members (Hodson et al., 
2000). Thus, the projection of intergroup attitudes and meta-stereotypes may be related to 
prejudice justification. 
Based on the results of an unpublished study by Hodson et al. (2000) it was 
expected that people who projected negative intergroup attitudes more (to the ingroup) 
would explicitly justify their prejudicial beliefs based on the beliefs of the ingroup. 
Similarly, it was expected that those who believed their group (or themselves) was 
viewed negatively by the outgroup (i.e., projected to the outgroup or held negative meta-
stereotypes) would justify their prejudices based on the perceived beliefs of the outgroup. 
Thus, projection and meta-stereotypes (both types) were expected to be correlated 
positively with a general measure of prejudice justification. 
Outgroup avoidance. People vary in desires to engage in outgroup contact. 
Specifically, people who are high in intergroup anxiety and prejudice may be motivated 
to avoid intergroup interactions (Dovidio et aI., 2003; Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Goffman, 
1963; Plant & Devine, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Thus, one who avoids outgroup 
contact is more likely to be prejudiced and project intergroup attitudes more strongly. 
Thus, a positive correlation between outgroup avoidance and projection was predicted. 
More relevant IS the relation between meta-stereotypes and outgroup avoidance. 
As mentioned above, anxiety is likely to result as a product of negative meta-stereotypes, 
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and anxiety is likely to lead to avoidance of intergroup contact. Thus, a positive 
correlation was expected between outgroup avoidance and negative meta-stereotypes, and 
for exploratory purposes it was examined whether this relation was mediated by 
intergroup anxiety (see below). Previous research has found that those who hold more 
negative meta-stereotypes are less interested in intergroup contact (Mendez et aI., 2007), 
suggesting that more negative meta-stereotypes in tum, are likely to be associated with 
avoidance of intergroup contact. 
Intergroup anxiety. Intergroup anxiety refers to the apprehension people may 
experience during (or at the prospect of) an interaction with an outgroup member( s) 
(Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Intergroup anxiety predicts negative attitudes toward groups 
(e.g., Stephan et aI., 2002), such as prejudice. Given that people sometimes project more 
strongly in an effort to reduce general life anxieties (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Schimel, 1999), it was expected that intergroup anxiety would be related 
to projection in the present context. Although no research has focused on social 
projection and intergroup anxiety specifically, it was expected that those higher in 
intergroup anxiety would more strongly project intergroup attitudes, as those anxious 
about intergroup interactions may project intergroup attitudes onto their ingroup to ease 
tensions. Moreover, people higher in intergroup anxiety are more likely to be prejudiced 
and higher in SDO (see Hodson, 2008), both expected to be linked with increased 
projection. Thus, predictions regarding intergroup anxiety and projection parallel those 
regarding prejudice and projection. 
Intergroup anxiety is cited in meta-stereotype research as a consequence of the 
perception that one (or one's group) is viewed negatively by an outgroup (Frey & Tropp, 
2006; Vorauer et al. 1998). Mendez et al. (2007) found that those who expected to be 
viewed negatively by the outgroup reported greater intergroup anxiety. Vorauer and 
colleagues (1998) suggested that negative meta-stereotypes create intergroup anxiety 
which in tum leads to hostility during or avoidance of intergroup interactions, but this 
possibility has yet to be directly tested. It was predicted that the more negative one's 
meta-stereotypes (both types), the more intergroup anxiety one would possess. For 
exploratory purposes, it was also investigated whether the relation between meta-
stereotypes and outgroup avoidance was mediated by intergroup anxiety, addressing 
whether those with negative meta-stereotypes avoid outgroups because of increased 
intergroup anxiety. 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-six Brock University students participated in the study for 
participation marks or monetary payment (5 dollars). Three participants (two Middle 
Eastern and one Hispanic) who did not categorize themselves as White were excluded 
from the analyses given the nature of the study, leaving a final sample of 133 (64% 
female). Participants ranged from age 18-31 (M= 19.44, SD = 2.21). 
Materials 
Projection (see Appendix B.3). Projection was measured using the standard social 
projection paradigm (Marks & Miller, 1987). To measure ingroup projection of prejudice, 
participants were first asked to indicate whether they were prejudiced against Blacks on a 
dichotomous measure (yes/no response). Participants also rated the percentage (0-100%) 
of Whites they believed to be prejudiced against Blacks (i.e., ingroup's anti-outgroup 
prejudice measure). Based on Ames (2004b), a continuous bias acknowledgment measure 
of prejudice analogous to the yes/no measure was also included, by which participants 
rated the extent to which they considered themselves to be prejudiced against Blacks on a 
scale ranging from not at all (0) to very much (10). To facilitate the measurement of 
outgroup projection, participants rated the percentage (0-100%) of Blacks they believed 
to be prejudiced against Whites (outgroup's anti-outgroup prejudice measure). To create 
a "projection" index for each participant, an absolute difference score was obtained 
whereby the continuous measure of bias acknowledgement was subtracted from ingroup 
anti-outgroup prejudice (converted such that both measures were on the same 0-10 scale). 
Using this difference score, scores of zero would indicate perfect projection, and scores 
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deviating significantly from zero would indicate a lack of projection. An outgroup 
projection index was also computed (whereby the continuous measure of bias 
acknowledgement was subtracted from the outgroup measure of anti-out group prejudice), 
for interest purposes. 
Meta-stereotypes (see Appendix B.4). To measure the meta-stereotype of in group, 
participants rated the extent to which they believed the average Black person views 
Whites to be prejudiced against Blacks on a scale ranging from not at all (0) to very much 
(10), such that higher scores meant more negative meta-stereotypes. To measure the 
meta-stereotype of self as individual, participants rated the extent to which Black people 
view participants personally to be prejudiced against Blacks on the same scale. 
Prejudice relevant measures (see Appendix B.5). To measure personal levels of 
prejudice, participants completed the Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay, Hardee, 
& Batts, 1981 [e.g., "Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in North 
America"]). Previous research has found the scale to be internally consistent (e.g., 
Cronbach's a = .85 in Plant & Devine, 1998) and McConahay et al. (1981) reported 6 
week test-retest reliability correlations for this scale to be .87 and .93. This 7-item 
measure uses a Likert-type response scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree), with 1 item reverse scored. Higher scores on this scale indicated more 
prejudice toward Blacks. The continuous bias acknowledgement measure (see projection 
materials) can also be considered an alternative prejudice measure. 
Ingroup identification (see Appendix B.6). To measure identification with one's 
ingroup, an identification scale was adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992). This was 
originally a subscale of a larger scale which demonstrated good internal consistency 
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(Cronbach's a = .73 to .80, and the 6 week test-retest reliability correlation of the 
identification subscale was .68 (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). This 4-item measure uses a 
response scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with 2 items 
reverse scored. Higher scores on this scale indicated greater identification. A sample item 
from the scale is "Being White is an important reflection of who I am." 
Social dominance orientation (see Appendix B. 7). This variable was measured 
using the 16-item Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et at, 1994, original 
Cronbach's a = .83, original 3 month test-retest reliability correlation = .81) which ranges 
from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (strongly agree). Eight items are reverse scored, and 
higher scores indicate higher SDO. A sample item from this scale is "Some groups of 
people are just more worthy than others." 
Right-wing authoritarianism (see Appendix B.8). This variable was measured with 
the 12-item shortened RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1996, original Cronbach's a = .90, 
originall week test-retest reliability correlation = .95). This scale ranged from 1 (do not 
agree at all) to 7 (strongly agree), with 6 items reverse scored. Higher scores on this scale 
indicated higher R W A. A sample item from this scale is "Our country will be destroyed 
someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fibre and 
traditional beliefs." 
Prejudice justification (see Appendix B.9). Justification of prejudice was 
measured in three ways. To measure the extent to which participants justified their 
intergroup attitudes based on the beliefs of Whites, a I-item measure was used (e.g., "To 
what extent do the attitudes held by Whites validate or explain your own attitude 
(positive or negative) toward Blacks?"), on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very 
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much). The extent to which participants justified their intergroup attitudes based on the 
beliefs of Blacks was measured in the same manner. A general measure of prejudice 
justification was also included (adapted from Esses & Hodson, 2006, original Cronbach's 
a = .81). This is a 7-item scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very), with higher scores 
indicating greater justification. A sample item from this scale is "Do you think ethnic 
prejudice is justifiable?" 
Intergroup anxiety (see Appendix B.IO). This was measured using Stephan and 
Stephan's (1985) intergroup anxiety scale (original Cronbach's a = .86). This measure 
asks participants to indicate the extent to which they would feel a variety of emotions 
when being the only White person interacting with a group of Black people. This is a 10-
item scale ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (extremely) with 3 items reversed scored. 
Higher scores on this scale indicated higher intergroup anxiety. A sample item from this 
scale is "I would feel awkward." 
Outgroup avoidance (see Appendix B.II). This was gauged using a single item 
measure on a 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much) scale, "To what extent do you avoid 
interacting with Black people?" Higher scores indicated more avoidance. 
Procedure 
Participants read and signed informed consent statements (see Appendix R2) and 
completed paper and pencil surveys containing the materials outlined above in groups 
ranging from 1-10 people. Participants received a debriefing form (see Appendix R13) 
upon completion of the survey and subsequently received proof of participation and 
monetary payment (where applicable). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses and Descriptive Statistics 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to investigate missing data, normality, and 
outliers. Missing data were analyzed by examining variable frequencies. There were 
found to be 10 values missing from the dichotomous acknowledgement of prejudice 
measure, 1 value missing from the continuous acknowledgment of personal bias measure 
(and hence 1 value missing from each projection index), 1 value missing from prejudice 
justification based on the beliefs of Whites, and 1 value missing from prejudice 
justification based on the beliefs of Blacks. This small amount of missing data was not 
deemed problematic. For variables on multi-item scales, the mean function was used to 
calculate final variable scores. Thus, individual items used to calculate each of these 
variables were investigated for missing data as well. There was found to be 1 value 
missing from each MRS item (all from 1 participant, hence one missing value on the 
MRS total score variable), I additional value missing from MRS item 7, 1 value each 
missing from general prejudice justification items 3, 4, and 6, 1 value each missing from 
SDO items 10 and 16, and one value missing from RWA item 12. It was determined that 
there were not enough data missing from these individual scale items to warrant action, 
and that scores could be accurately obtained by calculating the mean of the items that 
were present. There were also no data missing from any of the demographic variables 
(age, sex, ethnicity). Therefore, it was not necessary to take any additional action 
regarding missing data. 
To investigate normality, skewness and kurtosis values were examined for each 
continuous variable. Based on the criterion that skewness coefficients of> 121 indicate 
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distributions deviating from normality, distributions for all of the variables can be 
considered normal with the exception of one variable: outgroup avoidance exhibited 
skewness deviating from normality. Further examination revealed that this was likely due 
to a large number of participants (61.7%) responding with a "0", indicating that they did 
not avoid the outgroup at all. The kurtosis values obtained for all variables did not deviate 
from normality, according to the criterion that kurtosis values < 121 are acceptable, again 
with the exception of outgroup avoidance (meta-stereotype of self as individual also had 
a kurtosis value slightly above 2). These normality violations were not problematic 
enough to warrant action, but the reader should be aware of them nonetheless. 
To examine potential outliers in each of the continuous variables of interest, 
scores on each variable were converted to z-scores. Based on the criterion that z-scores > 
131 are probable outliers, examination ofz-score frequencies revealed outliers on several 
variables. There were found to be 3 outliers on the continuous acknowledgment of 
personal bias measure, 4 outliers on the outgroup avoidance measure, 1 outlier on the 
meta-stereotype of self as individual measure, 1 outlier on the SDO measure, and 1 on the 
RWA measure. Further examination revealed that in only one case did multiple outliers 
pertain to one participant. It was found that one participant had outliers on both the 
continuous acknowledgment of bias measure and outgroup avoidance. After performing 
several key analyses with and without this participant, no differences were found, and it 
was determined that this participant need not be excluded from further analyses. The 
outliers that were detected were not due to data entry errors; they were merely cases of 
high or low scoring individuals. Thus, no action was taken regarding these outliers. With 
regard to tested regression models, there were 2 outliers in the solution identified based 
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on the criterion that standardized residuals greater than 131 are probable outliers. However, 
no differences were obtained when key analyses were conducted with and without these 
outliers. Thus, they were not influential enough to warrant removal. 
Descriptive statistics for all relevant continuous variables are presented in Table 
1. For the most part, these results were as expected. 
No sex differences were observed on key projection and meta-stereotype 
variables.9 Thus, further sex differences were not examined. 
Projection 
Evidence in support of the first hypothesis was obtained. That is, Whites projected 
their prejudice onto fellow Whites. Those acknowledging personal prejudice on the 
dichotomous measure (n = 17) reported a significantly higher percentage of prejudiced 
Whites (M = 70.00, SD = 11.04) than those who did not acknowledge personal prejudice 
(n = 106) (M= 46.93, SD = 20.53), t (37.03) = -6.90,p < .001.10 The rating of White 
prejudice was significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (50) for those 
acknowledging personal prejudice, (t(16) = 7.47,p < .001), but not among those who did 
not acknowledge personal prejudice (t(105) = -1.62,p =.107). Superior evidence of 
projection was found in the two-tailed correlation between the continuous bias 
acknowledgement measure and perceived percentage of Whites holding prejudices, (r 
(131) = .34, p <.001). This correlation indicates that greater acknowledgement of 
personal bias was associated with higher ingroup prejudice ratings, an effect of moderate 
magnitude. 
9 One exception was the meta-stereotype of ingroup measure, which was rated significantly more 
negatively by women (p < .003). However, for both men and women this variable was higher than the 
midpoint of the scale, indicating that both sexes held a negative meta-stereotype. 
10 Equal variances not assumed based on Levene's test. Thoughout the thesis, all t-tests reported are two-
tailed. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics/or Key Continuous Variables (Study 1) 
Variable (Possible range) Mean SD Skew Kurt 
Prejudice (continuous acknowledgment of personal bias 1.73 1.70 .95 .65 
measure) (0-10) 
Ingroup anti-outgroup prejudice, percent (0-100) 49.17 21.04 -.17 -.89 
Outgroup anti-outgroup prejudice, percent (0-100) 50.79 22.54 -.17 -.57 
Ingroup Projection Index (0-10)* 3.29 2.02 .42 -.57 
Outgroup Projection Index (0-10)* 3.52 2.02 .31 -.10 
Meta-stereotype of ingroup (0-10) 6.41 2.08 -.23 -.27 
Meta-stereotype of self as individual (0-10) 1.42 1.86 1.53 2.06 
Prejudice ('actual prejudice', MRS) (0-4) .86 .61 .54 -.66 
Identification with ingroup (Whites) (1-7) 3.92 1.49 -.23 -.49 
Social dominance orientation (1-7) 2.35 1.02 .93 .52 
Right wing authoritarianism (1-7) 2.85 .95 .72 1.00 
Justification of prejudice based on Whites' beliefs (1-9) 3.77 2.19 .44 -.88 
Justification of prejudice based on Blacks' beliefs (1-9) 3.94 2.17 .30 -.88 
Justification of general prejudice (1-7) 2.60 .95 .14 -.13 
Outgroup avoidance (0-10) .83 1.38 2.02 4.30 
Intergroup anxiety (-3 to +3) -1.03 1.12 .40 -.64 
Note. * lower scores on projection measures indicate stronger projection. 
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A t-test revealed that there was also evidence present in support of outgroup 
projection: Whites acknowledging prejudice in themselves on the dichotomous yes/no 
question reported a significantly higher percentage of prejudiced Blacks (M = 69.71, SD 
= 23.28) than those who did not acknowledge prejudice in themselves (M = 48.15, SD = 
21.41), t(121) = -3.78,p < .001, demonstrating outgroup projection of intergroup 
attitudes. The rating of Black prejudice was significantly greater than the midpoint of the 
scale (50) for those acknowledging prejudice in themselves (t(16) = 3.49,p = .003), and 
not significantly different for those who did not acknowledge prejudice (t(105) = -.89,p 
= .374). Further evidence was the two-tailed correlation between the continuous bias 
acknowledgement measure and perceived percentage of Blacks holding prejudices, r 
(131) = .33,p < .001, indicating that higher acknowledgement of personal bias was 
associated with higher ratings of perceived outgroup prejudice. Thus, ingroup and 
outgroup projection of intergroup attitudes was demonstrated. 
Meta-stereotypes 
There was found to be a shared meta-stereotype among Whites that Whites are 
viewed by Blacks as prejudiced. This was found by examining the mean rating of the 
perceived extent to which Blacks believed Whites were prejudiced (M = 6.41, see Table 
1) which was significantly greater than the midpoint (5) of the scale, t(132) = 7.78,p < 
.001. These results signify evidence for a meta-stereotype at the group level. 
The mean rating of the perceived extent to which Blacks believed the participant 
personally was prejudiced (M = 1.42, see Table 1) was significantly lower than the 
midpoint of the scale (5), t(132) = -22.08,p < .001. This mean rating was also 
significantly lower than mean ratings of the extent to which Blacks were perceived to 
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view Whites as prejudiced, t(132) = -24.71,p <.001. As expected, there was a significant 
two-tailed correlation between participant's ratings of the extent to which Blacks view 
Whites as prejudiced and the extent to which Blacks view participants personally as 
prejudiced, r (132) = .30,p <.001. Thus, although participants did not expect to be 
personally viewed very negatively on average, they did expect to be viewed more 
negatively to the extent that their meta-stereotype of the ingroup was more negative. 
Relation between the Projection of Intergroup Attitudes and Prejudiced Meta-
stereotypes. 
In order to investigate the hypothesis that prejudiced meta-stereotypes of ingroup 
were formed via ingroup and outgroup projection of intergroup attitudes, several analyses 
were conducted. First, correlations were investigated (see Table 2). As reported in the 
projection results, there was a significant positive correlation between self-rated prejudice 
(continuous bias acknowledgement) and White prejudice ratings (r = .34), indicating 
ingroup projection of intergroup attitudes. There was also a positive correlation between 
White prejudice ratings and meta-stereotype rating (r = .49) illustrating evidence of 
outgroup projection at the level of specific category (e.g., "I think most Whites are high 
in prejudice, Blacks think Whites are high in prejudice as well"). These correlations 
indicated preliminary support for the top part of the hypothesized model (Figure 1.) There 
was a positive correlation between self-rated prejudice and Black prejudice ratings (r = 
.33) as well, illustrating outgroup projection (at the level of intergroup target category). 
Also, there was a positive correlation between Black prejudice ratings and the meta-
stereotype (r = .55), again indicating outgroup projection at the level of intergroup target 
category (e.g., "I think most Blacks are high in prejudice, therefore Blacks must 
Table 2. 
Correlations Depicting the Relation between Projection and Meta-stereotypes (Study 
1) 
(1) Self-rated prejudice (continuous 
acknowledgement of bias) 
(2) White prejudice (percent) 
(3) Black prejudice (percent) 
(4) Meta-stereotype of in group 
(1) (2) 
.34*** 
(3) (4) 
.33*** .33*** 
.60*** .49*** 
.55*** 
Note. ***p < .001. Pairwise deletion of missing cases used, N = 132-133 for each 
correlation presented here. Correlations are two-tailed. 
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think Whites are high in prejudice), and support for the bottom part of Figure 1. 
The model was formally tested in a path model using AMOS 16.0 software. 
Bootstrapping procedures were used to obtain the significance levels for standardized 
estimates. Acceptable fit criteria include: non-significant chi-squared values, root-me an-
square-error of approximation (RMSEA) values below .06, comparative fit index (CFI) 
values above .95, (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and standardized root-mean-squared residual 
(SRMR) values less than .05 (Byrne, 2001). One missing value from the continuous bias 
acknowledgement measure was replaced with the mean for this analysis only. The model 
in Figure 2 demonstrated reasonable fit on most indices, x2(1) = 2.79,p = .095, RMSEA 
= .116, CFI = .986, and SRMR = .034. Although the RMSEA value fell outside of the 
recommended boundary, the model is considered to demonstrate reasonable fit to the data 
as .10 is considered mediocre fit (Byrne, 2001), and most other fit criteria were within the 
ideal range. Further, although the zero-order correlation between self-rated prejudice and 
ingroup meta-stereotype was significant (r = .33), when this direct path was included in 
the hypothesized model it was not significant (ft = .13, p = .106). This suggests full 
mediation, according to established criteria (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Thus, results were 
consistent with expectations that self-ratings of prejudice impact meta-stereotypes about 
ingroup prejudice as a function of both ingroup and outgroup projection. 
To rule out the possibility that introjection (i.e., self-group congruency 
perceptions operating in the direction of group to self, see Krueger, 2002), rather than 
projection, contributes to the formation of meta-stereotypes, an alternative model was 
tested. It tested whether perceived ingroup and outgroup prejudice ratings predicted the 
ingroup meta-stereotype through self-prejudice ratings, reversing the positions of self and 
(Ingroup projection) 
.34*** 
Self-rated 
prejudice 
.33*** 
(Outgroup projection, 
intergroup target category 
level) 
White 
prejudice 
.55*** 
Black 
prejudice 
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(Outgroup projection, specific 
category level) 
.24** 
Meta-stereotype 
(Blacks perceivcd to view 
Whites as high in 
prejudice) 
Al *** 
(Outgroup projection, 
intergroup target category 
level) 
Figure 2. N = 133. Results of path model testing the hypothesized relation between meta-
stereotypes of in group and the projection of intergroup attitudes (Study 1).** p < .05, *** 
p < .01. Path coefficients are standardized. 
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group prejudice in Figure 2. This alternative model demonstrated poor model fit, X2(2) = 
43.81,p < .001, RMSEA = .398, CFI = .683, and SRMR = .184. Therefore, in terms of 
explaining meta-stereotypes, self-to-group 'projection' provides a better fit to the data 
than does group-to-self 'introjection.' 
Correlates of Projection and Meta-stereotypes 
Ingroup projection of intergroup attitudes, meta-stereotype of ingroup and meta-
stereotype of self as individual were each examined in terms of their relations with the 
correlates described above. Below, significant correlations only are reported for brevity. I I 
All two-tailed correlations can be found in Table 3. 
Prejudice (MRS a = .77). Correlations involving prejudice partially supported the 
hypotheses. Higher prejudice against Blacks was associated with more projection of 
intergroup attitudes onto fellow Whites. Also, the higher Whites were in prejudice 
(continuous bias acknowledgement measure only) the more negative (i.e., viewed to be 
higher in prejudice) were their meta-stereotypes (both types). 
Ingroup identification (a = .79).12 As predicted, the more Whites identified with 
their ingroup, the more negative their meta-stereotypes (both types). 
Social dominance orientation (a = .91). As predicted, higher SDO scores 
predicted greater projection of intergroup attitudes onto fellow Whites. Also, as 
predicted, the higher Whites were in SDO the more prejudiced they expected to be 
personally viewed by Blacks. 
Prejudice justification. In line with predictions, the more negative participants' 
meta-stereotypes (both types), the greater the extent to which participants explicitly 
II For example, there were no significant correlations obtained with RW A. 
12 Item 3 from the Identification scale was dropped to increase reliability due to the item's low item-total 
correlation. 
Table 3. 
Projection and Meta-stereotype Correlates (Study 1) 
Prejudice ('actual prejudice', MRS) 
Prejudice (continuous acknowledgment 
of personal bias measure) 
Identification with ingroup (Whites) 
Social dominance orientation 
Right wing authoritarianism 
Justification of prejudice based on 
Whites' beliefs 
Justification of prejudice based on 
Blacks' beliefs 
Justification of general prejudice 
Outgroup avoidance 
Intergroup anxiety 
Ingroup 
Projection 
Index 
-.24** 
na+ 
-.05 
-.25** 
-.15 
-.02 
-.05 
-.12 
-.21 * 
-.21 * 
Outgroup 
Projection 
Index 
.01 
na+ 
.10 
-.11 
.01 
.04 
.01 
-.OS 
-.12 
-.02 
Meta-
stereotype 
of in group 
.02 
.33** 
.23** 
.01 
.02 
.20* 
.24** 
.09 
.23** 
.1S* 
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Meta-
stereotype 
of self as 
individual 
.17* 
045** 
.21 * 
.22* 
.10 
.30** 
Al ** 
.22* 
.36** 
.39** 
Note. * p < .05; ** P < .01. Pairwise deletion of missing cases used,N= 131-133. Note that on the projection index 
scores closer to 0 indicate stronger projection, therefore negative correlations here actually signify relations where 
projection is greater. Correlations are two-tailed. 
+correlations between projection indices and continuous acknowledgement of bias measure are 
uninterpretable as this measure was involved in the calculation ofprojection indices. 
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justified their prejudice based on the beliefs of Blacks. Also, the more negative 
participants' meta-stereotypes (both types), the greater the extent to which participants 
explicitly justified their prejudice based on the beliefs of Whites, though this was of 
slightly smaller magnitude than the relation with justification of prejudice based on the 
beliefs of Blacks. The general Prejudice Justification scale (Esses & Hodson, 2006) (a = 
.81) was correlated with meta-stereotype of self as individual only, indicating that the 
more negative one's meta-stereotype of self as individual, the more one believes 
prejudice generally is justified. 
Intergroup anxiety (a = .89). As expected, higher scores on intergroup anxiety 
among Whites were related to stronger projection to the ingroup. Also, as predicted, 
heightened intergroup anxiety was associated with more negative meta-stereotypes (both 
types). 
Outgroup avoidance. As predicted, the greater the extent to which Whites 
reported avoiding contact with Blacks, the more they projected their intergroup attitudes 
onto Whites. It was also found, as expected, that those holding more negative meta-
stereotypes (both types) avoided Blacks to a greater extent. 
Exploratory Mediation Analyses 
As mentioned above, Vorauer et al. (1998) suggested that the relation between 
meta-stereotypes and outgroup avoidance may be mediated by intergroup anxiety. Study 
1 allowed for the investigation ofthis suggestion using 'prejudiced' meta-stereotypes 
(i.e., those referring to the extent to which Whites believe they are viewed by Blacks to 
be prejudiced). Mediation was operationalized according to Baron and Kenny's (1986) 
criteria. That is, it was necessary for significant relations to exist between the 
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independent and dependent variable, the independent variable and the mediator, the 
mediator and the dependent variable controlling for the independent variable's effect on 
the criterion, and for the relation between the independent and dependent variable to be 
reduced in the presence of the mediator. The results of several regression analyses 
provided evidence consistent with Vorauer et al.'s (1998) prediction (see Figures 3a & 
3b). The relation between meta-stereotypes and outgroup avoidance was partially 
mediated by intergroup anxiety. Therefore, meta-stereotypes appear to discourage contact 
through heightened anxiety, suggesting that negative meta-stereotypes are impediments 
to positive intergroup relations. 
Meta-
stereotype of 
self as 
individual 
Intergroup 
anxiety 
.36*** (.18*) 
Outgroup 
avoidance 
Sobel z = 3.74 
p < .001 
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Figure 3a. Tests of direct and indirect effects of negativity of meta-stereotype of self as 
individual on outgroup avoidance via intergroup anxiety (Study 1). Standardized 
coefficients shown, with parenthetical values representing relations after controlling for 
other predictor. * p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p < .001. 
Meta-
stereotype of 
mgroup 
Intergroup 
anxiety 
.23** (.13*) 
Sobel z = 2.01 
p< .05 
R2=.30 
Outgroup 
avoidance 
Figure 3b. Tests of direct and indirect effects of negativity of meta-stereotype of ingroup 
on avoidance of outgroup via intergroup anxiety (Study 1). Standardized coefficients 
shown, with parenthetical values representing relations after controlling for other 
predictor. * p < .05; ** p< .01; *** P < .001. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided evidence that Whites project their intergroup attitudes onto 
fellow Whites, seeing more (less) prejudice in ingroup members to the extent that they 
acknowledged (did not acknowledge) personal biases. This finding established that, like 
basic attitudes (see Mullen et al., 1985) and specific prejudicial beliefs (Krueger, 1996; 
Strube & Rahimi, 2006), general intergroup attitudes can be projected as well. Study 1 
also provided evidence of outgroup projection of intergroup attitudes, at a magnitude that 
was roughly equivalent to that of the ingroup projection. This both corresponded (Hodson 
et al., 2000; Judd et al., 2005) and conflicted (e.g., Clement & Krueger, 2002; Robbins & 
Krueger, 2005) with previous research, illustrating that intergroup attitudes may be 
projected to both the ingroup and the outgroup with the same strength. Study 1 also 
provided evidence that prejudiced meta-stereotypes of ingroup are formed via ingroup 
and outgroup projection of intergroup attitudes, illustrating that these two types of 
intergroup perceptions are related in a meaningful way. 
Ingroup projection of prejudice was correlated with prejudice and several 
correlates of prejudice (SDO, intergroup anxiety, and outgroup avoidance), suggesting 
that the more prejudiced one is, the more likely one is to project these intergroup attitudes 
onto ingroup members. Despite the absence of the expected correlation between ingroup 
projection of intergroup attitudes and explicit prejudice justification measures (see Table 
3), other correlates seem to imply that projection serves as a means to justify prejudice. 
Results indicated that those who were more apt to be prejudiced projected intergroup 
attitudes onto their ingroup more strongly. This implies that these individuals had more to 
justify, given that they held socially-sensitive attitudes, and thus projected strongly. It is 
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unclear why the correlation between projection and justification was absent, but Study 2 
examined this further. More importantly, these findings imply that the projection of 
intergroup attitudes may be motivated. The results suggested that people, especially those 
acknowledging negative attitudes, seek confirmation of their intergroup attitudes in the 
ingroup, possibly to reduce feelings of threat or anxiety about the attitude. Clearly 
though, this should occur more strongly for those experiencing more threat (i.e., those 
holding more negative outgroup attitudes), which these results illustrate. It is important to 
note that contrary to expectations, prejudice and its correlates were not related 
significantly to outgroup projection. It may be then, that only ingroup projection of 
intergroup attitudes eases the threat experienced by those holding negative attitudes. This 
study, having provided evidence that Whites project prejudice and suggesting that 
ingroup projection of prejudice may be motivated by threat, opened the door for Study 2 
to investigate further when ingroup projection occurs most strongly in intergroup settings. 
Study I also established that Whites hold a shared negative ingroup meta-
stereotype that their group is viewed by Blacks to be prejudiced. This replicates the 
previous finding that Whites hold the meta-stereotype that they are viewed to be 
prejudiced by Aboriginals (Vorauer et aI., 1998), extending this finding to perceived 
beliefs of a different outgroup, Blacks.13 It was found also that the more negative the 
meta-stereotype of ingroup, the more negative the meta-stereotype of self as individual. 
Despite this association, the meta-stereotype of ingroup was significantly more negative 
than the meta-stereotype of self as individual. Perhaps then, group membership must be 
salient in order for Whites' meta-stereotypes of self and meta-stereotypes of ingroup to 
13 Judd et al. (2005) conducted a similar examination involving Blacks; however, they did not investigate 
the meta-stereotype "prejudiced" per se. 
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be more similar (Mendez et aI, 2007); Study 2 investigated this potential. This could also 
be due to a 'better than average effect' (Alicke & Govorun, 2005), a well~established 
finding that individuals rate the self more positively than average group members. 
Indeed, people rate their group overall as more prejudiced than the self (Saucier, 2002). 
Thus one might consider one's group overall to be perceived as more prejudiced than the 
self, especially when one's personal group membership is not salient. 
Meta~stereotype of ingroup was found to be correlated positively with prejudice, 
correlates of prejudice (intergroup anxiety, outgroup avoidance), and ingroup 
identification. This is intuitive, and supports the posited hypothesis, but does not support 
Vorauer et al.'s (1998) finding that those lower in prejudice (and presumably ingroup 
identification, according to Vorauer et al. (1998)) held more negative ingroup meta-
stereotypes. Perhaps this finding was unique to Vorauer et al.'s (1998) research. It may 
also be that several differences between Study 1 and Vorauer et al.'s (1998) account for 
the discrepant findings, such as the use of a different outgroup (Blacks), different meta-
stereotype measurement, different prejudice measures, and different calculation of the 
correlation between prejudice level and meta-stereotype negativity (see Vorauer et aI., 
1998). As mentioned previously however, it is speculated that this discrepancy is likely 
due to the fact that Study 1 focused upon a meta-stereotype referring to a single attribute 
(prejudice) as opposed to several. Also as predicted, meta-stereotype of the ingroup was 
correlated with prejudice justification based on the beliefs of Blacks, suggesting that 
Whites use meta-stereotypes as a means to justify their own prejudice. All of the 
correlates of meta-stereotype of ingroup were also correlated with the meta-stereotype of 
self as individual, as were social dominance orientation and general prejudice 
justification. 
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Additionally, the relations between both types of meta-stereotypes and outgroup 
avoidance were partially mediated by intergroup anxiety, providing evidence for Vorauer 
et al.'s (1998) assertion. It is important to note however, that these data are correlational, 
thus, this finding illustrates a hypothesized relationship. This fmding, along with the 
correlates of meta-stereotypes discussed above, illustrates that meta-stereotypes hold very 
negative implications for intergroup relations. Study 1 established that Whites generally 
believe they are viewed negatively by Blacks in terms of prejudice; those who are higher 
in prejudice hold even more negative meta-stereotypes; and meta-stereotypes are 
associated with prejudice justification, intergroup anxiety, and avoidance of intergroup 
contact. These results not only suggest that meta-stereotypes lead to prejudice 
perpetuation alone, but also lead to negative or avoided intergroup contact, which is very 
detrimental to positive intergroup relations and, in turn, can lead to additional 
perpetuation of prejudice. Study 2 further explored meta-stereotypes, specifically their 
impact on intergroup contact. 
Study 1 also provided insight into the relation between projection and meta-
stereotypes. Clearly, these are related constructs, but the current study is the first to 
demonstrate that prejudiced meta-stereotypes are at least partly formed through the 
projection of intergroup attitudes. Personal intergroup attitudes influence perceptions of 
White and Black prejudice (ingroup and outgroup projection, respectively), which are 
then projected onto the outgroup, resulting in a prejudiced meta-stereotype rating. Thus, 
meta-stereotypes are not simply formed out of an awareness of the stereotypes ascribed to 
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one's ingroup by the outgroup (Frey & Tropp, 2006; Klien & Azzi, 2001), but are also 
heavily influenced by one's own perceptions of one's own and others' intergroup 
attitudes. Meta-stereotypes may be a product of one's own intergroup attitudes, a 
previously unconsidered possibility. Thus, not only are meta-stereotypes detrimental to 
ingroup relations, but the projection of intergroup attitudes is as well, through its 
influence on meta-stereotype formation (in addition to the other problems projection can 
lead to, such as attitude rationalization). This highlights the need for research into the 
specific intergroup damage created by meta-stereotypes and methods to reduce such 
damage. 
In conclusion, Study 1 was a useful preliminary investigation of social projection 
and meta-stereotypes in the context of intergroup attitudes. Study 1 established that 
Whites project their intergroup attitudes onto their ingroup (and outgroup); that Whites 
overall hold a meta-stereotype of how Whites are viewed by Blacks in terms of prejudice; 
and that these meta -stereotypes are formed through the proj ection of intergroup attitudes. 
Several correlates of social projection and meta-stereotypes in this context were also 
identified in Study 1. These results led to the development of Study 2, which further 
investigated these intergroup processes employing an experimental design. 
Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to further investigate the social projection of intergroup 
attitudes and the meta-stereotype that one or one's group holds negative intergroup 
attitudes. Study 1 established that the projection of intergroup attitudes exists, that the 
meta-stereotype that one (or one's group) is viewed to be prejudiced (by Blacks) was held 
by Whites, and that the projection of intergroup attitudes may playa role in the formation 
of these meta-stereotypes. Given that prejudiced meta-stereotypes are damaging to 
ingroup relations, it was deemed necessary to further understand the processes leading to 
meta-stereotypes (i.e., projection), and the damage these overlapping perceptions can 
cause. Thus, in addition to replicating the key findings of Study 1, the major objectives of 
Study 2 were to determine (a) when projection occurs most strongly in this context and 
(b) the extent to which these meta-stereotypes are damaging to intergroup contact. 
Specifics of the issues examined by Study 2 are detailed below. 
An unresolved question is whether the projection of intergroup attitudes is a 
motivated or perceptual process. Study 2, an experimental design, allowed for the 
investigation of the conditions under which this type of projection occurs most strongly. 
The primary interest of this study was to determine when ingroup projection of 
intergroup attitudes is strongest. A secondary issue for investigation was the direction of 
projection effects (i.e., from group-to-selfversus self-to-group). There seems to be strong 
evidence supporting the projection hypothesis (i.e., perceptions of self extended to the 
[in] group, e.g., see Krueger et aI., 2006), but it is possible that the underlying 
phenomenon could be introjection (i.e., perceptions of group extended to the self). Study 
2 was designed to experimentally address this question by exposing participants to 
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attitude feedback allegedly about the self or group and then examining perceptions of 
these targets. 
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An additional issue examined by Study 2 concerns meta-stereotypes. Given that 
holding the meta-stereotype that others view one (or one's group) is prejudiced is 
damaging to intergroup relations, it is important to determine how detrimental these 
perceptions are in intergroup situations, especially compared to other-stereotypes. To 
examine this, Study 2 manipulated meta-stereotypes (the first study to do so) and other-
stereotypes (in addition to self-stereotypes), and led participants to believe that they 
would engage in an intergroup interaction, with the opportunity to avoid or approach the 
intergroup contact. 
In order to address the new issues outlined above, Study 2 differed from Study 1 
in several notable ways. Study 2 examined the processes investigated in Study 1 in an 
anticipated intergroup contact context, allowing for a more engaging intergroup situation. 
Moreover, Study 2 was experimental, allowing for tests of causal relations, such as 
whether threatening feedback causes people to project their intergroup attitudes. In 
addition, Study 2 examined a different type of intergroup attitude than Study 1. Whereas 
Study 1 focused on anti-outgroup prejudice, Study 2 focused on 'ingroup favouritism.' 
Thus, Study 2 examined the projection of ingroup favouritism, and the meta-stereotype 
that one favours the ingroup. Ingroup favouritism involves the preferential treatment of 
one's own group over others, and is a well documented and commonly acknowledged 
type of prejudice (for reviews, see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Messick & Mackie, 1989). 
This substitution was made given that ingroup favouritism represents the most common 
form of intergroup bias (see Brewer, 1999), and was presumed more likely to be 
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expressed by participants in a lab setting than anti-outgroup prejudice. 
Thus, the primary aims of Study 2 involved: (a) replicating the projection and 
meta-stereotype findings of Study I with a different form of prejudice, "ingroup 
favouritism", (b) investigating the circumstances (in terms of motivation and direction) 
where people are more likely to project intergroup attitudes, and (c) examining which 
type(s) of perceptions (meta- versus other-stereotypes) have the most negative impact on 
anticipated intergroup contact. 
Replication Hypotheses 
Prior to examining issues new to Study 2, pre-manipulation data (collapsed across 
conditions) were examined to determine whether Study 1 results were replicated. The 
second study moved away from examining anti-Black prejudice perceptions by 
considering "ingroup favouritism" (i.e., pro-White biases), an intergroup bias that is more 
common and more pernicious (Gaertner et aI., 1996). Thus, it was important to replicate 
the projection and meta-stereotype findings when "ingroup favouritism" was examined. 
HI: Key results of Study I would be replicated in Study 2, specifically: 
HIa: Participants would demonstrate ingroup projection (and outgroup projection) 
of intergroup attitudes. 
HIb: Participants would hold a shared meta-stereotype that Whites are viewed by 
Blacks to favour their ingroup (i.e., Whites). Also, potential differences between 
the different types of meta-stereotypes (meta-stereotype of ingroup, meta-
stereotype of self as ingroup member, and meta-stereotype of self as individual) 
were expected to replicate Study 1 findings where possible, and were investigated 
for exploratory purposes otherwise. 
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HIc: Ingroup favouritism meta-stereotypes of in group would be rooted in the 
projection of ingroup favouritism. It was also examined whether ingroup 
favouritism meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup member were formed through the 
projection of ingroup favouritism. 
Experimental Hypotheses Overview 
In addition to replicating the key findings of Study 1, Study 2 was designed to 
address several new, interesting hypotheses. Most importantly, the manipulations in the 
Study 2 were designed to investigate whether people project intergroup attitudes to their 
ingroup more under conditions of threat, and whether manipulated Meta- or Other-
Stereotypes are most threatening in intergroup situations, hence producing the most 
negative implications for intergroup contact. Study 2 participants were expected to 
experience (at least one of) two key types of threat, depending on their condition; one 
type leading to strong projection of intergroup attitudes, and one type leading to negative 
intergroup contact expectations. Self-concept threat was expected to govern projection 
processes. I predicted that when participants felt personally threatened they would seek 
support or 'back up' in their attitudes from their ingroup. On the other hand, outcomes 
regarding intergroup contact expectations were expected to be governed by intergroup 
contact threat (i.e., concerns about how smooth or awkward the intergroup interaction 
would be). It was expected that when participants were most concerned or anxious about 
the intergroup interaction, they would have the most negative interaction expectations. 
Table 4 depicts the type(s) of threat presumably experienced by participants in each 
condition. Further detail on these hypotheses follows the overview of the experimental 
manipulations. 
Table 4. 
Experimental Conditions (Study 2) 
Personal 
Group 
Self-stereotypes 
(1) Personal Self-
Stereotype 
("It has been determined 
that you strongly favour 
Whites over Blacks '') 
(2) Group Self-Stereotype 
("It has been determined 
that White Brock students 
strongly favour Whites 
over Blacks '') 
Other-stereotypes 
(3) Personal Other-
Stereotype 
('It has been determined 
that your partner strongly 
favours Blacks over 
Whites'') 
(4) Group Other-
Stereotype 
( "It has been determined 
that Black Brock students 
strongly favour Blacks 
over Whites '') 
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Meta-stereotypes 
(5) Personal Meta-
Stereotype 
("Your partner has 
determined you to be 
someone who strongly 
favours Whites over 
Blacks',) 
(6) Group Meta-
Stereotype 
("Your Partner has 
determined White Brock 
students to be people who 
strongly favour Whites 
over Blacks '') 
Note. Manipulation feedback information presented to White participants is shown parentheses. Cells with 
double lined borders denote conditions expected to be threatening to the self concept (conditions 1 and 5). 
Cells with shaded backgrounds denote conditions expected to be threatening to intergroup contact 
(conditions 3, 4, 5, and 6). 
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Overview of Experimental Manipulations 
It is necessary to outline the experimental manipulations prior to a detailed 
discussion of the experimental hypotheses, given the complexity of the study. This will 
aid in the reader's understanding of the hypotheses. As mentioned above, a key addition 
to Study 2 was the anticipated intergroup interaction context. White participants were led 
to believe that they would be interacting with a Black person after first responding to 
some computer based questionnaires. The interaction however, did not actually occur, a 
commonly used methodology (e.g., Britt et al., 1996, Study 4; Goff, Steele, & Davies, 
2008; Johnson, Olsen, & Fazio, 2009, Study 2; Plant & Devine, 2003, Study 2; Vorauer 
et al., 1998, Study 2). After first completing pre-manipulation measures (details follow), 
participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. The conditions were based 
on three types of stereotypes: self-stereotypes (personal and group), other-stereotypes 
(personal and group), and meta-stereotypes (personal and group; see Table 4). These 
conditions were designed to test the hypotheses that projection would occur most strongly 
under conditions of self-concept threat, that projection would occur in the direction of 
self-to-group, and that intergroup contact threat would lead to negative intergroup contact 
expectations. A brief description of these conditions is below, with more detail to follow. 
The [mal sample of the study included only White participants. 
Personal Self-Stereotype Condition 
Each participant in this condition was given information that s/he personally 
strongly favours Whites over Blacks. This information came from tests completed by the 
participant and allegedly scored by the computer. Thus, the participant was essentially 
informed that slhe personally is prejudiced. 
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Group Meta-Stereotype (i. e., Meta-Stereotype of Ingroup) Condition 
Each participant in this condition was informed that the Black interaction partner 
thinks that White Brock students on average favour Whites over Blacks on the previous 
measures. This information apparently came from information provided by the partner. 
Thus, participants were informed that their Black partner believes that White Brock 
students on average are prejudiced. 
Experimental Hypotheses 
Projection 
Study I established that Whites project their intergroup attitudes (i.e., being 
prejudiced or not) onto other Whites. Study 2 attempted to investigate the circumstances 
under which Whites are more (or less) likely to project related attitudes (i.e., favouring 
one's ingroup or not) in order to investigate the possibility of motivated proj ection. In 
addition, the experimental conditions of Study 2 were designed to test the direction of 
self-group congruency ratings (self-to-group versus group-to-self). As discussed above, 
there is some debate regarding these issues. Divergent theoretical perspectives would 
predict different outcomes regarding projection in this context. Because of the various 
unresolved issues in the projection literature, and lack of experimental research on the 
issues investigated, five possible models explaining motivation behind and direction of 
the ingroup projection of intergroup attitudes were examined. Projection motivation and 
projection direction are intertwined issues. That is, people may project from self to group 
for one reason, and introject from group to self for another. Thus, it was predicted that the 
theoretical model standing out as supported would provide information on both 
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projection motivation and direction in this context. Using the experimental manipulations 
mentioned, the following models were examined (see Table 5). 
Model A: Selfas-sample model. This model is based on the premise that the self 
is the best source of information one has to make inferences about others (Krueger et aI., 
2006). That is, people naturally look to the self as an available and accurate source of 
information, and subsequently project outward to others. If true, external manipulations 
(information about either the self or others that does not originate from the self) should 
not exert much impact on this rather simple self-focused self-to-group bias, with the 
participant relying on what s/he personally perceives to be true of the self. This model 
predicts that projection is context independent and will occur equally across all 
conditions. 
Model B: Perceptual cognitive over generalization model. This model holds that 
projection is a passive cognitive overgeneralization, whereby people use the information 
they have about the self to make inferences about others (e.g., Dawes, 1989, 1990; Hoch, 
1987; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). If true, external information about the self could also be 
used as a basis for projection to the group. This model predicts that the strongest 
projection should occur in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition (where the participant 
receives information that s/he personally favours Whites over Blacks). If the self is the 
best source of information regarding the average ingroup member, this information 
received about the self would be employed to make predictions about one's group. This 
Model differs from the Self as Sample model (Model A) in that projection is affected by 
manipulations here, especially information about the self. 
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Table 5. 
Potential Models Regarding Projection Outcomes (Study 2) 
Experimental Condition 
Model Self-stereotype Other-stereotype Meta-stereotype 
Personal Group Personal Group Personal Group 
A. Self-as-sample 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B. Perceptual cognitive 3 1 1 1 2 1 
over generalization 
C. Motivated threat 5 1 1 1 4 1 
D. Introjection 1 3 1 1 1 2 
(Informational influence) 
E. Normative influence 3 3 1 1 2 2 
Note. Numbers within table refer to hypothetical projection magnitude (higher numbers = 
stronger projection magnitude) 
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This model predicts that projection would also occur, but to a lessened degree, in 
the Personal Meta-Stereotype condition (where the participant receives information that 
herlhis interaction partner believes s/he favours Whites). Again, in this condition 
participants would use this information they received about the self to make inferences 
about their group. However, less projection is expected in this condition because this self-
relevant information is second-hand information. That is, in the Personal Self-Stereotype 
condition, the information comes from the participant's apparent test results, whereas in 
the Personal Meta-Stereotype condition the information comes from one's partner's 
apparent impressions of the participant's test results. This model predicts that baseline 
levels of projection will occur in all other conditions. 
Model C: Motivated threat model. This model assumes that projection is a 
motivated process whereby people project their personal attitudes onto their group when 
they feel threatened, in an attempt to validate shortcomings (e.g., Campbell, 1986). This 
may reflect attributive projection (Bramel, 1962, 1963; Holmes, 1968, 1978), whereby 
people project traits/attitudes onto (often positively evaluated) others to reduce the 
anxiety of holding a relatively undesirable attitude. This model predicts that projection 
will occur most strongly in both the Personal Self-Stereotype ("f favour Whites") and 
Personal Meta-Stereotype ("Black partner thinks ffavour Whites") conditions. These 
conditions are expected to be highly threatening to one's self-concept, thus it is predicted 
that participants will seek support in their apparent attitudes by projecting onto their 
ingroup. The Personal Self-Stereotype condition was expected to lead to the most self-
concept threat of the two, given that this information comes from a first- versus second-
hand source (i.e., directly from computer's tabulation of self-provided data vs. one's 
interaction partner's reaction to the data). Thus, this model predicts the strongest 
projection in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition. This model predicts baseline 
projection in all other conditions. Thus, the difference between Models Band C is a 
matter of magnitude, not direction. Projection is expected to be of greater magnitude in 
Model C due to the self-concept threat experienced. 
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Model D: Introjection (Informational influence) model. This model is based in the 
previously described possibility that projection phenomena actually represent 
'introjection' (see Krueger, 2002), an inference that the self is similar to the group (rather 
than group as similar to the self). This model predicts that the greatest self-group 
congruency should occur most strongly in the Group Self-Stereotype condition, where 
participants receive information regarding high levels of ingroup favouritism among 
White Brock students generally. This model predicts that in this condition participants 
will integrate group information into the self. Previous research has shown that people 
(for the most part, those highly identified with the ingroup) will readily rate themselves to 
be similar to their group on a certain trait, even negative traits (Hodson & Esses, 2002). 
The same could be true for ingroup favouritism. This would reflect a form of 
informational social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) whereby people seek cues from 
others when they are unsure how to respond, behave, or think. This model also predicts 
self-group congruence (but to a lesser degree than the Group Self-Stereotype condition) 
in the Group Meta-Stereotype condition. Here again, each participant receives 
information regarding her/his group, but self-group congruency is expected to be slightly 
weaker because this information comes from a second-hand source (one's interaction 
partner's reaction to the computer-based data). This model predicts baseline projection 
levels in other conditions. 
78 
Model E: Normative influence model. This model holds that projection is 
motivated to the extent that people project out of a desire to be normal or similar to the 
group. This model predicts that the strongest self-group congruence should occur in both 
the Personal Self-Stereotype ("ffavour Whites") and Group Self-Stereotype ("White 
Brock students favour Whites") conditions. In the Personal Self-Stereotype condition, one 
receives information that s/he favours Whites, and thus would be expected to rate the 
ingroup to similarly favour Whites out of a desire to render the group to be similar to 
her/him and be normal. Self-group congruence would be expected to be equally strong in 
the Group Self-Stereotype condition whereby receiving information regarding Whites' 
ingroup favouritism would cause participants to rate themselves similarly to be 'normal' 
or fit in with the group. This model predicts somewhat less self-group congruency in the 
Personal Meta-Stereotype and Group Meta-Stereotype conditions. Again, according to 
this model, when a participant receives information regarding self (or group) ingroup 
favouritism, the participant will rate the ingroup (or self, depending on condition) to be 
similar to the information received in order to be 'normal' and/or likeable. This reflects a 
form of normative social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) whereby people are 
influenced by a desire to be accepted by others. Self-group congruence was expected to 
be weaker in the Meta-Stereotype conditions as the information again comes from a 
second-hand source. This model predicts that no or baseline levels of projection should 
occur in both Other-Stereotype conditions. 
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Overall. Based on the results of Study 1, and the nature of the socially-sensitive 
attitudes being projected, I predicted that the projection of intergroup attitudes would be 
motivated by feelings of self-concept threat. Given prevailing norms of egalitarianism in 
Western society, prejudice is generally viewed to be undesirable (see Blanchard, Lilly, & 
Vaughn, 1991; Monteith, Deneen,& Tooman, 1996), and self-reports of racial bias are 
becoming less common (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Schuman et aI., 1997). Evidence 
stating that one is particularly high on such a quality then, likely threatens one's self-
concept. Recall that in Study 1, Whites who admitted being prejudiced rated the 
percentage of prejudiced Whites in the population to be 70% (significantly higher than 
50%), whereas those denying prejudice rated the percentage of prejudiced Whites to be 
roughly 46% (close to, but under, 50%). This large difference (d = 1.40) between those 
acknowledging and denying personal prejudices implies motivation on behalf of those 
claiming to hold socially-sensitive attitude positions. Both groups rated Whites in the 
population to have similar beliefs to their own, but those acknowledging prejudice 
exaggerated this rating compared to those denying personal prejudice. These results 
suggest that the projection of prejudice/ingroup favouritism is motivated by a desire to 
reduce feelings of self-concept threat. Thus, it was predicted that participants in the self-
concept threatening conditions (the Personal Self- and Personal Meta-Stereotype 
conditions) would react by perceiving heightened commonality between their attitudes 
and those of others. The Motivated threat model was the model most consistent with a 
self-concept threat-based account of the projection of intergroup attitudes, and was 
therefore predicted to gamer the most support (even so, the validity of all models was 
examined). This would provide evidence for the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Projection (perceived self-group congruence) would be strongest under conditions 
of self-concept threat, given that projection can serve a self-protective function (e.g., 
Bramel, 1962, 1963; Newman et al., 1997). Thus, when people are informed they are 
prejudiced (a socially undesirable attribute), they presumably exaggerate similar biases 
among their peers. 
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H2b: The direction of the projection of intergroup attitudes would be from self to group. 
That is, participants would use information about the self to make inferences about the 
group, as opposed to using information about the group to make inferences about the self. 
Anticipated Intergroup Contact Reactions 
As discussed above, intergroup perceptions can often have a negative impact on 
intergroup interactions (e.g., Britt et al., 1996; Butz & Plant, 2006; Devine et al., 1996), 
and negative intergroup interactions can be quite detrimental to intergroup relations (e.g., 
Shelton & Richeson, 2005). Still more detrimental is when intergroup perceptions lead to 
the avoidance of intergroup contact, given that contact is central to prejudice reduction 
and improved intergroup relations (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). At this point, it is not 
entirely clear which types of perceptions (i.e., meta-stereotypes or other-stereotypes) 
most negatively affect intergroup interactions. The experimental conditions in the current 
study allowed for this investigation. Study 2 specifically investigated the impact of Meta-
Stereotype and Other-Stereotype manipulations on participants' expectations regarding 
an anticipated intergroup interaction. Both Meta- and Other-stereotype manipulations 
should lead to concerns regarding intergroup interactions (i.e., intergroup contact threat) 
given that they both involve perceptions that one (or one's group) is viewed negatively by 
an outgroup member (or entire outgroup), but it is unclear which more negatively 
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influences an intergroup interaction. As with tests of the projection outcomes, several 
theoretical models predicting reactions to the upcoming interaction were forwarded. Prior 
to an overview of these theoretical models, a review of the available literature on this 
topic is presented. 
Why is this issue of importance? It has been predicted in previous research (e.g., 
Vorauer et al., 1998) that meta-stereotypes exert a more negative impact on intergroup 
interactions than other-stereotypes. Meta-stereotypes are believed to have a greater 
impact than other-stereotypes on intergroup interactions as they are believed to be more 
threatening and anxiety-provoking than other-stereotypes (Vorauer et al., 1998), 
especially for majority groups such as Whites (Shelton, 2003). Meta-stereotypes 
presumably lead to intergroup contact threat. Clearly the belief that one (or one's group) 
is viewed negatively by an outgroup member would create concerns about how smooth or 
awkward the intergroup interaction will be. However, meta-stereotype information has 
never been manipulated experimentally to investigate this potential, and the research 
regarding the impact of meta-stereotypes on intergroup interactions is limited. Vorauer 
and Turpie (2004, Study 2) found that low prejudice Whites experienced heightened 
evaluative concerns and anxieties regarding an intergroup interaction when their 
Aboriginal interaction partner reportedly perceived experiencing a high (vs. low) amount 
of discrimination at the university (here the meta-stereotype that their ingroup is 
prejudiced was made salient to Whites, but not directly manipulated, i.e., participants 
were not directly informed that their partner thought Whites were prejudiced). Results of 
another study (Vorauer et aI., 1998, Study 2) showed that meta-stereotypes exerted a 
greater impact on anticipated enjoyment of an intergroup interaction than did other-
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stereotypes, and there was a relation between meta-stereotypes and anticipated negative 
emotional reactions, whereas no such relation existed between other-stereotypes and 
emotions. It is important to note though that this research did not involve direct meta-
stereotype manipulation, and targeted Aboriginals as an outgroup. The current Study 
examined whether meta-stereotypes are indeed more influential than other-stereotypes, as 
previous research would imply, or if a divergent model is supported. The three following 
models were tested (see Table 6.) 
Model X' Meta-stereotypes dominant. This model is based on the premise that 
meta-stereotypes exert more negative influence on intergroup interaction expectations 
than other-stereotypes. This possibility has been predicted by previous research (e.g., 
Vorauer et al., 1998). Thus, the Meta-stereotypes dominant model predicts that 
intergroup contact expectations will be very negative in the Personal and Group Meta-
Stereotype conditions, somewhat negative in the Personal and Group Other-Stereotype 
conditions, and neutral ( or baseline) in the Personal and Group Self-Stereotype 
conditions. 
Model Y: Meta- and other-stereotypes equally dominant. This model is based on 
the possibility that the negative impact of meta- and other-stereotypes on intergroup 
interaction expectations is equal. As stated above, both Meta- and Other-Stereotype 
manipulations are expected to lead to intergroup contact threat. Thus, it is possible that 
regardless of whether the outgroup holds a negative attitude toward the participant or 
her/his group (other-stereotype), or believes the participant or her/his group holds a 
negative attitude toward them (meta-stereotype), equal levels of intergroup contact threat 
are generated, leading to equally negative intergroup contact expectations. Thus, the 
83 
Table 6. 
Potential Models Regarding Anticipated Intergroup Contact Reactions Outcomes (Study 2) 
Experimental Condition 
Model Self-stereotype Other-stereotype Meta-stereotype 
Personal Group Personal Group Personal Group 
X. Meta-stereotypes I I 2 2 3 3 
dominant 
Y. Meta- and Other- I I 3 3 3 3 
stereotypes equally 
dominant 
Z. Other-stereotypes most I I 3 3 2 2 
dominant 
Note. Numbers within table refer to hypothetical magnitude of anticipated contact 
negativity ratings. 
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Meta- and other-stereotypes equally dominant model predicts very negative contact 
expectations in the Personal and Group Meta-stereotype conditions, and the Personal and 
Group Other-Stereotype conditions. This model predicts neutral (or baseline) contact 
expectations in the Personal and Group Self-Stereotype conditions. 
Model Z: Other-stereotypes dominant. This model is based on the possibility that 
other-stereotypes exert more negative influence on intergroup contact expectations than 
meta-stereotypes. It is possible that in the current study, concern regarding outgroup 
prejudice (other-stereotypes) may create more intergroup contact threat, and hence lead to 
more negative interaction expectations than concerns regarding outgroup perceptions of 
ingroup prejudice (meta-stereotypes). Thus, the Other-stereotypes dominant model 
predicts that intergroup contact expectations will be very negative in the Personal and 
Group Other-stereotype conditions, somewhat negative in the Personal and Group Meta-
Stereotype conditions, and neutral (or baseline) in the Personal and Group Self-
Stereotype conditions. 
Overall. It should be noted that in all models no differences are expected between 
each Personal and Group stereotype condition. Where differences are expected to exist is 
among Meta-, Other-, and Self-stereotype manipulations. In all models Personal and 
Group Meta-Stereotype manipulations are expected to have equal influence, given that 
both are expected to be equally threatening in tenns of intergroup contact threat, and that 
White participants were expected to generalize their partner's beliefs about Whites to the 
self and vice versa (e.g., "My partner thinks Whites are high in ingroup favouritism, I am 
White, so she must think this about me as well"). This parallels the finding that meta-
stereotypes of ingroup and meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup member tend to be similar 
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(Mendez et aI., 2007). In all models Personal and Group Other-Stereotype manipulations 
are expected to be equally influential given that both Other-Stereotype conditions are 
expected to be equally threatening, and that White participants are expected to generalize 
beliefs of Blacks in the sample to their Black interaction partner and vice versa (e.g., 
"Blacks feel this way, my partner is Black, she likely feels this way as well"), paralleling 
outgroup homogeneity effects (e.g., Judd & Park, 1988). Finally, in all models both 
Personal and Group Self-Stereotype manipulations are not expected to impact anticipated 
intergroup contact expectations. The Self-Stereotype manipulations are not expected to 
induce intergroup contact threat, and therefore not expected to lead to any strong 
interaction expectations. In the Self-Stereotype conditions, neutral or baseline ratings of 
contact expectations are expected. The inclusion of these conditions was important 
nonetheless, for comparison purposes. 
In keeping with Vorauer et al.' s (1998) prediction, I expected that Meta-
Stereotype manipulations would impact the intergroup interaction expectations more 
negatively than Other-Stereotype manipulations. It was expected that Meta-Stereotype 
manipulations would lead to higher levels of intergroup contact threat, and hence have a 
more negative impact. It was expected that both Personal and Group Other-Stereotype 
manipulations would create negative expectations regarding the intergroup interaction, 
but that these expectations would be less negative than those in the Meta-Stereotype 
conditions. The belief that one's partner (or one's partner's group) is prejudiced against 
one's ingroup is likely to create intergroup contact threat, but such a belief is often more 
threatening for minority than majority groups (Shelton, 2003). Historically, majority 
groups are the perpetrators of prejudice, while minority groups are the victims (Shelton, 
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2003); thus a majority group (e.g., Whites) is less likely to be concerned over being a 
target of prejudice, and more likely to be concerned with appearing prejudiced (i.e., meta-
stereotypes). Therefore, Other-Stereotype conditions were expected to create negative 
intergroup contact expectations, but less negative expectations than Meta-Stereotype 
conditions. 
Thus, for majority group members such as Whites, concerns about how 
prejudiced one (or one's group) is viewed (i.e., Meta-Stereotype manipulations) were 
expected to lead to high levels of intergroup contact threat (and hence the most negative 
contact expectations and reactions). Concerns that one's outgroup partner (or partner's 
group) is prejudiced (i.e., Other-Stereotype manipulations) were expected to also lead to 
intergroup contact threat (and negative expectations) but to a lesser degree (based on 
Vorauer et aI., 1998). As mentioned previously, concerns about one's own prejudice level 
(i.e., Personal Self-Stereotype manipulation) was expected to lead to self-concept threat, 
which was not expected to have an impact on intergroup contact expectations. Lastly, 
concerns about ingroup bias (i.e., the Group Self-Stereotype condition) were not expected 
to lead to much threat to participants or influence intergroup contact expectations, 
brushed off as relatively irrelevant to the participant's own interaction. It is important to 
note that the Personal Meta-Stereotype manipulation was expected to be threatening to 
both the self-concept and intergroup contact (see Table 4). However, as stated, 
introducing self-concept threat was expected to provide minimal influence on intergroup 
contact expectations. Thus, intergroup contact reactions in the Personal Meta-Stereotype 
condition were expected to be governed primarily by intergroup contact threat. 
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In summary, it was expected that the Meta-stereotypes dominant model would be 
supported, with the following hypotheses about the upcoming intergroup contact 
reactions: 
H3: Participants in both Meta-, and both Other-Stereotype conditions would exhibit 
negative interaction expectations, but participants in the Meta-Stereotype conditions 
would exhibit relatively more negative interaction expectations than those in the Other-
Stereotype conditions. 
Exploratory Investigations 
For exploratory purposes, differences in ingroup identification and prejudice 
justification among experimental groups were examined. No predictions were made 
regarding these relations. 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and forty-six Brock University Students participated in the Study 
for course participation or $5. Because the primary interest of the study was Whites, 24 
non-White participants (Asian, Aboriginal, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, and/or Other) and 2 
part-Black participants were excluded from the analyses. Fourteen suspicious participants 
(i.e., those who were accurate at identifying the hypotheses of the study) were also 
excluded. After screening the data, 1 participant was excluded due to clear random 
responding, and another was excluded due to having outlier scores (> 3 standard 
deviations above the mean) on six key variables (see preliminary analyses section). This 
left a final sample of204 (74% female). Participants ranged in age from 17-71 (M = 
20.04, SD = 4.48). 
Procedure 
The study took place entirely on computers in a lab, supervised by the researcher. 
Participants sat at private partitioned computer terminals, responding to various measures 
and receiving feedback messages. The experiment involved a "pre-manipulation" phase, 
a "manipulation" phase, and a "post-manipulation" phase. 
Pre-manipulation phase. After consenting (see Appendix C.2) to participation, 
participants completed several preliminary measures (see Materials), some of which were 
intended to gather pre-manipulation data, but primarily to enhance the manipulations of 
the study pertaining to feedback about ingroup favouritism. 
Manipulation phase. Next, participants received a message from the computer 
stating that their scores on their preliminary measures were being tabulated (see 
88 
89 
Appendix C.9 for wording of messages). Participants then read that the study would 
involve responding to some questionnaires, followed by a brief interaction with a partner. 
Participants then received demographic information from their apparent partner. Each 
participant received the same partner description (participant X: a Black 20 year old who 
liked watching TV and hanging out with friends), with the exception that each received a 
random partner number and partners matched the participant's sex. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the conditions mentioned 
above (see Table 4). To do this, participants received a message from the computer 
stating that they would receive information pertaining to preliminary measure outcomes. 
Depending on the condition they were assigned to, each participant was told they would 
receive information based on either the outcome of: (a) their own (Personal Self-
Stereotype condition); (b) their partner's (Personal Other-Stereotype condition) or other 
participants' (Group Self- and Other-Stereotype conditions) preliminary measures; or (c) 
their partner's interpretation of the participant's preliminary measures (Personal and 
Group Meta-stereotype conditions). Participants then received that information (e.g., in 
the Personal Self-Stereotype condition: "It has been determined that you strongly favour 
Whites over Blacks", see Appendix C.9 for details) reflecting their random assignment to 
one of six conditions. This information was displayed on the screen for several seconds 
before participants could move on. 
Post-manipulation phase. Participants responded to post-manipulation measures, 
most relating to their expectations about the upcoming interaction (see Materials). 
Participants then answered suspicion and manipulation check measures, and were 
debriefed (see Appendices C.20 & C.2I). Following this, participants received proof of 
participation and payment (if necessary). 
Materials 
During the pre-manipulation phase, participants completed several measures: 
Demographics (see Appendix C3). Participants provided demographic 
information in the pre-manipulation stage to ostensibly aid in the selection oftheir 
appropriate interaction partner. Participants provided their sex, ethnicity, age, year of 
study, and a list of hobbies. 
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JAT A measure of implicit ingroup favouritism, the Implicit Associations Test 
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) was 
included. The IAT paired Black and White faces with positive and negative terms. This 
reaction-time measure is difficult to consciously control. The IAT compares reaction 
times in response to congruent items (e.g., White-positive; Black-negative) with 
incongruent items (e.g., Black-positive; White-negative). The more rapidly one associates 
positive terms with a particular group, the more one will be considered to favour that 
group. The IAT was used to enhance the cover story of the experiment in that participants 
were led to believe that their (or other participants ') 'scores' on this measure would be 
tabulated and received as feedback. 
Prejudice relevant measures (see Appendix C4). The Modem Racism Scale was 
again employed (MRS, McConahay et al., 1981) to measure prejudice. Also, serving as 
an alternative measure of prejudice, was a self-rating of ingroup favouritism measure 
(analogous to Study I 's acknowledgement of personal bias measure). It was a one-item 
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measure ("To what extent do you favour Whites over Blacks") on a scale ranging from 0 
(not at all) to 10 (very much). 
Projection (see Appendix C. 5). As in Study 1, to measure projection of ingroup 
favouritism, participants were first asked to indicate whether they favoured Whites over 
Blacks on a dichotomous measure (yes/no response). Participants then rated the 
percentage of Whites and Blacks they believed to favour their respective ingroups (group 
ingroup favouritism; "percentage measures"; 0-100%). As another group ingroup 
favouritism measure, participants rated the extent to which Whites and Blacks favour 
their respective ingroups on scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much; "degree 
measures"). To create a "projection" index for each participant, an absolute difference 
score was obtained whereby the continuous measure of self-rated ingroup favouritism 
(see prejudice measures above) was subtracted from the second group ingroup 
favouritism measure (degree measure ).14 The degree measure was used as both it and 
continuous ingroup favouritism were measured on the same scales and referred to 
"extent" of ingroup favouritism (rather than one referring to extent and one to percent). 
Indices were computed for ingroup and outgroup projection. Using such difference 
scores, zeros would indicate perfect projection (i.e., complete self-group congruence), 
and scores deviating significantly from zero would indicate a lack of self-group 
congruence, as in Study 1. 
Big Five (see Appendix C.6). The Big Five personality inventory (BFI, John, 
Donahue, & Kentle 1991) was used to enhance the cover story of the experiment (i.e., 
14 These measures were multiplied by 10 before calculating the projection index such that projection index 
scores range from 0-100. This is for ease of understanding as post-manipulation prejudice 'extent' ratings 
ranged from 0-100. 
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some participants were led to believe that their interaction partner would form opinions 
based on preliminary measures). The BF1 is a 44-item scale with scores ranging from 1 
(disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly), which measures Extroversion, 
Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, and Agreeableness. A sample 
item from the scale is "I see myself as someone who is inventive." 
Meta-stereotypes and other-stereotypes (see Appendix C 7 & C8). To measure 
pre-manipulation meta-stereotype of self as individual, participants rated the extent to 
which Blacks in general view herlhim to show ingroup favouritism. For pre-manipulation 
meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member, participants were asked this question again, 
but group membership was salient (i.e., Based on your membership in the group, Whites, 
rate the extent to which Blacks view you to favour Whites over Blacks). To measure pre-
manipulation meta-stereotypes of ingroup, participants rated the extent to which Blacks 
view Whites to show ingroup favouritism. As a second measure of pre-manipulation 
meta-stereotypes of ingroup, participants rated the percentage of Whites that Blacks 
believe to show ingroup favouritism. Ratings of Black ingroup favouritism used to 
calculate outgroup projection (see projection materials) also served as a measure of pre-
manipulation other-stereotypes. As mentioned above, participants rated the extent to 
which Blacks favoured Blacks over Whites and the percentage of Blacks who favour 
Blacks over Whites. All degree measures were on scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 
(very much), whereas percentage ratings ranged from 0-100%. 
Post-manipulation, participants responded to questions regarding the alleged 
upcoming interaction, as well as measures of projection, ingroup identification and 
prejudice justification. 
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Contact-specific intergroup anxiety and outgroup avoidance (see Appendix ClO). 
Stephan and Stephan's (1985) intergroup anxiety scale, modified to refer to the specific 
interaction, gauged anxiety anticipated during the interaction. The avoidance measure 
consisted of the mean of two items: (a) the desire to avoid the upcoming interaction, and 
(b) the extent to which participants would rather not interact with their partner, which 
were on a 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much) scale. 
Personalized meta-stereotypes and other-stereotype (see Appendices Cll & 
Cl2). To measure the meta-stereotype of self as individual, participants rated the extent 
to which their partner would view her/him to show ingroup favouritism. For meta-
stereotype of self as ingroup member, participants were asked this question again, but 
group membership was salient (i.e., Based on your membership in the group, White 
Brock students, rate the extent to which your partner will view you to favour Whites over 
Blacks). To measure meta-stereotypes of in group, participants rated the extent to which 
their partner viewed White Brock students to show ingroup favouritism, and also the 
percentage (0-100%) of White Brock students their partner viewed to show ingroup 
favouritism. These were all measures of 'personalized meta -stereotypes' (see Vorauer et 
al., 1998), as they refer to the thoughts of one specific outgroup member (the interaction 
partner). To assess the personalized 'other-stereotype', participants rated the extent to 
which their partner favoured Blacks over Whites. All of these ratings scales ranged from 
o (not at all) to 10 (very much), except of the ingroup meta-stereotype percentage 
measure (0-100%). 
Quality of the interaction (see Appendix Cl3). Three items adapted from V oci 
and Hewstone (2003) were employed to assess anticipated quality of the interaction 
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(original Cronbach's a = .67). Each participant rated the extent to which slhe anticipated 
the interaction with the partner to be ( a) pleasant, (b) cooperative, (c) superficial and 
insincere. Participants also rated their perceptions of their partner's responses to these 
items. Items were rated on a 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much) scale. 
Post manipulation projection (see Appendix CI4). Projection was measured as in 
the pre-manipulation phase, with the exception that self-rated and group (White and 
Black) ingroup favouritism degree measures were on scales ranging from 0 to 100, to 
provide variety for participants. 
Ingroup identification (see Appendix CI5). A new identification measure was 
employed in Study 2 in an attempt to attain higher reliability than obtained in Study 1. 
This 3-item measure adapted from Hodson et al. (2009) ranged from 0 (not at all) to 10 
(very much) and had an original Cronbach's a = .86. A sample item from this scale is 
'How important is being White to your self-identity?'. 
Prejudice justification (see Appendix CI6). The general prejudice justification 
measure (Esses & Hodson, 2006) used in Study 1 was employed. 
Behavioural measure of avoidance (see Appendix CIl). Near the end of the study 
participants were given a choice whether or not to participate in the interaction with their 
partner. This was a yes/no choice, worded such that "yes" meant the participant would 
like to interact with herlhis partner, and "no" meant slhe would rather have a different 
partner. For clarity purposes, responses on the "yes" measure will be termed "approach" 
and responses on the "no" measure will be termed "avoidance." 
Following all measures, participants completed suspicion and manipulation 
checks. 
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Suspicion checks (see Appendix C.J8). Participants responded to an open-ended 
measure asking them to guess the hypotheses of the study. Participants also responded to 
a dichotomous measure asking whether they found anything about the study suspicious 
(yes versus no). Participants responding "yes" were asked to elaborate in an open-ended 
space. 
Manipulation check (see Appendix C.J9). Due to the nature of the study, it was 
determined that a traditional manipulation check (i.e., immediately following the 
manipulation, see Pelham & Blanton, 2007) would likely compromise the study, either by 
arousing suspicion about the purposes of the study, or by systematically biasing 
responses (for a similar rationale, see Blanton, Pelham, Dehart, & Carvallo, 200 1). 
Instead, an alternative manipulation check was employed. At the closing of the 50 minute 
study, participants were asked to choose which information they were given by the 
computer at the beginning of the study, selecting from a list of7 options (l option each 
referring to each condition, and 1 stating "I did not receive any of this information"). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses and Descriptive Statistics 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to investigate missing data, normality, and 
outliers. There were no data missing on any of the relevant final calculated variables 
because in most cases participants were not permitted to continue the computer-based 
study without entering data, with the exception of some variables on multi-item scales. 
For these variables, the mean of the items was calculated to avoid statistical concerns 
with missing data. Thus, individual items used to calculate each of these variables were 
investigated for missing data as well. It was found that there was 1 missing value on 
contact-specific intergroup anxiety item 5, 2 values missing on contact-specific 
intergroup anxiety item 6, and 1 value each missing from contact-specific intergroup 
anxiety items 8, 9, and 10. On general prejudice justification there was 1 value each 
missing from items 1, 2, and 6. Visual examination revealed that one participant was 
missing data on 3 items of the contact-specific intergroup anxiety scale. However, it was 
determined that intergroup anxiety could be accurately obtained by calculating the mean 
of the remaining items, so this participant was not excluded from further analyses. 
Examination of the data revealed that in the other case where there were multiple items 
missing from one scale, these missing items were not from the same participant. Thus, 
because such a small amount of data was missing from these scales, it was deemed 
acceptable to use the mean function to calculate the variables, and the (final calculated) 
variables were considered to be without missing data. There were also no missing data 
found on any of the demographic variables (age, sex, ethnicity). 
To investigate normality, skewness and kurtosis values were examined for each 
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continuous variable. Based on the criteria that skewness coefficients and kurtosis values 
of> 121 indicate distributions deviating from normality, distributions for all ofthe 
variables can be considered normal with regard to skewness and kurtosis. These values 
are presented in Table 7. 
To examine potential univariate outliers in each of the continuous variables of 
interest, scores on each variable were converted to z-scores. Based on the criterion that z-
scores> 131 are probable outliers, examination of z-score frequencies and visual 
examination of the data revealed outliers on several variables. A pattern emerged, where 
one participant presented outlier scores on 6 variables. After performing several key 
analyses with and without this participant, it was determined that this participant was 
erroneously skewing results and should be excluded from further analyses. With this 
participant excluded, examination of the data revealed only 2 outliers on pre-
manipulation ingroup meta-stereotype (degree measure), and 3 outliers on general 
prejudice justification. The outliers that were detected were not due to data entry errors, 
nor did they skew results. Thus, with no justifiable reason to remove these outliers, they 
were included in subsequent analyses. With regard to tested regression models, there 
were 3 outliers in the solution identified based on the criterion that standardized residuals 
greater than 131 are probable outliers. However, further analyses revealed that these 
outliers were not influential enough to warrant removal from the main analyses (e.g., no 
differences found when conducting key analyses with and without these outliers). 
Descriptive statistics for key continuous variables collapsing across conditions are 
presented in Table 7, and frequency statistics for all key categorical variables collapsed 
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Table 7. 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Continuous Variables, Collapsed across Conditions (Study 2) 
Variable (possible range) Mean SD Skew Kurt 
Pre-manipulation phase 
Self-rating of in group favouritism (0-100)a 23.03 26.57 .967 -.307 
Prejudice against Blacks, MRS (0-4) .84 .58 .978 .718 
Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, percent (0-100) 54.29 21.82 -.286 -.803 
Outgroup's ingroup favouritism, percent (0-100) 64.58 22.94 -.535 -.356 
Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, degree (0-100t 55.24 20.83 -.364 -.601 
Outgroup's ingroup favouritism, degree (0-100t 65.14 20.40 -.631 .103 
Ingroup projection index, (0-100t 33.67 23.46 .318 -.922 
Outgroup projection index, (0-100t 43.77 25.74 .000 -1.04 
Meta-stereotype of self as individual (0-10) 4.64 3.19 -.112 -1.33 
Meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member (0-10) 5.13 3.02 -.364 -1.153 
Meta-stereotype ofingroup, degree (0-10) 6.82 2.05 -.714 .291 
Meta-stereotype of in group, percent (0-100) 71.82 21.67 -.762 -.155 
Post-manipulation phase 
contact-specific intergroup anxiety (-3 to +3) -.83 1.10 .145 -.502 
contact-specific outgroup avoidance (desire to avoid) (0-10) 2.71 2.61 .823 -.108 
personalized meta-stereotype of self as individual (0-10) 4.66 3.20 -.139 -1.28 
personalized meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member (0-10) 5.00 3.05 -.342 -1.13 
personalized meta-stereotype of ingroup, degree (0-10) 5.66 2.86 -.496 -.751 
personalized meta-stereotype ofingroup, percent (0-100) 62.10 24.44 -.805 -.025 
personalized other-stereotype, degree (0-10) 5.52 2.91 -.371 -.859 
anticipated quality of interaction, self ratings (0-10) 7.16 1.71 .018 -.775 
anticipated quality of interaction, partner ratings (0-10) 6.59 1.95 -.012 -.521 
Self-rating ofingroup favouritism (0-100) 24.27 24.87 .757 -.812 
Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, percent (0-100) 56.70 22.42 -.499 -.588 
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Mean SD Skew 
Post-manipulation phase (continued) 
Outgroup's ingroup favouritism, percent (0-100) 63.19 22.78 -.801 
Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, degree (0-100) 52.60 22.93 -.483 
Outgroup's ingroup favouritism, degree (0-100) 63.28 20.87 -.667 
Ingroup projection index (0-100) 29.27 22.34 .589 
Outgroup projection index (0-100) 40.08 23.53 .299 
General prejudice justification (1-7) 2.18 .92 .900 
Ingroup identification (0-10) 5.54 2.21 -.299 
Note. Pre-manipulation phase measures marked with the superscript 'a' originally ranged from 0-10 but 
were multiplied by 10 to facilitate comparisons with other measures on 0-100 scales. Lower scores on the 
projection index represent more self-group congruency (i.e., more projection). 
Kurt 
.076 
-.538 
-.183 
-.732 
-.840 
.800 
-.599 
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across conditions are presented in Table 8. Descriptive statistics for all key post-
manipulation continuous variables within conditions can be found in Table 9, and key 
post-manipulation categorical variable frequencies within conditions can be found in 
Table 10. Note that descriptive statistics of both pre- and post-manipulation variables are 
presented. 
Sex differences on key pre-manipulation projection and stereotype variables were 
examined, with no significant sex differences obtained. Thus, further sex differences 
were not examined. 
Correlations among Key Variables 
Correlations among key variables are presented in Tables 11 and 12. For clarity 
purposes, Table 11 displays two-tailed correlations between pre-manipulation variables; 
Table 12 displays two-tailed correlations between post-manipulation variables. Most 
correlations were consistent with expectations. Key correlations will be discussed 
subsequently. Note that the correlations of both pre- and post-manipulation variables are 
presented below. 
Differences among Conditions on Key Pre-manipulation Variables 
Several one-way ANOY As were conducted to test for potential differences among 
experimental groups on the pre-manipulation variables. None ofthese ANOY As were 
significant. However, examination of Fisher's LSD post hoc tests revealed marginal 
differences on the ingroup projection index, the outgroup projection index, and the meta-
stereotype of ingroup ( degree) variables. Despite this, given that the omnibus test was not 
significant, and that the differences observed were merely marginal, the pre-manipulation 
variables can be considered equivalent across experimental conditions for the most part. 
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Table 8. 
Frequency Statistics for Key Categorical Variables, Collapsed across Conditions (Study 
2) 
% YES %NO 
Pre-manipulation 
Dichotomous ingroup favouritism self-rating 25.0 75.0 
Post-manipulation 
Dichotomous ingroup favouritism self-rating 27.5 72.5 
% APPROACH % AVOID 
Behavioural avoidance 89.7 10.3 
Note. Recall that 'yes' responses on behavioural avoidance represent approach, while 
'no' represents avoidance. 
Table 9. 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Post-Manipulation Variables within Experimental Conditions (Study 2) 
Personal Group Self- Personal Group Personal Group Meta-
Self- Stereotype Other- Other- Meta- Stereotype 
Stereotype (n = 34) Stereotype Stereotype Stereotype (n = 30) 
(n = 34) (n = 35) (n = 35) (n = 36) 
Variable (Possible range) M M M M M M 
(SD) (SD) (SD) (flD) (SD2 (flD) 
-1.02 -1.28 -.63 -.78 -.52 -.75 
contact-specific intergroup anxiety (-3 to +3) (1.10) (.82) (1.05) (1.15) (1.20) (1.16) 
contact-specific outgroup avoidance (desire to 1.85 2.34 3.28 2.68 3.09 3.00 
avoid (0-10) (2.44) (2.31) (2.31) (2.63) (2.56) (3.30) 
personalized meta-stereotype of self as 3.38 4.47 5.17 5.29 4.64 5.00 
individual (0-10) (2.73) (3.30) (3.30) (3.15) (3.31) (3.20) 
personalized meta-stereotype of self as ingroup 3.62 5.12 5.37 5.86 4.64 5.40 
member (0-10) (2.63) (2.94) (3.24) (2.80) (2.94) (3.48) 
personalized meta-stereotype of ingroup,degree 3.91 5.15 6.71 6.17 5.53 6.53 
(0-10) (2.82) (2.93) (2.33) (2.47) (2.62) (3.21) 
personalized meta-stereotype of ingroup, 45.29 58.35 72.72 65.63 60.47 70.83 
percent (0-100) (26.91) (26.92) (17.85) (19.78) (23.60) (21.17) 
personalized other-stereotype, degree (0-10) 3.47 5.00 7.94 6.37 4.64 5.70 
(2.68) (2.84) (2.21 ) (2.49) (2.58) (2.62) 
anticipated quality of interaction, self ratings 8.10 7.38 6.56 7.12 6.93 6.88 
(0-10) (1.47) (l.41) (1.43) (1.81) (1.86) (1.87) 
anticipated quality of interaction, partner 7.50 6.98 6.03 6.57 6.11 6.35 
ratings (0-10) (1.89) (1.51) (1.60) (1.99) (2.26) (2.13) 
Self rating of ingroup favouritism (0-100) 21.09 21.12 31.23 25.26 21.53 25.47 
(23.30) (23.56) (26.01) (25.60) (23.84) (27.16) 
Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, percent (0-100) 49.62 58.35 60.09 63.97 50.22 58.17 
(26.66) (21.98) (17.62) (21.62) (20.08) (23.83) 
....... 
0 
tv 
Personal Group Self- Personal Group Personal Group Meta-
Self- Stereotype Other- Other- Meta- Stereotype 
Stereotype (n = 34) Stereotype Stereotype Stereotype (n = 30) 
(n = 34) (n = 35) (n = 35) (n = 36) 
Variable (Possible range) M M M M M M 
(SD) (SD) (SD)_ . (§!2J (!$D) (SD) 
Outgroup's ingroup favouritism, percent (0- 53.44 63.09 67.43 69.63 60.89 64.67 
100) (28.29) (20.89) (17.16) (21.17) (21.94) (24.10) 
Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, degree (0-100) 43.71 56.65 56.80 59.14 46.61 52.77 
(25.85) (24.03) (20.78) (17.94) (21.78) (24.04) 
Outgroup's ingroupfavouritism, degree (0-100) 56.17 64.41 66.28 69.43 59.72 63.66 
(22.16) (20.77) (21.43) (17.31) (21.97) (19.91) 
Ingroup projection index (0-100) 22.79 36.11 27.85 35.54 25.41 27.83 
(18.60) (26.15) (20.75) (20.68) (23.60) (21.70) 
Outgroup projection index (0-100) 35.20 44.41 38.25 46.00 38.19 38.20 
(22.27) (24.91) (22.74) (22.67) (26.24) (21.50) 
General prejudice justification (1-7) 1.92 2.26 2.31 2.19 2.35 2.05 
(.81) (.81) (1.20) (.90) (.96) (.76) 
Ingroup identification (0-10) 4.87 5.61 5.78 5.65 5.80 5.52 
(2.28) (2.42) (2.03) (2.28) (2.06) (2.21) 
,..... 
o 
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Table 10. 
Frequency Statistics for Key Post Manipulation Categorical Variables, within Experimental Condition (Study 2) 
Personal Self- Group Self- Personal Other- Group Other- Personal Meta-
Stereotype Stereotype Stereotype Stereotype Stereotype 
(n = 34) (n = 34) (n = 35) (n = 35) (n = 36) 
% % % % % % % % % % 
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Dichotomous 26.5 73.5 20.6 79.4 28.6 71.4 28.6 71.4 25.0 75.0 
mgroup 
favouritism rating 
self-rating 
% % % % % % % % % % 
Approach Avoid Approach Avoid Approach Avoid Approach Avoid Approach Avoid 
Behavioural 94.1 5.9 94.1 5.9 94.3 5.7 88.6 11.4 75.0 25.0 
avoidance 
Note. Recall that 'yes' responses on behavioural avoidance represent approach, while 'no' represents avoidance. 
Group Meta-
Stereotype 
(n = 30) 
% 
YES 
36.7 
% 
Approach 
93.3 
% 
NO 
63.3 
% 
Avoid 
6.7 
,..... 
o 
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Table 11. 
Correlations among Key" Pre-Manipulation Variables Collaesed across Condition (Study 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) self rating of ingroup favouritism .49*** .33*** .2S*** .44*** .29*** na+ na+ .43*** .35*** .25*** .23*** 
(2) Prejudice against Blacks (MRS) .SO .16* .25*** .16* .17* -.2S*** -.30*** .14* .16* .05 .07 
(3) Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, .76*** .67*** .52*** .27*** .13 .35*** .44*** .56*** .70*** 
percent 
(4) Outgroup's ingroup favouritism, .57*** .72*** .25*** .32*** .30*** .39*** .59*** .66*** 
percent 
(5) Ingroup's ingroup favouritism, .63*** .39*** .07 .40*** .40*** .50*** .55*** 
degree 
(6) Outgroup's ingroup favouritism, .22** .37*** .30*** .31 *** .54*** .53*** 
degree 
(7) Ingroup projection index .77** -.OS .01 .21 *** .27*** 
(8) Outgroup projection index -.14* -.04 .21 ** .22** 
(9) Meta-stereotype of self as individual .66*** .50*** .37*** 
(10) Meta-stereotype of self as ingroup .44*** .40*** 
member 
(11) Meta-stereotype of ingroup, degree .79*** 
(12) Meta-stereotype of ingroup, percent 
Note. N = 204. Where applicable, values in diagonal represent scale reliabilities. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. +correlations between projection indices and continuous acknowledgement of bias 
measure are uninterpretable as this measure was involved in the calculation of projection indices. Correlations are two-tailed. 
....... 
o 
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Table 12. 
Correlations among Key Post-Manipulation Variables Collapsed across Condition (Study 2) 
I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17 . 18. 
I. Contact- .90 . 63*** .31 *** .29*** .25*** .19** .25*** -.63*** -.53*** .33*** .03 .12 .11 .13 -.20** -.20** .14* .08 
specific 
intergroup 
anxiety 
2. Contact- .85 .39*** .38*** .38*** .34*** .30*** -.64*** -.49*** .44*** .25*** .28*** .32*** .29*** -.11 -.20** .27*** .19** , 
specific outgroup 
avoidance (desire) 
3. Personalized .75*** .64*** .58*** .52*** -.35*** -.38*** .33*** .40*** .38*** .47*** .43*** .14* .04. .26*** .15* 
meta-stereotype 
of self as 
individual 
4. Personalized .74*** .60*** .57*** -.34*** -.32*** .36*** .45*** .44*** .50*** .49*** .14* .06 .28*** .28*** 
meta-stereotype 
of self as ingroup 
member 
5. Personalized .69*** .65*** -.40*** -.36*** .36*** .51*** .50*** .51 *** .57*** .15* .13 .28*** .28*** 
meta-stereotype 
of in group, 
degree 
6. Personalized .68*** -.27*** -.26*** .38*** .73*** .72*** .62*** .69*** .23** .22** .34*** .32*** 
meta-stereotype 
of in group, 
percent 
7. Personalized -.30*** -.28*** .41*** .48*** .52*** .49*** .61*** .07 .11 .31 *** .32*** 
other-stereotype, 
degree 
8. Anticipated .75 .80*** -.39*** -.14* -.21 ** -.26*** -.21 ** .12 .22** -.17* -.10 
quality of 
interaction, self 
ratings 
9. Anticipated .81 -.26*** -.11 -.18* -.25*** -.18** .01 .11 -.15* -.05 
quality of 
interaction, 
partner ratings 
10. Self rating of .49*** .42*** .52*** .40*** na+ na+ .56*** .36*** 
ingroup 
favouritism 
>-' 
0 
0\ 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. II. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
11. Ingroup' s . 86*** .81*** .69*** .30*** .13 
ingroup 
favouritism, 
percent (0-100) 
12.0utgroup's .69*** .80*** .26*** .26*** 
ingroup 
favouritism, 
percent (0-100) 
13. Ingroup's .65*** .44*** .06 
ingroup 
favouritism, 
degree 
14.0utgroup's .25*** .40*** 
ingroup 
favouritism, 
degree 
15. Ingroup .73*** 
proj ection index 
16.0utgroup 
proj ection index 
17. General 
prejudice 
justification 
18. Ingroup 
identification 
Note. N = 204. Where applicable, values in diagonal represent scale reliabilities. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. +correlations 
between projection indices and continuous acknowledgement of bias measure are uninterpretable as this measure was involved in the 
calculation of projection indices. Correlations are two-tailed. 
17 . 
.35*** 
.32*** 
.36*** 
.28*** 
-.20** 
-.32*** 
.77 
18. 
.34*** 
.28*** 
.24*** 
.25*** 
-.12 
-.13 
.36*** 
.80 
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Results Testing the Replication a/Study 1 
The following analyses concern variables measured prior to manipulation and are 
thus collapsed across experimental conditions. 
Projection. Consistent with Study 1 and RIa, evidence of in group projection of 
ingroup favoritism was found in Study 2. First, traditional projection analyses (using the 
standard social projection paradigm) demonstrated evidence of projection. Those 
acknowledging personal ingroup favouritism on the dichotomous measure (n = 51) 
reported a significantly higher percentage of ingroup favouring Whites (M = 68.49, SD = 
18.18) than those who did not acknowledge personal ingroup favouritism (M= 49.56, SD 
= 20.91), t(202) = 5.78,p < .001. Replicating Study 1, this rating of White ingroup 
favouritism was significantly greater than the midpoint of the scale (50) among those 
acknowledging personal ingroup favouritism, t(50) = 7.26,p < .001, but was not 
significantly different from the midpoint among those who did not acknowledge personal 
ingroup favouritism, t(152) = -.26,p = .793. Second, more accurately depicting the 
projection phenomenon were the two-tailed correlations between the continuous self 
rating of ingroup favouritism measure (employed based on Ames' (2004b ) suggestion) 
and White's ingroup favouritism ratings (extent and percent measures rs = .33 and .44, 
respectively; see Table 11). These results indicate that greater self-rated ingroup 
favouritism was associated with higher ratings of White's ingroup favouritism. 
Study 2 also revealed evidence of outgroup projection of ingroup favoritism (i.e., 
Whites who favoured their ingroup thought a large number of Blacks favoured their own 
ingroup). On pre-manipulation measures, Whites who acknowledged ingroup favouritism 
on the dichotomous measure reported a significantly greater percentage of ingroup-
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favouring Blacks (M = 77.41, SD = 18.62) than those who did not acknowledge personal 
ingroup favouritism (M= 60.30, SD = 22.70), t(202) = 4.86,p < .001. There were also 
positive two-tailed correlations between continuous self-ratings of ingroup favouritism 
and outgroup ratings of ingroup favouritism (rs = .28, .29; see Table 11). One difference 
between ingroup and outgroup projection of in group favouritism however, was that the 
ratings of Black ingroup favouritism were significantly higher than the midpoint of the 
scale (50) for both those acknowledging personal ingroup favouritism, and those denying 
personal ingroup favouritism (ps<.OOl). This was inconsistent with Study 1, but recall 
that here the intergroup attitude concerns favouritism and not anti-outgroup prejudice. 
Thus, Whites overall believed that Blacks strongly favoured their own ingroup (Blacks), 
however those acknowledging personal ingroup favouritism did so considerably more 
than those denying personal favouritism. That is, ingroup-favoring Whites exaggerated 
the extent to which most Blacks do the same. Because the primary interest of Study 2 is 
ingroup proj ection, this will be the focus of subsequent discussions of proj ection. 
Meta-stereotypes. Consistent with Study 1, and in support of hypothesis RIb, 
Whites held a meta-stereotype that Blacks view Whites to favour their ingroup (Whites). 
Evidence of this can be found by examining the mean ratings of meta-stereotypes of 
ingroup (both percent and degree ratings; see Table 7). These mean ratings were 
significantly greater than the midpoint of the scale (5 for degree ratings [t(203) = 12.73,p 
< .001], 50 for percentage ratings[t(203) = 14.38,p < .001]). In examining differences 
among the different types of meta-stereotypes, t-tests revealed participants rated the 
meta-stereotypes of ingroup (using both the degree and percentage measures 15) more 
15 percentage ratings were divided by lOin order to compare to the other meta-stereotype ratings which 
were measured on a 0-10 scale. 
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negatively than meta-stereotype of self as individual, replicating Study 1, t(203) = 11.14, 
p < .001; t(203) = 11.65,p < .001. Meta-stereotypes of in group (both degree and 
percentage measures) were also rated significantly more negatively than meta-stereotypes 
of self as ingroup member, t(203) = 8.61,p < .001; t(203) = 10.Ol,p < .001, respectively. 
Additionally, participants rated meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup member more 
negatively than meta-stereotypes of self as individual, t(203) = 2.77, p = .006. Thus, 
participants expected that Blacks would view them more positively as individuals than as 
members of their ingroup. This analysis in particular is unique to the current study. 
Despite these mean differences, all types of meta-stereotype ratings were significantly 
correlated (see Table 11). 
Relation between projection and meta-stereotypes. To test the hypothesis that 
ingroup favouritism meta-stereotypes of ingroup were formed via ingroup and outgroup 
projection of ingroup favouritism, analyses similar to those performed in Study 1 were 
conducted. However, because Study 2 involved two types of measures of meta-
stereotypes of ingroup (a percentage measure and a degree measure), two models were 
tested. The first model tested whether self-rated ingroup favouritism predicted meta-
stereotype of ingroup percentage ratings through perceived ingroup' s (White's) and 
-
outgroup's (Black's) ingroup favouritism percentage ratings, whereas the second tested 
whether self-rated ingroup favouritism predicted meta-stereotype of ingroup degree 
ratings through ingroup and outgroup ingroup favouritism degree ratings (see Figures 4a 
and 4b). All correlations relevant to both models were significant (see Table 11), 
indicating preliminary support for the models. Each model was then tested in a path 
model using Amos 16.0 software. Again, bootstrapping procedures were employed. 
(Ingroup projection) 
.33*** 
Self-rated 
mgroup 
favouritism 
.28*** 
(Outgroup projection, 
intergroup target category level) 
White ingroup 
favouritism 
.73*** 
Black ingroup 
favouritism 
111 
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Meta-stereotype 
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percentage of Whitcs favouring 
Whites) 
.30*** 
(Outgroup projection, 
intergroup target category level) 
Figure 4a. Results of path model testing the hypothesized relation between meta-stereotypes of ingroup 
(percent measure) and the projection of intergroup attitudes. *** p < .01. Path coefficients are standardized. 
(Ingroup projection) 
.44*** 
Self-rated 
mgroup 
favouritism 
.29*** 
(Outgroup projection, 
intergroup target category level) 
White ingroup 
favouritism 
.59*** 
Black ingroup 
favouritism 
(Outgroup projection, specific 
ategory level) 
.27*** 
Meta-stereotype (degree 
measure) (Blacks perceived to 
view high degree White ingroup 
favouritism) 
.36*** 
(Outgroup projection, 
intergroup target category level) 
Figure 4b. Results of path model testing the hypothesized relation between meta-stereotypes of ingroup 
(degree measure) and the projection of intergroup attitudes.*** p < .01. Path coefficients are standardized. 
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Both models demonstrated good fit, X2(I) = .039,p = .884, RMSEA = .000, CFI = 1.00, 
and SRMR = .003 (percentage measures), and X2(l) = .200,p = .654, RMSEA = .000, 
CFI = 1.00, and SRMR = .007 (degree measures) according to established fit criteria. 
Also, including a direct path from self-rated ingroup favouritism to meta-stereotype in 
each model resulted in a non-significant path, p = -.OI,p = .873 (percentage measures), p 
= .03,p = .727 (degree measures), illustrating full mediation. Thus, results were 
consistent with expectations, and replicated Study 1. 
Alternative models similar to those tested in Study 1 were performed to rule out 
the possibility that introjection contributes to the formation of meta-stereotypes rather 
than projection. Both of these models demonstrated poor fit to the data: X2(2) = 140.99,p 
< .001, RMSEA = .585, CFI = .594, and SRMR = .271 (percentage measures), and X 2(2) 
= 69.II,p < .001, RMSEA = 0407, CFI = .703, and SRMR = .192 (degree measures). 
This illustrated that in the context of explaining ingroup favouritism meta-stereotypes, 
self-to-group 'projection' provides a better fit to the data than group-to-self 'introjection', 
replicating Study 1. 
Following these analyses, for exploratory purposes, the hypothesized model was 
tested with meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup member as the dependent variable. This 
perception is highly group-relevant, and possibly formed through ingroup and outgroup 
projection as well, unlike meta-stereotypes of self as individual. Thus, it was tested 
whether self-rated ingroup favouritism predicted meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup 
member through ingroup' sand outgroup' s ingroup favouritism ratings. Degree measures 
of group ingroup favouritism ratings were used, given that meta-stereotype of self as 
ingroup member was measured on this scale. All model paths were significant (p < .001), 
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with the exception ofthe path from outgroup's (Black's) ingroup favouritism rating to 
meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member. The model did not fit well, t(l) = 9.39, p = 
.002, RMSEA = .203, CFI = .956, and SRMR = .054, however. Meta-stereotypes of 
ingroup then, are likely formed through ingroup projection and outgroup projection at the 
level of specific category only (i.e., only paths 1 and 2 of Figure 1). 
Manipulation Check 
Of the participants who reported receiving information corresponding to one of 
the experimental conditions, the following percentages of participants chose the option 
referring to the correct condition: 93% Personal Self-Stereotype condition, 79% in the 
Group Self-Stereotype condition, 71% in the Personal Other-Stereotype condition, 38% 
of participants in the Group Other-Stereotype condition, 62% in the Personal Meta-
Stereotype condition, and 50% of participants in the Group Meta-Stereotype condition. 
As stated above, the manipulation check was reserved until the end of the study to 
avoid influencing the key dependent measures (see also Blanton et aI., 2001). Note also 
that several of the choices from the options list were quite similar (e.g., the options 
referring to the Personal Other-Stereotype and Group Other-Stereotype conditions, see 
Appendix C.21), which may have led to confusion at this late point in the study. Perhaps 
percentages of participants choosing the response corresponding to the correct condition 
would be higher were it not for these issues. Regardless, based on the results, the fact that 
participants could not continue to the next section of the study without pauses at the 
screens involving the manipulation messages, and visual examination of open-ended 
suspicion check measures of the study, it was deemed reasonable to assume that 
participants included in the analyses were aware of the manipulation information. 
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Projection 
The following tests examine the validity of Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Post-manipulation projection correlations within experimental condition. Recall 
that ingroup projection of ingroup favouritism is represented by the correlation between 
self ratings of ingroup favouritism ( continuous measure), and ingroup ratings of ingroup 
favouritism (degree measure ).16 These correlations were examined within experimental 
conditions, to determine ifthe correlations were stronger in any condition(s) (see Table 
13). To remove the potential influence of chance pre-manipulation projection differences, 
post-manipulation projection correlations were examined controlling for pre-
manipulation projection (using the pre-manipulation projection index). This partial 
correlation was very strong in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition (r = .80), 
illustrating strong projection under self-concept threat, as expected. Although z-tests 
conducted using the statistical package Corpack (MacIntyre & MacMaster, 2000) 
revealed that in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition this correlation did not differ 
significantly from those in the Personal or Group Meta-Stereotype conditions, it did 
differ significantly from the other three conditions. This cannot be said for the two 
aforementioned Meta-Stereotype conditions. Thus, participants in the Personal Self-
Stereotype, Personal Meta-Stereotype, and Group Meta-Stereotype conditions 
demonstrated the strongest post-manipulation projection correlations, with the correlation 
in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition standing out as quite strong. Although the focus 
of this study was ingroup projection ofingroup favouritism, Table 13 presents within 
16 Both the correlation between self-rated ingroup favouritism and ingroup ratings of ingroup favouritism 
(percent) and the correlation between self-rated ingroup favouritism and ingroup ratings of ingroup 
favouritism (degree) provide evidence of projection, but these analyses will focus on the correlation 
between self-rated ingroup favouritism and degree ratings, simply because both are on a 0-10 "extent" 
rating scale. Correlations between self-rated ingroup favouritism and percent ratings are quite similar. 
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Table 13. 
Post-Manipulation Projection Partial Correlations (correlations between self-rated ingroup 
favouritism and ratings of ingroup 's ingroup favouritism [degree)) within Experimental 
Condition, Controllingfor Pre-Manipulation Projection (Study 2) 
Condition Ingroup projection correlation Outgroup projection correlation 
Personal Self-Stereotype .80*** a .62*** ab 
Group Self-Stereotype .36* b .32+a 
Personal Other-Stereotype .56** b .39*a 
Group Other-Stereotype .49** b .41 *a 
Personal Meta-Stereotype .65*** ab .72***b 
Group Meta-Stereotype .64*** ab .74***b 
Note.+ p = .06 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Within columns, correlations sharing an alphabet subscript 
do not differ significantly; correlations that do not share a subscript differ significantly from one another at 
p < .05 using z-tests derived from the Corpack statistical package (MacIntyre & MacMaster, 2000). 
Correlations are two-tailed. 
condition outgroup projection correlations for interest. The pattern of the outgroup 
projection correlations appears similar, save that in the Personal Self-Stereotype 
condition the outgroup projection correlation was not as prominent as the ingroup 
projection correlation. Future research can examine why this difference may exist. 
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Differences in projection scores from pre- to post- manipulation. As an alternative 
way to investigate projection strength as a function of experimental condition, an 
examination of whether projection of ingroup favouritism became stronger in certain 
experimental conditions was conducted. To do so, means of the projection score index 
were compared between the pre- and post-manipulation phase. This was to examine 
whether participants in certain conditions might project ingroup favouritism more or less 
after receiving manipulation feedback. Paired t tests revealed that only in the Personal 
Self-Stereotype condition (i.e., participant informed of personal biases, thus under self-
concept threat) did projection become significantly stronger from the pre- to post-
manipulation phase (see Table 14). 
Upon establishing this mean difference, it was necessary to "unpack" this effect to 
examine what component(s) of the projection index changed based on the manipulation. 
To do so, means of the variables composing the projection index (self-ratings of ingroup 
favouritism and ingroup ratings of ingroup favoritism [degree]) were compared between 
the pre- and post-manipulation phase in the key (Personal Self-Stereotype) condition to 
determine which ratings became higher or lower leading to greater congruency between 
self and ingroup ratings of ingroup favouritism. Figure 5 illustrates that, in the Personal-
Self Stereotype condition, ingroup ratings of ingroup favouritism decreased significantly 
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Table 14. 
Mean Differences in Projection Indexfrom Pre- to Post-Manipulation, within Experimental 
Condition (Study 2) 
Condition Pre-manipulation Post-manipulation Paired t-test 
ingroup projection ingroup projection 
index mean index mean 
(standard deviation) (standard deviation) 
Personal Self-Stereotype 31.47 22.79 t(33) = 2.50,p = .018 
(24.63) (18.60) 
Group Self-Stereotype 40.88 36.11 t(33) = .80, P = .430 
(25.86) (26.14) 
Personal Other-Stereotype 31.71 27.85 t(34) = 1.11,p = .273 
(20.22) (20.75) 
Group Other-Stereotype 36.57 35.54 t(34) = .23,p = .822 
(22.61) (20.67) 
Personal Meta-Stereotype 30.55 25.41 t(35) = 1.64, p = .110 
(22.16) (23.60) 
Group Meta-Stereotype 30.55 27.83 t(29) = .56,p = .581 
(25.04) (21.71) 
Note. *p < .05. Lower scores on the projection index indicate stronger projection (i.e., 
more congruency between self and consensus ingroup favouritism ratings). 
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Figure 5. Differences in self and ingroup's ingroup favouritism ratings from pre- to post-
manipulation in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition (Study 2). 
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(based on t-tests) from the pre- to post-manipulation phase, and that self ratings of 
ingroup favouritism decreased marginally (p = .09). Thus, in the Personal Self-Stereotype 
condition, both self and ingroup consensus ratings of ingroup favouritism were lowered 
(either significantly or marginally), explaining the pattern beneath the strong self-group 
congruency (i.e., projection). 
Post-manipulation projection comparisons examining potential theoretical 
models. The final and key analyses conducted regarding projection within experimental 
conditions were those to examine which of the previously outlined theoretical models 
(see Table 5) were supported by the data. Results presented thus far have suggested that 
the strongest projection occurred in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition, which would 
provide evidence for the Perceptual cognitive over generalization and Motivated threat 
models (recall that both of these models predicted the strongest projection in this 
condition). Specific analyses were conducted to test all of the models, beginning with the 
Perceptual cognitive over generalization and Motivated threat models (which predict very 
similar outcomes, differing in magnitude). 
Prior to testing theoretical models however, an exploratory analysis was 
conducted to determine whether anyone condition had a significant impact on the 
dependent variable relative to the grand mean. To do so, a hierarchical regression 
analysis was executed. Pre-manipulation projection (index score) was entered on Step 1 
to remove variance accounted for by chance pre-manipulation projection differences, and 
five effect coded predictors representing the experimental conditions (see Appendix D, 
p.211, effect coding scheme) were entered on Step 2. Effect coding schemes are 
employed to explore whether the outcomes of a specific group differ from the average 
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outcome of the sample (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003, p.320). These effect coded 
predictors compared each condition's post manipulation projection score to the 
(unweighted) grand mean post-manipulation projection score of the sample. The model 
overall was significant, R2 = .19, F( 6, 197) = 7.64, P < .001, with 19% of the variability in 
post-manipulation projection accounted for by the model. Only one of the coded 
predictors, predictor E 1, representing the effect of the Personal Self-Stereotype condition, 
(see Table 15) was marginally significant (fJ = -.15, P = .077), while all other predictors 
were not significant. This provided evidence, albeit marginal, of stronger projection in 
the Personal Self-Stereotype condition as compared to the projection grand mean. 
To test whether the Perceptual cognitive over generalization or Motivated threat 
models were supported, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. Post-
manipulation projection was the criterion, and pre-manipulation projection was entered 
on step 1, again to remove variance accounted for by chance pre-manipulation projection 
differences. An orthogonal contrast coding scheme was composed to make the 
comparisons necessary to determine whether these models were supported (see Appendix 
E, p.213, contrast coding scheme l)Y Orthogonal contrasts compare conditions or 
groups of conditions with other conditions or other groups of conditions and are 
recommended as a clear and powerful way to test precise hypotheses (Rosenthal, 
Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). These coded predictors were entered on step 2. 
The main interest of this analysis was to determine whether there was stronger 
projection in the Personal Self-Stereotype and Personal Meta-Stereotype conditions 
compared to the other conditions. The predictor representing this comparison (CIa in 
17 Performing 2 regression analyses with the same predictor variable coded 2 different ways can inflate 
Type I error. Thus, these and subsequent results should be interpreted with this in mind. 
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Table 15. 
Regression Analyses: Condition (using coded predictors) Predicting Post-manipulation 
Projection (§tudJ!.. 2) 
Model tested Criterion Predictor fJ B SE t P 
Exploratory, not Post E1 -.15 -5.69 3.20 -1.77 .077 
testing modele s) manipulation 
projection E2 .11 4.25 3.23 1.32 .190 
index 
E3 .14 5.23 3.17 1.65 .100 
E4 -.07 -2.73 3.13 -.87 .384 
E5 -.01 -.35 3.37 -.11 .916 
Perceptual Post CIa .13 2.10 1.01 2.08 .038 
cognitive manipulation 
overgeneralizationl projection Clb -.04 ~1.48 2.44 -.60 .547 
Motivated threat index 
models C1c .01 .16 1.77 .09 .930 
Cld -.08 -2.97 2.45 -1.21 .226 
C1e .06 2.30 2.58 .89 .372 
Introjection model Post C2a -.06 -.97 1.03 -.94 .346 
manipulation 
projection C2b -.06 -2.30 2.58 -.89 .372 
index 
C2c .12 3.23 1.73 1.87 .063 
C2d -.08 -2.97 2.45 -1.21 .226 
C2e .04 1.48 2.44 .60 .547 
Normative Post C3a -.07 -1.13 1.00 -1.12 .262 
influence model manipulation 
projection C3b -.08 -2.97 2.45 -1.21 .226 
index 
C3c .01 .41 1.78 .23 .816 
C3d -.l3 -4.97 2.49 -1.99 .048 
C3e -.03 -1.19 2.53 -.47 .639 
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Appendix E) was significant, (fJ = .13, p = .038); there was stronger projection in these 2 
conditions than in the others, in support of the Perceptual cognitive overgeneralization 
and Motivated threat models. Further, the predictor representing the comparison between 
the Personal Self-Stereotype condition and Personal Meta-Stereotype condition (Clb in 
Appendix E) was not significant (fJ = -.04,p = .547) indicating that projection was 
equally strong in each of these conditions (see Table 15). Significance of the remaining 
contrasts in this analysis is not discussed here; these predictors were simply included to 
maintain orthogonality and were not of interest nor theoretically meaningful for these 
projection analyses. Overall, this analysis indicates direct evidence in support of the 
Perceptual cognitive over generalization and Motivated threat models. 
To test whether the Introjection (Informational influence) model was supported, a 
regression analysis similar to the one conducted to test the Perceptual cognitive 
over generalization and Motivated threat models was performed, using an orthogonal 
coding scheme that would make the comparisons necessary to provide support for this 
model (see Appendix E, p.215, contrast coding scheme 2). The contrast that was required 
to be significant to provide support of the Introjection model was C2a (see Appendix E), 
which compared post manipulation projection in the Group Self-Stereotype and Group 
Meta-Stereotype conditions to the other conditions. This contrast was not significant (fJ = 
-.06, p = .346), thus failing to support the Introjection model (see Table 15). Significance 
of the remaining contrasts is not discussed here as these contrasts were simply included to 
maintain orthogonality, and were not of interest or theoretically meaningful. 
To test whether the Normative influence model was supported, a regression 
analysis akin to those performed above using contrast coding, but using contrasts specific 
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to the model comparisons necessary (see Appendix E, p.2l7, contrast coding scheme 3) 
was employed. The key contrast testing support for the Normative influence model was 
C3a, which compared post-manipulation projection in both Self-Stereotype and both 
Meta-Stereotype conditions to post-manipulation projection in both Other-Stereotype 
conditions. This predictor was not significant (fJ = -.07, p = .262), indicating a lack of 
support for the Normative influence model (see Table 15). Significance of the remaining 
contrasts is not discussed here as these contrasts were simply included to maintain 
orthogonality, and were not of interest or theoretically meaningful. 
The Self-as-sample model, which predicted equal projection in all conditions, 
would be supported if there were no differences in post-manipulation projection among 
experimental conditions, given that this model holds that projection is not impacted by 
the manipulations. As the above results have shown (e.g., support provided for the 
Perceptual cognitive over generalization and Motivated threat models), this is not the 
case, thus the Self as sample model is not supported. 
Overall, only the Perceptual cognitive over generalization and Motivated threat 
models were supported. As the discussion will address, the Motivated threat model is 
believed to stand out as most strongly supported, supporting the hypothesis that ingroup 
projection of ingroup favouritism takes the form of self-to-group projection as a self-
concept threat-based reaction. In other words, upon receiving information that is 
threatening to the self-concept, people project their intergroup attitudes onto the ingroup. 
Summary of experimental projection results. To summarize, the results ofthe 
experimental projection analyses provide evidence in support of Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Providing evidence in support of Hypotheses 2a were results showing that: (a) projection 
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correlations were very strong in the most self-threatening condition (Personal Self-
Stereotype, "you favour Whites"), and also quite strong in the somewhat less self-
threatening condition (Personal Meta-Stereotype, "your partner views you to favour 
Whites"); (b) projection only became stronger upon receiving manipulation feedback in 
the Personal Self-Stereotype condition; and (c) the Personal Self-Stereotype and Personal 
Meta-Stereotype conditions (the two most self-threatening conditions) produced the 
strongest post-manipulation projection index scores compared to all other conditions. 
Thus, self-group congruence (projection) was the strongest in both the Personal Self-
Stereotype and Personal Meta-Stereotype conditions, supporting H2a. There was no 
support for the Introjection theoretical model, supporting H2b. Thus, it appears that in 
this contact setting, self-group congruence was more consistent with self to group 
projection, than group to self introjection. 
Anticipated Intergroup Contact Reactions 
In the post-manipulation measurement phase, participants responded to questions 
regarding their thoughts, feelings, and expectations about an apparent upcoming 
interaction with a Black partner. Several analyses were conducted to test the theoretical 
models (see Table 6), with the intention of deducing which types of perceptions are most 
damaging to intergroup contact. In all cases, prior to testing theoretical models, an 
exploratory analysis was conducted to determine whether anyone condition had a 
significant impact on the dependent variable relative to the grand mean. This preliminary 
analysis regressed each dependent variable on condition, with 5 effect coded predictors 
representing condition (see Appendix D). The analysis testing the theoretical models 
regressed each dependent variable on condition, with 5 orthogonal contrast coded 
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predictors representing condition (see Appendix E, p. 219, contrast coding scheme 4). 
The key contrasts for these anticipated intergroup contact analyses were: (a) C4c, which 
compared the Other-Stereotype (both types) conditions to the Meta-stereotype (both 
types) conditions, testing both the Meta-stereotypes dominant (Model X) and Other-
stereotypes dominant models (Model Z); and (b) C4a, which compared the Other-
Stereotype (both types) and Meta-Stereotype (both types) conditions to the Self-
Stereotype conditions, testing Meta- and other-stereotypes equally dominant model 
(Model Y). Unlike tests of the projection models, here these contrasts could be included 
in the same regression model because conditions for orthogonality (see Cohen et aI., 
2003, p.315) could be met within a single analysis, which was not the case for the 
projection models. Another advantage ofthis cooing scheme was that it allowed for the 
exploratory investigation of differences in the dependent variables between the Personal 
and Group Self-Stereotype manipulations (C4b), Personal and Group Other-Stereotype 
manipulations (C4d), and the Personal and Group Meta-Stereotype manipulations (C4e). 
Although such differences were not expected, the coding scheme allowed for the 
examination of this possibility. 
Contact-specific intergroup anxiety. The omnibus F of the regression analyses 
predicting contact-specific intergroup anxiety reached marginal significance, R2 = .05, 
F(5, 198) = 2.25,p = .051. The exploratory analysis regressing contact-specific 
intergroup anxiety on condition, with 5 effect coded predictors representing condition 
(see Appendix D) revealed that predictor E2 was significant, and predictor E4 was 
marginal (see Table 16). This indicated that there was significantly less intergroup 
anxiety in the Group Self-Stereotype condition relative to the intergroup anxiety grand 
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mean, and marginally more intergroup anxiety in the Personal Meta-Stereotype condition 
relative to the intergroup anxiety grand mean, respectively. 
The next analysis, testing the anticipated intergroup contact reaction theoretical 
models, regressed contact-specific intergroup anxiety on condition, with 5 orthogonal 
contrast coded predictors representing condition (see Appendix E, contrast coding 
scheme 4). As revealed in Table 16, the C4a contrast was significant (fJ = .21,p = .003), 
supporting the Meta- and other-stereotypes equally dominant theoretical model. Thus, 
there was more intergroup anxiety in the Meta-(both types) and Other-(both types) 
Stereotype conditions than in the Self-Stereotype (both types) conditions. The C4c 
contrast was not significant (fJ = -.02, p = .739), demonstrating a lack of support for the 
Meta-stereotypes dominant and Other-stereotypes dominant models, thus indicating that 
there was no significant difference between intergroup anxiety in the Other-Stereotype 
versus Meta-Stereotype conditions. Thus, the negative impact of Meta- and Other-
Stereotype manipulations on intergroup anxiety in this context appeared to be equal, in 
contrast to assertions by Vorauer et al. (1998). 
Anticipated quality of interaction. Regarding self-ratings of anticipated quality of 
interaction, the omnibus regression analysis was significant, R2= .08, F(5, 198) = 3.53,p 
= .004. The exploratory analysis that regressed self-ratings of anticipated quality of 
interaction on condition, represented by effect coded predictors (see Appendix D), 
showed that only the E1 predictor was significant (see Table 16). This indicated that 
anticipated quality of interaction ratings were significantly more positive in the Personal 
Self-Stereotype condition compared to the anticipated interaction quality grand mean. 
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Table 16. 
Regression Analyses: Condition (using coding predictors) Predicting Contact-Specific 
Intergroup Anxiety and Anticipated Quality of Interaction Ratings (Study 2) 
Criterion Predictor p B SE t P 
Contact-specific E1 -.10 -.19 .17 -1.13 .258 
Intergroup Anxiety E2 -.24 -.45 .17 -2.65 .009 
E3 .02 .05 .17 .32 .752 
E4 .16 .30 .17 1.83 .069 
E5 .04 .08 .18 .45 .656 
Contact -specific C4a .21 .16 .05 2.99 .003 
Intergroup Anxiety C4b .07 .13 .13 .99 .329 
C4c -.02 -.03 .09 -.33 .739 
C4d .04 .07 .13 .59 .556 
C4e .06 .11 .13 .84 0404 
Anticipated quality El .32 .93 .26 3.60 <.001 
of interaction (self E2 .07 .22 .26 .84 .399 
perceptions) E3 -.01 -.04 .26 -.15 .878 
E4 -.08 -.23 .25 -.90 .370 
E5 -.09 -.28 .27 -1.05 .297 
Anticipated quality C4a -.24 -.29 .08 -3.52 .001 
of interaction (self C4b .12 .36 .20 1.78 .076 
perceptions) C4c -.01 -.03 .14 -.22 .823 
C4d -.10 -.28 .20 -1.42 .157 
C4e .01 .03 .20 .14 .889 
Anticipated quality El .27 .91 .30 3.03 .003 
of interaction E2 .11 .39 .30 1.29 .l98 
(partner perceptions) E3 -.01 -.02 .30 -.07 .943 
E4 -.14 -048 .29 -1.64 .102 
E5 -.07 -.24 .31 -.75 0453 
Anticipated quality C4a -.23 -.32 .09 -3.41 .001 
of interaction C4b .08 .26 .23 1.12 .264 
(partner perceptions) C4c .01 .04 .16 .22 .828 
C4d -.08 -.27 .23 -1.16 .245 
C4e -.04 -.12 .24 -.52 .606 
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When orthogonal contrast predictors representing condition were examined, 
contrast C4a was significant (fJ = -.24,p<.001), supporting the Meta- and other-
stereotypes equally dominant model, thus indicating that the anticipated interaction 
quality was significantly more negative in the Other- and Meta-Stereotype conditions 
than the Self-Stereotype conditions. The C4c contrast was not significant (fJ = -.01, p = 
.157), providing a lack of support for both the Meta-stereotypes dominant and Other-
stereotypes dominant models, thus indicating that the negative impact of the Meta- and 
Other-Stereotype manipulations on anticipated interaction quality in this context was 
equal. Also, the C4b contrast was marginally significant, indicating that anticipated 
interaction quality in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition was marginally more 
positive than in the Group Self-Stereotype condition. 
With anticipated partner ratings of anticipated interaction quality as the criterion, 
the omnibus analysis was significant, R2= .07, F(5, 198) = 2.94,p = .014. As revealed in 
Table 16, the pattern for these analyses was identical to that presented above, with the 
one exception that the C4b predictor was not significant in this case. 
Personalized meta-stereotypes. The pattern of results was quite similar for each 
type of personalized meta-stereotype (i.e., ingroup, self as individual, and self as ingroup 
member), so these results will be presented together. When the criterion was personalized 
meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member, R2= .06, F(5, 198) = 2.33,p = .044, 
personalized meta-stereotype of in group (degree), R2= .11, F(5, 198) = 4.93,p < .001, or 
personalized meta-stereotype of in group (percent), R2 = .14, F(5, 198) = 6.39,p < .001, 
the omnibus analysis was significant, but when the criterion was personalized meta-
stereotype of self as individual, R2 = .04, F(5, 198) = 1.65,p = .148, the omnibus analysis 
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was not significant. Regarding exploratory analyses where effect coded predictors 
represented condition, predictor El was significant in all cases, indicating that meta-
stereotypes were rated most positively in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition relative 
to each grand mean (see Table 17). 
Table 17 also illustrates that for all of the analyses where orthogonal contrasts 
represented condition, C4a was significant, supporting the Meta- and other-stereotypes 
equally dominant model, and indicating that personalized meta-stereotypes were more 
negative in the Other- and Meta-Stereotype conditions compared to the Self-Stereotype 
conditions. In all cases the C4c contrast was not significant, showing a lack of support for 
both the Meta-stereotypes dominant and Other-stereotypes dominant models, and 
indicating that the negative impact of Other- and Meta-Stereotype manipulations on 
meta-stereotype ratings was equal, contrary to suggestion by Vorauer et al. (1998). 
Additionally, in all cases (with the exception of when personalized meta-stereotype of 
self as individual was the criterion), the C4b contrast indicated that meta-stereotypes 
were either significantly or marginally more positive in the Personal Self-Stereotype 
condition compared to the Group Self-Stereotype condition. 
Thus, in terms of ingroup favouritism, White participants thought themselves or 
their group would be viewed most negatively by an outgroup member in the Other- and 
Meta-Stereotype conditions (representing negative concern with intergroup contact), and 
most positively in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition (possibly representing a denial 
or non-prejudiced response). Additional marginal differences can be viewed in Table 17. 
Contact-specific outgroup avoidance. For regression analyses predicting the 
desire to avoid the upcoming contact with an outgroup member, the omnibus analysis 
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Table 17. 
Regression Analyses: Condition (using coding predictors) Predicting Personalized Meta-
Stereotypes (Study 2) 
Criterion Predictor fJ B SE t P 
Personalized meta- El -.23 -1.28 .50 -2.57 .011 
stereotype of self as E2 -.03 -.19 .50 -.38 .706 
individual E3 .11 .63 .49 1.28 .203 
E4 -.01 -.02 .49 -.04 .968 
E5 .06 .34 .52 .65 .514 
Personalized meta- C4a .16 .37 .16 2.33 .021 
stereotype of self as C4b -.10 -.54 .38 -1.41 .159 
individual C4c .05 .20 .27 .75 .454 
C4d -.01 -.06 .38 -.15 .880 
C4e -.03 -.18 .39 -.46 .646 
Personalized meta- E1 -.26 -1.83 .47 -2.94 .004 
stereotype of self as ingroup E2 .02 .12 .47 .249 .804 
member E3 .16 .86 .46 1.84 .067 
E4 -.07 -.36 .46 -.79 .433 
E5 .07 .40 .49 .80 .421 
Personalized meta- C4a .15 .32 .15 2.21 .035 
stereotype of self as ingroup C4b -.14 -.75 .36 -2.05 .041 
member C4c .08 .30 .26 1.15 .251 
C4d -.05 -.24 .36 -.67 .500 
C4e -.07 -.38 .37 -1.02 .307 
Personalized meta- El -.36 -1.76 .43 -4.10 <.001 
stereotype of ingroup, E2 -.11 -.52 .43 -1.22 .225 
extent E3 .10 .50 .42 1.19 .235 
E4 -.03 -.14 .42 -.33 .738 
E5 .17 .87 .45 1.92 .056 
Personalized meta- C4a .28 .57 .14 4.20 <.001 
stereotype of ingroup, C4b -.12 -.62 .33 -1.86 .064 
extent C4c .06 .21 .23 .88 .381 
C4d .06 .27 .33 .83 .407 
C4e -.10 -.50 .34 -1.49 .138 
Personalized meta- El -.40 -16.92 3.60 -4.70 <.001 
stereotype of ingroup, E2 -.09 -3.86 3.60 -1.07 .284 
percent E3 .08 3.41 3.55 .96 .339 
E4 -.04 -1.74 3.51 -.50 .620 
E5 .20 8.62 3.78 2.28 .024 
Personalized meta- C4a .30 5.20 1.14 4.57 <.001 
stereotype of ingroup, C4b -.15 -6.53 2.78 -2.34 .020 
percent C4c .06 1.76 1.97 .89 .373 
C4d .08 3.55 2.74 1.29 .198 
C4e -.12 -5.18 2.84 -1.82 .070 
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was not significant, R2 = .04, F(5, 198) = 1.45,p = .205. Regarding the preliminary 
exploratory analysis, predictor El was significant (see Table 18), indicating that the 
desire to avoid the partner was lowest in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition, relative 
to the desire to avoid grand mean. 
In the analysis testing the theoretical models, Table 18 shows that contrast C4a 
was significant supporting the Meta- and other-stereotypes equally dominant model, and 
indicating that the desire to avoid the interaction was highest in the Other- and Meta-
Stereotype conditions compared to the Self-Stereotype conditions. Also, contrast C4c was 
not significant, demonstrating a lack of support for both the Meta-stereotypes dominant 
and Other-stereotypes dominant models, and indicating that the desire to avoid the 
interaction was equal in the Other- and Meta-Stereotypes conditions, again inconsistent 
with Vorauer et al. ' s (1998) prediction. 
Regarding the dichotomous measure of behavioural avoidance choice, the 
omnibus analysis was significant, R2 = .05, F(5, 198) = 2.28, p = .048. In the exploratory 
analysis, the E4 predictor was significant (see Table 18), indicating that there was 
significantly more behavioural avoidance (as compared to behavioural approach) in the 
Personal Meta-Stereotype condition relative to the grand mean. Regarding the model 
testing regression, only contrast C4e was significant, indicating that there was 
significantly more behavioural avoidance in the Personal Meta-stereotype condition than 
in the Group Meta-Stereotype condition. The results of these two analyses combined do 
not show perfect support for any of the theoretical models, but provide partial support for 
the Meta-Stereotypes dominant model, consistent with Vorauer et al. (1998). Thus, it 
appears Meta- and Other-Stereotype manipulations strongly and equally influence the 
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Table 18. 
Regression Analyses: Condition (using coding predictors) Predicting Contact-Specific 
Outgroup Avoidance (Study 2) 
Criterion Predictor It B SE t P.. 
Contact -specific-outgroup El -.19 -.86 .41 -2.11 .036 
avoidance (desire to avoid) 
E2 -.08 -.37 .41 -.91 .362 
E3 -.01 -.02 .40 -.06 .952 
E4 .09 .39 .40 .97 .331 
E5 .06 .29 .43 .68 .499 
Contact -specific-outgroup C4a .17 .31 .13 2.39 .018 
avoidance (desire to avoid) 
C4b -.05 -.24 .31 -.77 .442 
C4c -.01 -.03 .22 -.14 .888 
C4d .07 .30 .31 .97 .335 
C4e .01 .05 .32 .15 .880 
Behavioural A voidance El .08 .04 .05 .90 .371 
(actual choice to avoid) 
E2 .08 .04 .05 .90 .371 
E3 -.03 -.01 .05 -.29 .774 
E4 -.29 -.15 .05 -3.25 .001 
E5 .06 .03 .05 .69 .488 
Behavioural Avoidance C4a -.09 -.02 .01 -1.42 .158 
(actual choice to avoid) 
C4b .00 .00 .04 .00 1.000 
C4c .10 .04 .03 1.41 .161 
C4d .05 .03 .04 .80 .426 
C4e -.17 -.09 .04 -2.47 .014 
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desire to avoid an intergroup interaction (see first set of analyses above), but actual 
behavioural avoidance (dichotomous measure) is most strongly influenced by Personal 
Meta-Stereotype manipulation. 
Summary of anticipated intergroup contact reaction results. Overall, the Meta-
and other-stereotypes equally dominant model was supported. Other- and Meta-
Stereotype manipulations (Personal and Group) exerted the most negative impact on the 
upcoming intergroup interaction. This diverges from the Meta-stereotypes dominant 
model, which was expected to be supported (Hypothesis 3, based on predictions by 
Vorauer et aI., 1998). Also, the Personal Self-Stereotype manipulation ("you favour 
Whites") actually exerted a positive impact on expectations regarding an intergroup 
contact experience. This is much more interesting than expectations regarding this 
condition (neutral anticipated intergroup contact reactions), and will be addressed in 
detail in the discussion section. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Two analyses were conducted to test whether participants in certain conditions 
might exhibit stronger prejudice justification and/or ingroup identification. 
General prejudice justification. To examine whether prejudice justification was 
stronger in any single condition, a regression analysis was performed with general 
prejudice justification predicted by condition represented by effect-coded predictors. The 
omnibus analysis was not significant, R2 = .03, F(5, 198) = 1.07,p = .377. As Table 19 
shows, only predictor E 1 approached significance: participants in the Personal Self-
Stereotype condition viewed prejudice against Blacks as marginally less justified relative 
to the grand mean. 
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Ingroup identification. To examine whether ingroup identification was stronger in 
any single condition, a regression analyses was performed with ingroup identification 
predicted by condition, again represented by effect coded predictors only (given that 
specific hypotheses were not specified regarding ingroup identification). Similar to 
prejudice justification results, the omnibus analysis was not significant, R2 = .02, F(5, 
198) = .82,p = .537. Only predictor El approached significance, with participants in the 
Personal Self-Stereotype condition identifying with the ingroup marginally less, 
compared to the grand mean (p = .056, see Table 19). 
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Table 19. 
Regression Analyses: Condition (using effect coded predictors) Predicting General 
Prejudice Justification and Ingroup Identification (Study 2) 
Criterion Predictor p B SE t P 
General Prejudice El -.16 -.26 .14 -1.77 .079 
Justification 
E2 .05 .07 .14 .50 .616 
E3 .01 .01 .14 .07 .946 
E4 .11 .17 .14 1.22 .223 
E5 -.08 -.13 .15 -.85 .394 
Ingroup Identification El -.18 -.67 .35 -1.92 .056 
E2 .02 .07 .35 .20 .844 
E3 .03 .12 .34 .34 .732 
E4 .07 .26 .34 .76 .451 
E5 -.01 -.02 .37 -.05 .962 
Discussion 
Although focusing on a different form of prejudice, Study 2 successfully 
replicated the key findings of Study 1. More importantly, Study 2 introduced 
experimental manipulations and an anticipated intergroup contact paradigm, allowing 
interesting and novel findings about the social projection of intergroup attitudes and 
negative meta-stereotypes about intergroup attitudes. The results of this study will add to 
several literatures, providing useful directions for future research. 
The results of Study 2 first provided evidence of the projection of ingroup 
favouritism, and Whites' meta-stereotype that they are viewed by Blacks to favour their 
own ingroup. It was also found in Study 2 that ingroup favouritism meta-stereotypes of 
ingroup, and to some extent meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup member, are formed 
through the social projection of ingroup favouritism. It will be necessary to replicate this 
pattern in particular, examining meta-stereotypes referring tol the projection of different 
attributes, given that the focus of the current investigation was intergroup attitudes. 
Overall, these findings extended Study 1 's results to a more prevalent form of prejudice. 
Pre-manipulation analyses new to Study 2 showed that participants rated meta-
stereotypes of ingroup most negatively, followed by meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup 
member, subsequently followed by meta-stereotypes of self as individual. The fact that 
meta-stereotypes of ingroup were rated most negatively was not surprising. This 
replicated Study 1, and is in accordance with well-established findings that people rate 
themselves more positively than their group generally (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Hodson 
& Esses, 2002) and in terms of prejudice (Saucier, 2002). What was new was that when 
group membership was made salient (i.e., "based on your membership in the group, 
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Whites ... "), meta-stereotypes of self were rated more negatively than when it was not. 
This finding addressed predictions made by Mendez et al. (2007), who stated that these 
two types of 'self meta-stereotypes would likely be similar, but recognized that 
differences could be possible. Mendez et al.'s (2007) twofold prediction appears to be 
supported; these meta-stereotype ratings were similar (they were highly correlated), but 
distinct (meta-stereotypes of self as ingroup were significantly more negative than meta-
stereotypes of self as individual). This finding may also be due to people's willingness to 
rate that the group is viewed more negatively than the self (see above); one rates her! 
himself more positively as a unique individual, as opposed to a typical group member. 
Thus, this seemingly minor distinction between the two types of meta-stereotypes of self 
is not insignificant. Future investigators can explore the implications of this distinction. 
Projection Findings 
The main goal of Study 2 was to investigate social projection and meta-stereotype 
issues not addressed by Study 1 or the respective literatures. The first of these issues dealt 
with motivation behind and direction of the projection of intergroup attitudes. Several 
different analyses illustrated that the strongest projection occurred in the Personal Self-
Stereotype and Personal Meta-Stereotype conditions. Of the theoretical models that were 
tested regarding projection, Study 2 provided clear support for the Perceptual cognitive 
over generalization and Motivated threat models, and a lack of support for the Self-as-
sample, Introjection, and Normative influence models, supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Relative to the Perceptual cognitive overgfmeralization model, the Motivated threat 
model stands out as supported for several reasons. First, the strongest projection occurred 
in the most self-concept threatening conditions, and these effects were of large 
138 
magnitude, with correlations well over .50 (see Table 13), representing large effects 
(Cohen, 1988). This best supports the favoured Motivated threat model. Second, had the 
Perceptual cognitive over generalization model been supported, participants would have 
used the feedback they were given about the self, "you strongly favour Blacks over 
Whites" (determined either by the computer or one's partner), to make inferences about 
the group. Clearly though, participants did not employ this manipulation feedback in 
determining their ratings of the group's ingroup favouritism. In contrast, participants in 
these conditions rated the self and the group to be relatively low in ingroup favouritism, 
creating more self-group congruency in these conditions, and displaying a self-protective 
pattern. If a simple cognitive overgeneralization was operating, participants would have 
used the information provided about the self and endorsed the strong bias. They would 
have rated the self high in ingroup favouritism, and in tum rated the group high in 
ingroup favouritism, leading to more self-group congruency. This was not the case, 
which suggests that participants did not experience perceptual-cognitive 
overgeneralization. 
Although the Motivated threat model stood out as supported (Hypothesis 2a), 
there was an interesting twist, alluded to above. The strongest projection occurred in the 
self-concept threatening conditions, but interestingly, participants here projected a low 
level of prejudice. That is, self and ingroup ratings were highly correlated, with each 
rated as quite low in ingroup favouritism. I contend that this further confirms that 
projection is motivated by self-concept threat in this context. It appears that when 
participants in these key conditions received this threatening information, it 
psychologically jarred them, leading to an attempt to deny high ingroup favouritism (on 
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behalf of the self and the group) even when the self or group was rated higher in ingroup 
favouritism on pre-manipulation measures (i.e., Personal Self-Stereotype condition). 
Based on the evidence presented, it is speculated that participants experienced feelings of 
self-concept threat which led to the lower ratings of self and group ingroup favouritism, 
and hence greater self-group congruency of these ratings (i.e., strong projection) in these 
highly self-concept threatening conditions. It appears that in this threatening condition, 
participants opted for a double-pronged defence, not only denying bias in self (and 
ingroup), but also tightening the congruence between self and group on this dimension, to 
decrease the salience of self-bias and make any bias "normal." 
These results may reflect a display of attributive projection (projection of 
traits/attitudes onto others to reduce the anxiety of holding an undesirable attitude, see 
Bramel, 1962, 1963). In the self-concept threatening Personal Self-Stereotype condition 
however, findings may not reflect a display of attributive projection in its traditional 
form, but a combination of both defensive (e.g., Newman et aI., 1997) and attributive 
projection. That is, when the socially-undesirable attitude (ingroup favouritism) becomes 
personally salient, people attempt to deny the attitude due to the threat it poses to the self-
concept (consistent Newman et al.'s [1997] defensive projection model), but cannot deny 
the attitude completely (due to receiving the scientific data in real timeI8), acknowledging 
personal bias at a "safer" level. In a final step of defensiveness, participants project this 
onto others to reduce the dissonance or threat that remains from being unable to 
completely deny the attitude, and to gather "back up" or support in the attitude. In the 
18 Bramel (1963) contended that the use of an "impressive" looking apparatus (skin galvanometer) in his 
study made it difficult for participants to deny homosexual arousal (the attribute th~y projected). I contend 
that the highly sensitive computer scored test which provided feedback in the current study appeared 
equally impressive, and hence make it difficult for participants to completely deny the information it gave. 
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current context, upon having it detennined that one favours Whites over Blacks, a 
participant's thought sequence might be: "to the extent that I do favour Whites, I am 
relatively low in ingroup favouritism, and my group is very low in it as well, therefore 
there is no need for me to feel anxious or threatened by this undesirable attribute." Thus, 
participants do not completely deny holding the undesirable attribute as defensive 
projection models suggest, but admit to holding it at a very low, less threatening and 
more acceptable level, in addition to rating their ingroup similarly to make it even less 
threatening and even more "acceptable." It appears then, that the projection of 
prejudice/ingroup favoritism may reflect attributive projection, or a combination of 
attributive and defensive projection, in conditions of self-concept threat. 
No evidence of "introjection" was found. There was a lack of support for the 
Introjection model, which predicted self-group congruency in the direction of group to 
self. Although the introjection hypothesis cannot be ruled out completely, introjection did 
not appear to be operating in the current study. It is likely then, that the projection of 
ingroup favouritism occurs in the direction of self to group, as projection is classically 
defined. This issue will require further investigation in future research. 
Anticipated Intergroup Contact Findings 
Another issue that Study 2 investigated was which type of perception( s) had the 
most negative impact on anticipated intergroup contact. For all dependent variables (with 
the exception of behavioural avoidance), the Meta- and other-stereotypes equally 
dominant theoretical model was supported. In other words, Meta-Stereotype and Other-
Stereotype manipulations exerted equally negative impacts on interaction expectations, 
diverging from Hypothesis 3, which was based on assertions by Vorauer et al. (1998). 
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Although Hypothesis 3 predicted negative interaction expectations in both the Meta- and 
Other-Stereotype conditions, it was not predicted that the expectations would be equally 
negative across these conditions, yet such equivalence was found. Meta- and Other-
Stereotype manipulations led to comparably negative contact expectations. However, 
with regard to behavioural measures of avoidance, manipulating Personal Meta-
Stereotypes led to the most avoidance of the outgroup partner, supporting Vorauer et al. 
(1998) and H3 (partially) on this measure (arguably a very important dependent variable). 
Recall that Vorauer et al. (1998) predict that meta-stereotypes exert a more 
negative impact on intergroup interactions than other-stereotypes, because meta-
stereotypes are believed to be more threatening and anxiety-provoking (among majority 
group members). Based on the results of Study 2, Vorauer et al. (1998) are accurate in 
their expectation that meta-stereotypes are highly impactful on intergroup interaction 
perceptions. Study 2 clearly shows that manipulated meta-stereotypes lead to negative 
intergroup contact expectations. However, Vorauer et al.'s (1998) assertion that meta-
stereotypes would have a more negative impact on intergroup interactions than other-
stereotypes is not supported by the current research. This discrepancy may result from the 
fact that evidence in support of this prediction (Vorauer et aI, 1998; Vorauer & Turpie, 
2004) has not involved direct meta-stereotype manipulations, or because of other 
differences present in the current research design. For example, the current study focused 
on a meta-stereotype referring to one specific attribute (i.e., ingroup favouritism), 
whereas Vorauer and colleagues typically research meta-stereotypes referring to many 
attributes. 
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Another likely possibility is that Vorauer et al. (1998) are correct in their 
prediction, but only for behavioural measures. As stated above, the results of Study 2 
showed that the Personal Meta-Stereotype manipulation led to the most behavioural 
avoidance (i.e., in this condition the greatest number of participants hit the button 
allowing them to "bailout" of the intergroup interaction) of an interaction with an 
outgroup partner, as compared to Other-Stereotype (as well as all other) conditions. 
Perhaps with regard to actual behaviour in an intergroup interaction situation, meta-
stereotypes (personal or "self' meta-stereotypes especially) have the most negative 
impact on intergroup interactions, whereas expectations, thoughts, and feelings about 
intergroup contact generally are influenced by both meta- and other-stereotypes equally. 
This possibility is consistent with recent research by Goff et al. (2008), where the 
activation of a "White racist" meta-stereotype was correlated with sitting distance (a 
behavioural variable) in an intergroup (Black-White) interaction under conditions of 
threat. Thus, Vorauer et al. (1998) may be right to hypothesize that meta-stereotypes have 
the most negative impact on intergroup interactions, but this distinction may apply 
primarily to behaviour. 
Self-Concept Threat Reaction 
An interesting, unpredicted pattern emerged when investigating Hypothesis 3 and 
the exploratory analyses (and to some extent Hypothesis 2a as well). It was revealed that 
participants in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition demonstrated the most positive 
intergroup contact expectations and prejudice justification ratings (where differences 
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existed). In addition, participants in this condition also identified least with the ingroupl9 
(marginally) and revealed the lowest (i.e., most positive or socially desirable) post-
manipulation self and group ratings of ingroup favouritism. It was originally expected 
that for participants in this condition, the self-concept threat experienced would lead to 
neutral contact expectations and high self and group ingroup favouritism ratings. 
Alternatively though, this self concept-threat appears to have led to a defensive reaction, 
causing participants to rate everything in a more positive, most socially desirable manner. 
It is possible that participants' positive ratings of these variables reflected a self-
protecting reaction. This is consistent with Monteith's (1993) self regulation model of 
prejudice. Monteith found that when participants who were low in prejudice (as most of 
the current sample, MRS mean = .84 on a 0-4 scale) were made to believe they had 
responded in a prejudiced manner they inhibited future prejudiced responses. Monteith 
suggested that this reflects a dissonance reducing strategy, brought on by the experience 
of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1957), and motivated by a threat 
to the self-concept. Evidence of cognitive dissonance or similar experiences improving 
intergroup attitudes has been documented by others (e.g., Devine, 1989, Study 3; 
Gringart, Helmes, & Speelman, 2008). The difference between these studies and the 
current one is that previous researchers either simply make stereotypes salient (e.g., 
Devine, 1989, Study 3) or lead participants to believe that they have done something 
prejudiced (e.g., Gringart et al., 2008; Monteith, 1993), whereas in the current study 
participants were led to believe that they are fundamentally prejudiced. These dissonance 
reducing reactions likely generalize to "you are prejudiced" feedback though, and may be 
19 Participants in this condition likely dis-identified with Whites to be "safe", given that participants overall 
believed that Whites are viewed by Blacks to be prejudiced (see meta-stereotype findings). Thus, showing 
less identification with this group would be the most non-prejudiced and socially desirable response. 
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even stronger, given that such feedback is likely to create a greater self-concept threat 
than feedback stating that one has simply done something prejudiced. Indeed, previous 
researchers have suggested that self-concept threat is most intense when the individual 
views the trait to be negative and inconsistent with one's view ofthe self (Vorauer et aI., 
1998). 
In the present context then, it appears that the presumed self-concept threat-
inducing information (stating that one is high in ingroup favouritism) operated somewhat 
differently than expected. It was expected to primarily influence the projection of 
intergroup attitudes, but it appears to have also had a major impact on intergroup contact 
expectations. Also, self-concept threat was expected to primarily lead to negative, 
prejudiced responses, but instead it may have led to dissonance reducing non-prejudiced 
responses. Thus, it appears that the common thread between the influence of self-concept 
threat on projection outcomes and anticipated intergroup contact outcomes was cognitive 
dissonance. Regarding projection, upon receiving the self-concept threatening feedback 
(i.e., "you favour Whites"), participants strongly projected (a low level of) the attitude to 
reduce the dissonance experienced as a result of this threatening information. Regarding 
contact expectations, participants under self-concept threat (i.e., those in the Personal 
Self-Stereotype condition) rated the anticipated intergroup contact quite positively, 
presumably to reduce the dissonance created by the threatening feedback. So, gathering 
the support of one's group while responding in a manner inconsistent with the threatening 
feedback likely reduced participants' dissonance, allowing them to feel more comfortable 
and less threatened. Future research could more directly test this possibility. 
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It is also possible that the socially desirable and non-prejudiced ratings in the 
Personal Self-Stereotype condition are a reflection of a "leaning over backward" effect 
(Friend & Vinson, 1974). This effect occurs when a participant shifts away from any 
information that might bias herlhis opinions or impressions in an attempt at objectivity or 
impartiality. It could be that participants in the Personal Self-Stereotype condition reacted 
against the feedback information they were given in light of its direct negative personal 
implications. Participants here may have "leaned over backward" (Friend & Vinson, 
1974), denying personal bias and reporting willingness to engage in contact with their 
Black partner to engage in impression management. Future research can further explore 
the mechanisms involved. 
Study 2 Conclusions 
This study illustrated the importance of self and group perceptions to intergroup 
attitudes and consequently, relations. Specifically, the importance of the projection of 
intergroup attitudes, and prejudice/ingroup favouritism meta-stereotypes and other-
stereotypes were demonstrated. Correspondingly, intergroup threat perceptions too, are 
key to understanding intergroup relations. The projection of intergroup attitudes seems to 
occur as a result a/threat, whereas prejudice-relevant meta- and other-stereotypes seem 
to result in responses that reflect threat reactions. Self-concept threat is an important 
trigger of projection, and an important consequence of meta-stereotypes of self. 
Intergroup contact threat is an important consequence of meta- and other-stereotypes. 
These threat perceptions, through the roles they play in social projection, meta-, and 
other-stereotypes, greatly impact intergroup relations. Self-concept threat leads people to 
see their intergroup attitudes in the ingroup, which can be detrimental or beneficial to 
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intergroup relations, depending on the attitudes projected (e.g., high or low prejudice). 
Intergroup contact threat on the other hand, leads to negative intergroup contact 
expectations as a result of prejudice-relevant meta- and/or other-stereotypes, which is 
largely detrimental to intergroup relations. Thus, projection, meta- and other-stereotypes 
are related perceptions that are strongly associated with threat, and greatly impact 
intergroup relations . 
.overall, Study 2 fulfilled its objective of further investigating social projection 
and meta-stereotypes in the context of intergroup attitudes. Study 2 replicated key results 
of Study 1 using "ingroup favouritism" as the target type of prejudice; provided evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that projection of intergroup attitudes is a process motivated 
by self-concept threat; and failed to support the "introjection" hypothesis. Thus, in an 
intergroup contact setting, self-group congruence ratings are more consistent with a self-
to-group process than the reverse. Study 2 also revealed that Meta- and Other-Stereotype 
manipulations led to equally negative influences on thoughts, feelings, and expectations 
regarding anticipated intergroup contact, with Personal Meta-Stereotype manipulations 
leading to heightened actual avoidance of intergroup contact. Finally, Study 2 established 
that providing people with feedback that they personally favour the ingroup leads to a 
strong display of egalitarian responses as a backlash. The results of this study will add to 
the projection, meta-stereotype, and intergroup contact literatures, providing important 
implications for future research. 
General Discussion 
Study 1 provided evidence of the social projection of prejudice, the meta-
stereotype Whites hold concerning Black's views of White prejudice, the relation 
between projection and meta-stereotypes in this context, and several correlates of these 
processes. Study 2 built on these findings, exploring when the ingroup projection of 
intergroup attitudes occurs strongly, and how meta-stereotypes (and related perceptions) 
influence intergroup relations. Although these studies investigated similar processes, 
there were notable differences across the two. Study 1 was correlational in nature, 
whereas Study 2 involved experimental manipulation. In Study 1, participants were 
aware that the study would only involve the completion of a survey, whereas Study 2 
participants were under the impression that they would soon interact with an outgroup 
partner. Study 1 investigated anti-Black prejudice, whereas Study 2 examined pro-White 
ingroup favouritism, the most common form of intergroup bias. And of course, Study 2 
expanded on Study 1, finding more specific results regarding projection and meta-
stereotypes. Of the investigations common to both studies, there are some interesting 
differences and similarities to note. 
One difference was that more people more readily admitted ingroup favouritism 
(Study 2) than anti-Black prejudice (25-27% versus 13% ofthe sample). This is likely 
because "ingroup love" seems less harsh than "outgroup hate", although in reality, both 
are quite damaging (see Brewer, 1999). Another difference of note was that meta-
stereotypes of self as individual were rated less negatively in Study 1 (M = 1.42) than in 
Study 2 (M = 4.64, pre-manipulation, collapsed across conditions analyses). It is unclear 
why this was the case. Perhaps it was due to the discrepancy noted above. 
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Perhaps participants were more willing to rate themselves to be viewed negatively in 
terms of ingroup favouritism than anti-outgroup prejudice. Regardless, the key fmding 
that meta-stereotypes of individual were the type rated most positively compared to the 
other types of meta-stereotypes, was consistent across studies. 
A third notable difference concerned outgroup projection. In Study 1, ratings of 
Blacks' anti-outgroup prejudice was significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale 
only for those acknowledging personal anti-outgroup prejudice. In contrast, in Study 2 
ratings of Blacks' ingroup favouritism were significantly higher than the midpoint of the 
scale for both those acknowledging personal ingroup favouritism, and those denying 
personal ingroup favouritism (although stronger for those acknowledging personal 
biases). In Study 2 White participants overall viewed a large percentage of Blacks to 
strongly favour their own ingroup (Blacks), whereas in Study 1, this was only the case for 
those acknowledging personal prejudice. It is speculated that this too may have been due 
to the fact that participants were more willing to rate Blacks negatively on ingroup 
favouritism than anti-outgroup prejudice. 
Despite these differences, there were some interesting similarities between the 
two studies. One similar pattern of findings from Study 1 to Study 2 concerned ingroup 
identification. There was no relation between ingroup identification and projection in 
Study 1 or Study 2. It seems logical to assume that the more people identify with their 
ingroup, the more they would project onto that group; however this relation was not 
found, even when using a more reliable measure of identification in Study 2. Further, in 
the condition where participants projected the most (Study 2), they identified less with 
the ingroup. These fmdings may seem counterintuitive, but ingroup identification and 
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feeling similar to the ingroup on a particular dimension are not synonymous. It appears 
that those who project intergroup attitudes feel similar to the group on that dimension, but 
do not necessarily identify strongly with the group overall. Of the items used to measure 
ingroup identification (across studies, see appendices B.6 and C.15), only one measured 
feelings of similarity with the ingroup, all others dealt with the importance of the ingroup 
to one's identity. It is possible that those who projected strongly in these studies felt very 
similar to their ingroup, but did not feel that the ingroup was an important part of "who 
they are." This is consistent with Spears et al.'s (1997) characterization of identification 
as a general commitment to a category versus an evaluation of one's relative position in a 
category (i.e., self-group similarity or projection). Thus, a relation should be expected 
between projection and one's ratings of similarity to the ingroup on the projected 
dimension, but not necessarily one's ratings of identification with the ingroup overall. 
The other notable similarity between the two studies was that key results of Study 
1 were replicated in Study 2 (examining pre-manipulation measures). This replication 
establishes the reliability of these findings. Basic projection and meta-stereotype results 
were almost identical (in terms of means and effect sizes) from Study 1 to Study 2. 
Further, these results were replicated in a new context, using a different form of 
prejudice. Thus, these [mdings primarily established evidence of the processes in 
question, allowing Study 2 to go further and investigate more specific hypotheses relating 
to the social projection of and meta-stereotypes regarding intergroup attitudes. 
Limitations 
Though the current research produced interesting and novel results, it is not 
without limitations. First, as is common in many social psychology studies, participants 
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were university students. Student samples are limited with respect to age range of 
participants, variability in educational background and political values, and 
generalizability to the population at large (Sears, 1986). This research was also limited 
with regard to the prejudice target group studied (i.e., Blacks). The results ofthis research 
may only be applicable to White-Black relations. Future research might attempt to 
replicate the current findings in community samples, and using different target groups. 
Limitations specific to Study 1 (e.g., correlational data, lack of an intergroup 
situation) were remedied by Study 2. One limitation is that Study 2 involved an 
anticipated, as opposed to actual, interaction context. The primary interest of the study 
was thoughts/feelings that occur prior to an intergroup interaction, and an anticipated 
interaction allowed this to be investigated successfully. This procedure has been 
employed by many previous researchers (e.g., Britt et aI., 1996, Study 4; Goff et aI., 
2008; Johnson et aI., 2009, Study 2; Plant & Devine, 2003, Study 2; Vorauer et al., 1998, 
Study 2) and has provided valuable insights into intergroup contact phenomena. 
However, it would be valuable to obtain data during an intergroup interaction to examine 
possible differences in behaviour based on experimental condition. This would be 
especially interesting given evidence that Meta-Stereotype manipulations have a key 
influence on behaviour in intergroup contact situations (see Study 2). 
An additional limitation was that Study 2 involved only negative, or "prejudiced", 
feedback. That is, participants were informed in all cases that an individual or a group 
was high in ingroup favouritism. This allowed for the investigation of the hypotheses of 
the current study, but it might be useful to examine the effect of giving participants 
information that an individual or a group is high in egalitarian values. A third limitation 
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of Study 2 was that the ostensible partner was always an outgroup member. Again, this 
was ideal for the purposes of the study, but it may have been useful in some cases to have 
an ingroup partner for comparison purposes. Future research can address these issues. 
Directions for Future Research 
In addition to addressing the limitations mentioned above, several further 
considerations for future research arose out of the current investigation. Key areas for 
future exploration include the direction of projection in this context, the influence of 
meta-stereotypes on intergroup behaviour, and the seemingly positive implications of 
prejudicelingroup favouritism feedback. These are elaborated below. 
One issue that requires further investigation is the direction of the projection of 
intergroup attitudes. The current investigation found no evidence of introjection, but 
future research will be necessary to completely rule out this hypothesis. After all, it is 
probable that, at times, we glean personal attitudes from our groups, and research 
establishes this to be true (e.g., Abrams et aI., 1990; Haslam et aI., 1996; Stangor, 
Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Also, future research should explore whether the introjection 
hypothesis might be supported when participants are given feedback stating that the 
ingroup holds egalitarian views, rather than prejudiced ones. It could be that the ingroup 
feedback information provided in Study 2 was deemed too negative to integrate into the 
self, but perhaps people would be more willing to do so with more socially desirable 
intergroup attitudes. Lun, Sinclair, Whitchurch, and Glenn (2007) found that people high 
in epistemic motivation reduced their implicit prejudice after contact with a person 
apparently holding egalitarian beliefs. It is possible that the same could occur after 
contact with a group holding egalitarian attitudes, which would be a reflection of 
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introjection. Perhaps when the intergroup attitude is socially desirable, self-group 
congruency ratings may occur in the direction of group to self, at least for some people 
(those high in epistemic motivation). That Lun et al. 's (2007) finding was specific to 
those high in epistemic motivation introduces the other possibility that introjection may 
be influenced by individual differences. It is possible that only certain people are subject 
to introjection in this context. Future research should examine this possibility. 
A second issue for future research deals with the influence of 'prejudiced' meta-
stereotypes on intergroup behaviour. Study 2 results illustrated that whereas both Meta-
and Other-Stereotype manipulations created negative expectations for intergroup 
interactions, manipulated Meta-Stereotypes exerted the most negative impact on actual 
avoidance of intergroup interactions. Previous research has also shown that meta-
stereotypes negatively impact behaviour in intergroup interactions (Goff et aI., 2008). 
Given these findings, it will be necessary to further investigate the impact of meta-
stereotypes on intergroup behaviour. For instance, it will be important to study the 
influence of prejudiced meta-stereotypes on additional types of intergroup behaviours 
(e.g., verbal behaviour, touching, attacking, etc.). It will also be interesting to investigate 
whether it is possible to reduce negative meta-stereotypes, and whether this in tum 
reduces negative intergroup behaviour. This could have great implications for reducing 
prejudice and negative intergroup perceptions. 
The last, and arguably most interesting, issue for future research arising out of the 
current investigation addresses the apparent positive implications of prejudice/ingroup 
favouritism feedback. The results of the current research illustrated that informing people 
that they (essentially) were prejudiced, led to very positive intergroup attitudes and 
153 
interaction expectations. In particular, participants in the Personal Self-Stereotype ("you 
favour Whites") condition viewed prejudice as marginally less justified, and expected 
their intergroup interaction to be significantly more positive, than the combination of 
those in all other conditions. It will be necessary to determine why this effect occurs by 
examining potential mediators. Consistent with previous research (Monteith, 1993), it is 
speculated that it occurs as a result of feelings of self-concept threat, but future research 
will need to accurately pinpoint this. Although previous research has demonstrated that 
challenges to an egalitarian self-concept can improve intergroup attitudes generally (e.g., 
Devine, 1989, Study 3; Gringart et al., 2008; Monteith, 1993), it will be necessary to 
determine definitively whether self-concept threat can lead to more positive intergroup 
contact, as the findings of Study 2 imply. Should this be a reliable phenomenon, it could 
lead to major improvements in intergroup relations. For example, telling a person that 
s/he may be prejudiced before entering an intergroup interaction (which can be anxiety-
provoking regardless of one's level of prejudice, Plant, 2004; Stephan & Stephan, 1985, 
1989) may lead the person to intensely try to convey an egalitarian attitude and create a 
smooth interaction, resulting in a very positive interaction and hence, the experience of 
the beneficial effects of intergroup contact (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) for both parties 
involved in the interaction. The present investigation, although unable to test it, certainly 
suggests this possibility. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current investigation resulted in several important findings that 
will add greatly to the social projection, meta-stereotype, intergroup contact, and 
prejudice literatures, and spawn useful future research. This research confirmed the 
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existence of the projection of intergroup attitudes on behalf of Whites, and the meta-
stereotype Whites hold regarding how they are viewed oy Blacks in terms of prejudice. It 
also established an important role of projection in the formation of meta-stereotypes, 
although this process requires further investigation. This research also determined that the 
ingroup projection of intergroup attitudes occurs most strongly under conditions of self-
concept threat, and that projection in this context appears to operate in the direction of 
self to group. The current investigation also established that Meta- and Other-Stereotype 
manipulations are quite detrimental to intergroup relations, and that feedback stating that 
one is prejudiced may lead to strong egalitarian responses. The current research 
integrated several related but distinct fields, establishing some important fmdings and 
producing exciting new research questions for each. 
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
Projection 
.. Social projection: the tendency for people to perceive that others share their thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviours. 
• Outgroup projection at the level of specific category: involves projecting one's 
beliefs about a specific group onto the outgroup, e.g., "I (a White person) like Whites, 
therefore Blacks like Whites too." 
• Outgroup projection at the level of intergroup target category: involving projecting 
one's beliefs about an intergroup category onto the outgroup, e.g., "I (a White person) 
like Whites (my ingroup), therefore Blacks like Blacks (their ingroup)." 
Meta- and other-stereotypes 
• Meta-stereotype of ingroup: the beliefs one holds regarding the stereotypes the 
outgroup holds about hislher ingroup (e.g. 20"I think Blacks think Whites are 
prejudiced"). 
• Meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member: the beliefs one holds regarding the 
stereotypes the outgroup ascribes to him/her personally, based on hislher group 
membership (e.g., "Because I am White, I think Blacks think I am prejudiced"). 
It Meta-stereotype of self as individual: the beliefs one holds regarding the stereotypes 
the outgroup ascribes to him/her personally, independent of his I her group 
membership (e.g., "I think Blacks think I am prejudiced"). 
20 All meta-stereotypes in the current study refer to prejudice. All examples are from the perspective of a 
White person. 
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• Personalized meta-stereotypes: Any type of meta-stereotype regarding the 
stereotype ONE specific outgroup member holds (e.g., "I think John, a Black person, 
thinks I am prejudiced") 
• Other-stereotype: the stereotype one holds about the outgroup (e.g., "Blacks are 
prejudiced") 
Experimental Conditions: 
• (Self-stereotype: the stereotypes one holds about one's self or one's group, e.g., "I 
am prejudiced") 
Personal self-stereotype: In this condition the participant received 
information that slhe favours Whites. 
Group self-stereotype: In this condition the participant received 
information that White Brock students on average favour Whites. 
• (Other-stereotype: the stereotype one holds about the outgroup e.g., "Blacks are 
prejudiced") 
Personal other-stereotype: In this condition the participant received 
information that hislher Black interaction partner favours Blacks. 
Group other-stereotype: In this condition the participant received 
information that Black Brock students on average favour Blacks. 
• (Meta-stereotypes: see above) 
Personal meta-stereotype: In this condition the participant received 
information that hislher Black partner thinks the participant personally 
favours Whites. 
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Group meta-stereotype: In this condition the participant received 
information that hislher Black partner thinks that White Brock students on 
average favour Whites. 
DATE: 
FROM: 
TO: 
FILE: 
TITLE: 
Appendix B.l: Study 1 Brock University Ethics Approval 
February 12, 2008 
Michelle McGinn, Chair Research Ethics Board (REB) 
Dr. Gordon HODSON, Psychology 
Cara MacInnis 
07-199 HODSON 
Jokes and Perceptions of Self and Others22 
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The Brock University Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above research proposal. 
DECISION: Accepted as Clarified 
This project has received ethics clearance for the period of February 12,2008 to 
December 1, 2008 subject to full REB ratification at the Research Ethics Board's next 
scheduled meeting. The clearance period may be extended upon request. The study may 
now proceed 
22 Note that Study 1 was packaged with another study (a humour study) that was not relevant to Study 1. 
i 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
j 
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Appendix B.2: Study 1 Informed Consent Form 
Project Title: Jokes and Perceptions of Self and Others 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Gordon Hodson, Brock University Associate Professor ghodson@brocku.ca ; 
905-688-5550 ext. 5127; Co-Investigator: Cara MacInnis, cm07jh@brocku.ca 
.. I understand that this study involves research, and that I am being invited to participate 
II I understand that the purpose of this study is to examine humour, attitudes, personality, and perceptions 
regarding self and other groups and issues relevant to Canada 
• I understand that I will be reading jokes, some of which I may find offensive. 
• I understand that the expected duration of my participation in this study is approximately 50 minutes. 
• I understand the procedures to be followed, which include reading and signing two copies of this 
consent form; 1 of which I will keep for my own records. Once I have signed the consent form I will 
be asked to complete a questionnaire package. After the package has been completed, the researcher 
will provide me with a debriefing form explaining the general purpose of the study. 
.. I understand that there are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation in this research, 
and I understand that this study can count as research participation in a psychology course. As a 
participant I will also gain experience concerning how research in social psychology is conducted. 
• All information provided is considered confidential; my name will not be included or, in any other 
way, associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because the interest is in the average 
responses of the entire group of participants, I will not be identified individually in any way in written 
reports of this research 
" I understand that only the Principal Investigator (Dr. Gordon Hodson) and the research assistant(s) 
collecting the data will have access to my data, and that all information will be stored securely in a 
locked filing cabinet. Given the intentions of publishing the results, data will be kept until 
approximately 5-7 years from date, after which all data will be destroyed! shredded. 
.. I understand that any other person participating in this study in the same session as I am holds the same 
right to privacy as I do. Therefore I will ensure that I do not reveal to anyone the identity of others 
present during this session. 
• I understand that the results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at 
conferences. Feedback about this study will be available approximately 6 months from date. 
II I understand that participation is voluntary; refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of 
benefits to which I am otherwise entitled and I may discontinue participation at any time; I understand 
that my data cannot be withdrawn after submission, but it remains anonymous. If I withdraw, I can 
still receive payment or course participation. 
• I understand that some questions may make me feel uncomfortable and ifI wish, I may decline to 
answer any questions or participate in any component of the study. 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact the Principal 
Investigator using the contact information provided above. If you have any comments or concerns about 
your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, 
reb@brocku.ca. 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through Brock University's Research 
Ethics Board (file # 07-199) 
I _______ -::----:-----:,--_ (please print) 
1. Have read and understood the relevant information regarding this research project 
2. Understand that I may ask questions in the future 
3. Indicate free consent to research participation by signing this research consent form 
Participant's Signature: _____________ _ Date: _____ _ 
Researcher's Signature: _____________ _ Date: ______ _ 
Below complete EITHER Form A or Form B (in recognition that you will receive payment OR 
course participation). 
FORM A. I am participating in this experiment for $5. This experiment will not count toward research 
participation hours in a psychology course. 
Signature of participant Signature of experimenter 
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FORM B. I am participating in this experiment for research participation in a psychology course and will 
not receive monetary payment for this experiment. 
Signature of participant course for participation Signature of experimenter 
If you would like a copy of the results for this study (approximately 6 months from date) and/or would like 
to be informed of any publication of the results, please provide your email address below. 
Please keep a copy of consent form for your own records 
Appendix B.3: Study 1 Projection Materials 
(a) Dichotomous prejudice measure: 
Are you prejudiced against Black people ( circle one) YES 
(b) Ingroup's anti-outgroup prejudice measure: 
Specifically, what percentage of White people hold negative (prejudicial) attitudes 
toward Blacks? (0-100%) % 
(c) Continuous acknowledgement of personal bias measure: 
To what extent do you consider yourself prejudiced against Black people? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Outgroup's anti-outgroup prejudice measure: 
6 7 8 9 
NO 
Specifically, what percentage of Black people hold negative (prejudicial) attitudes 
toward Whites? (0-100%) % 
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10 
Very 
much 
Appendix B.4: Study 1 Meta-stereotype Materials 
(a) meta-stereotype of in group 
To what extent does the average BLACK person view WHITES IN GENERAL to be 
prejudiced against Black people? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 
(b) meta-stereotype of self as individual 
5 6 7 8 9 
To what extent do BLACK people generally view YOU personally to be prejudiced 
against Black people? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
Appendix B.5: Study 1 Prejudice Relevant Materials 
(a) Modern Racism Scale: 
Please indicate your responses to the following questions. 
1. Over the past few years, the government 
and news media have shown more respect 
for Blacks than they deserve. 
2. It is easy to understand the anger of Blacks 
in North America. (R) 
3. Discrimination against Blacks is no longer 
a problem in the North America. 
4. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten 
more economically than they deserve. 
5. Blacks have more influence on government 
policies than they ought to have. 
6. Blacks are getting too demanding in their 
push for equal rights. 
7. Blacks should not push themselves where 
they are not wanted. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
Strongly 
Agree 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
(b) Continuous acknowledgement of personal bias measure (note this was not 
measured twice, but used to calculate projection scores and also as an alternative 
measure of prejudice): 
To what extent do you consider yourself prejudiced against Black people? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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10 
Very 
much 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Appendix B.6: Study 1 Ingroup Identification Scale 
2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
3 
Slightly 
Disagree 
4 
Neither 
Disagree 
Nor Agree 
5 
Slightly 
Agree 
6 
Moderately 
Agree 
1. Overall, being White has very little to do with how I feel about myself.(R) 
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7 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Being White is an important reflection of who I am. 
1 234 5 6 7 
3. Being White is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.(R) 
1 2 3 456 7 
4. In general, being White is an important part of my self-image. 
1 2 345 6 7 
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Appendix B.7: Study 1 Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, 
please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by writing in a number from 1 to 7 
on the line next to it. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers, and that your 
first responses are usually the most accurate. 
1 2 3 4: 5 6 7 
Do not agree Strongly Agree 
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others. 
2. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups (R) 
3. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against 
other groups. 
4. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
5. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally (R) 
6. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
7. No one group should dominate in society.(R) 
8. Group equality should be our ideal.(R) 
9. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.(R) 
10. We must increase social equality(R) 
11. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. 
12. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at 
the bottom. 
13. We must strive to make incomes more equal. (R) 
14. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
15. It would be good if all groups could be equal. 
16. Inferior groups should stay in their place.(R) 
I 
I 
I 
Appendix B.8: Study 1 Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale 
Please circle your response, using the scale below. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
3 
Slightly 
Disagree 
4 
Neither Disagree 
Nor Agree 
5 
Slightly 
Agree 
1. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.(R) 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
Moderately 
Agree 
6 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
7 
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2. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good 
and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. (R) 
1 2 345 6 7 
3. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today who are trying to ruin it for their godless 
purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
1 2 345 6 7 
4. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our 
moral fibre and traditional beliefs. 
1 2 345 6 7 
5. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they 
eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes 
them different from everyone else.(R) 
1 2 345 6 7 
People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, 
and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral. (R) 
1 2 345 6 7 
The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put 
some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. (R) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights" is a good, stiff dose of law and order. 
1234567 
11. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing 
religion, and ignoring the "normal way" things are supposed to be done. (R) 
1 2 345 6 7 
12. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show that we have to crack 
down harder on deviant groups and trouble-makers if we are going to save our moral standards and 
preserve law and order. 
1 2 3 4 567 
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Appendix B.9: Study 1 Prejudice Justification Materials 
(a) Justification based on the beliefs of Whites: 
White people hold attitudes (positive and negative) toward Blacks for a variety of cultural 
and personal reasons. To what extent do these attitudes held by Whites validate or 
explain your own attitude (positive or negative) toward Blacks? 
1 
Not at 
all 
2 3 4 5 
(b) Justification based on the beliefs of Blacks: 
6 7 8 9 
Very much 
Black people hold attitudes (positive and negative) toward Whites for a variety of cultural 
and personal reasons. To what extent do these attitudes held by Blacks validate or 
explain your own attitude (positive or negative) toward Blacks? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at Vervmuch 
(c) General prejudice justification: 
1. Do you think that ethnic prejudice is justifiable? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Moderately Very 
2. Do you think that ethnic prejudice is warranted? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Moderately Very 
3. To what extent is ethnic prejudice legitimate? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Moderately Very 
4.To what extent is ethnic prejudice appropriate? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Moderately Very much so 
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5. To what extent is it understandable that people hold negative attitudes toward members 
of other ethnic groups? 
1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 
Moderately 
6. How easy is it to defend ethnic prejudice? 
1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 
Moderately 
7. How easy is it to excuse ethnic prejudice? 
1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 
Moderately 
5 6 7 
Very much so 
5 6 7 
Very much so 
5 6 7 
Very much so 
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Appendix B.l 0: Study 1 Intergroup Anxiety Scale 
If you were the only White person interacting with a group of Black people (e.g., talking 
with them, working on a project with them), how would you feel compared to occasions 
when you were interacting with White people? 
Not at all 
-3 -2 -1 
(i) I would feel awkward -3 -2 -1 
(ii) I would feel self-conscious -3 -2 -1 
(iii) I would feel happy (R) -3 -2 -1 
(iv) I would feel accepted (R) -3 -2 -1 
(v) I would feel confident (R) -3 -2 -1 
(vi) I would feel irritated -3 -2 -1 
(vii) I would feel impatient -3 -2 -1 
(ix) I would feel defensive -3 -2 -1 
(x) I would feel suspicious -3 -2 -1 
(xi) I would feel careful -3 -2 -1 
Extremely 
o +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
0 +1 +2 +3 
Appendix B.II: Study 1 Outgroup Avoidance Scale 
To what extent do you avoid interacting with Black people? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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10 
Very 
much 
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Appendix R12: Study 1 Demographics 
INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
Age: years old 
Sex (check one):' Male' Female 
Ethnic Background (check any that apply): 
I White/Caucasian/European 
I Black! African-American 
, Asian 
, Aboriginal Peoples of Canada 
, Middle Eastern 
I Hispanic/Latino/South American 
I Other (please specify): ____________ _ 
Please place a checkmark (".J") beside any group that you consider yourself a member 
(if any) 
CANADIANS 
WHITE PEOPLE 
AMERICANS 
BLACK PEOPLE 
MEXICANS 
IMMIGRANTS 
ETHNIC MINORITIES 
HOMOSEXUALS 
JEWS 
THE POOR 
FOREIGNERS 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA 
DRUG ADDICTS 
MUSLIMS 
Appendix B.13: Study 1 Debriefing Form 
Project Title: Jokes and Perceptions of Self and Others 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Gordon Hodson 
Brock University Associate Professor 
ghodson@brocku.ca; 905-688-5550 ext. 5127 
Co-Investigator: Cara MacInnis 
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The purpose of this research is to examine in-group (i.e. own group) perceptions 
of in-group racial attitudes, and in-group perceptions of out-group (i.e. other group) 
beliefs about in-group racial attitudes. Specifically, this research pertains to White-Black 
relations, as a function of perceptions of oneself, one's own group, and other racial 
groups. 
We are investigating the relations among perceptions of in-group/ out-group 
attitudes, several personality variables (e.g., authoritarianism, social dominance), 
intergroup attitudes (e.g., attitude thermometer), and related beliefs about racial attitudes, 
such as whether they are justified. 
This research is important as it will help us understand how "we view others" and 
how we think "others view us." This study will build on current research and act as a 
step toward understanding the causes of negative racial attitudes. In addition we are 
examining how people perceive jokes toward Mexicans. These jokes were quite 
disparaging (offensive), as we are interested in how certain personality types perceive 
such jokes and such humour appreciate relates to attitudes toward Mexicans. 
If any part of the study has made you feel especially uncomfortable and you wish 
to seek help in dealing with your feelings, please note that the Student Development 
Center at Brock offers personal counseling services to students free of charge for any 
personal! social concerns or difficulties students may have. To make an appointment 
with a counselor, phone 905-684-6891. 
If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or 
your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this 
project, you may contact the Research Ethics Officer at Brock University at 905-688-
5550, extension 3035. This project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance 
through the Office of Research Ethics Board, Brock University (File # 07-199). 
Thank you for your time and support in participating in this study! 
Dr. Gordon Hodson 
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact any of the researcher 
(see above). 
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Appendix C.l: Study 2 Brock University Ethics Approval 
DATE: September 22, 2008 
FROM: Michelle McGinn, Chair Research Ethics Board (REB) 
TO: Dr. Gordon HODSON, Psychology 
Cara MacInnis 
FILE: 08-042 HODSON 
TITLE: Perceptions of Self and Others 
The Brock University Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above research proposal. 
DECISION: ACCEPTED AS CLARIFIED 
This project has received ethics clearance for the period of September 22, 2008 to July 
31,2009 subject to full REB ratification at the Research Ethics Board's next scheduled 
meeting. The clearance period may be extended upon request. The study may now 
proceed. 
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Appendix C.2: Study 2 Informed Consent Form 
Project Title: Perceptions of Self and Others 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Gordon Hodson, Brock University Associate Professor 
ghodson@brocku.ca;905-688-5550ext.5127; 
Co-Investigator: Cara MacInnis, cm07jh@brocku.ca 
II 
• 
" 
• 
" 
II 
III 
• 
• 
" 
I understand that this study involves research, and that I am being invited to participate 
I understand that the purpose of this study is to examine attitudes, personality, and perceptions 
regarding other groups (e.g., racial, social, economic groups) and issues relevant to Canada. 
I understand that the expected duration of my participation in this study is approximately 50 minutes. 
I understand the procedures to be followed, which include reading and signing two copies of this 
consent form; 1 of which I will keep for my own records. Once I have signed the consent form I will 
be asked to complete a questionnaire package on a computer. Afterwards the researcher will provide 
me with a debriefing form explaining the general study purpose. 
I understand that this study can count as research participation in a psychology course. As a 
participant I will also gain experience concerning how research in social psychology is conducted. 
All information provided is anonymous; my name will not be included or, in any other way, associated 
with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because the interest is in the average responses of 
the entire group of participants, I will not be identified individually in any way in written reports of 
this research 
I understand that only the Principal Investigator (Dr. Hodson) and the research assistant(s) collecting 
the data will have access to my data, and that all information will be stored securely in password 
protected computer files. Given the intentions of publishing the results, data will be kept until 
approximately 5-7 years from date, after which all data will be destroyed. 
I understand that any other person participating in this study in the same session as I am holds the same 
right to privacy as I do. Therefore I will ensure that I do not reveal to anyone the identity of others 
present during this session. 
I understand that the results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at 
conferences. Feedback about this study will be available approximately 6 months from date. 
I understand that there is a risk that I may experience mild emotional distress during the study 
I understand that participation is voluntary; refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of 
benefits to which I am otherwise entitled and I may discontinue participation at any time; I understand 
that my data cannot be withdrawn after submission, but it remains anonymous. If I withdraw, I can still 
receive payment or course participation. Thus, I may withdraw at any point during the study, but once 
I have completed the study, my data cannot be withdrawn due its anonymous nature. 
I understand that some questions may make me feel uncomfortable and if! wish, I may decline to 
answer any questions or participate in any component of the study. 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact the Principal 
Investigator using the contact information provided above. If you have any comments or concerns about 
your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, 
reb@brocku.ca. 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through Brock University's Research 
Ethics Board (file # 08-042) 
I (please print) 
1. Have read and understood the relevant infonnation regarding this research project 
2. Understand that I may ask questions in the future 
3. Indicate free consent to research participation by signing this research consent form 
Participant's Signature: _____________ _ Date: _____ _ 
Researcher's Signature: _____________ _ Date: ______ _ 
Below complete EITHER Form A or Form B (in recognition that you will receive payment OR 
course participation). 
FORM A. I am participating in this experiment for $5. This experiment will not count toward research 
participation hours in a psychology course. 
Signature of participant Signature of experimenter 
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FORM B. I am participating in this experiment for research participation in a psychology course and will 
not receive monetary pavment for this experiment. 
Signature of participant course for participation Signature of experimenter 
If you would like a copy of the results for this study (approximately 6 months from date) and/or would like 
to be informed of any publication of the results, please provide your email address below. 
Please keep a copy of consent form for your own records 
Appendix C.3: Study 2 Pre-manipulation Demographics 
INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
Age: years old 
Sex (check one):' Man' Woman 
Year of Study (choose one): 1 2 3 
Ethnic Background (check which best applies): 
, White/Caucasian/European 
, Black! African-Canadian 
, Asian 
, Aboriginal Peoples of Canada 
, Middle Eastern 
, Hispanic/Latino/South American 
4 5+ 
, Other (please specify): _____________ _ 
Please briefly list your hobbies or things you like to do in your spare time: -
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Appendix C.4: Study 2 Pre-manipulation Prejudice Relevant Materials 
(a) Modern Racism Scale: 
Please indicate your responses to the following questions. 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1. Over the past few years, the government 0 1 2 3 4 
and news media have shown more respect 
for Blacks than they deserve. 
2. It is easy to understand the anger of Blacks 0 1 2 3 4 
in North America. (R) 
3. Discrimination against Blacks is no longer 0 1 2 3 4 
a problem in the North America. 
4. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten 0 1 2 3 4 
more economically than they deserve. 
S. Blacks have more influence on government 0 1 2 3 4 
policies than they ought to have. 
6. Blacks are getting too demanding in their 0 1 2 3 4 
push for equal rights. 
7. Blacks should not push themselves where 0 1 2 3 4 
they are not wanted. 
(b.) self rating of ingroup favouritism 
To what extent do you favour Whites over Blacks? 
0 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at Very 
all much 
Appendix C.5: Study 2 Pre-manipulation Projection Materials 
(a) dichotomous measure of in group favouritism: 
Do you favour Whites over Blacks? (choose one) YES NO 
(b) Ingroup's ingroup favouritism (percent): 
What percentage of White people favour Whites over Blacks? (0-100%) % 
(c) Outgroup's ingroup favouritism (percent) 
What percentage of Black people favour Blacks over Whites? (0-100%) % 
(d) Ingroup's ingroup favouritism (degree): 
To what extent do Whites favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Outgroup's ingroup favouritism (degree): 
6 
To what extent do Blacks favour Blacks over Whites? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 8 
7 8 
(1) self rating ofingroup favouritism (also used as a measure of prejudice) 
To what extent do you favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 
9 
9 
191 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
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Appendix C.6: Study 2 Pre-manipulation Big Five Inventory 
Here are a number of characteristics that mayor may not apply to you. Please choose a 
number for each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that 
statement. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
5 = agree strongly 
4 = agree a little 
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree a little 
1 = disagree strongly 
I see myself as someone who ... 
is talkative 23. tends to be lazy 
tends to find fault with others 24. is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
does a thorough job 25. is inventive 
is depressed, blue 26. has an assertive personality 
is original, comes up with new 27. can be cold and aloof 
ideas 
is reserved 28. perseveres until the task is finished 
is helpful and unselfish with 29. can be moody 
others 
can be somewhat careless 30. values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
is relaxed, handles stress well 3l. is sometimes shy, inhibited 
is curious about many different 32. is considerate and kind to almost 
things everyone 
is full of energy 33. does things efficiently 
starts quarrels with others 34. remains calm in tense situations 
is a reliable worker 35. prefers work that is routine 
can be tense 36. is outgoing, sociable 
is ingenious, a deep thinker 37. is sometimes rude to others 
generates a lot of enthusiasm 38. makes plans and follows through with 
them 
has a forgiving nature 39. gets nervous easily 
tends to be disorganized 40. likes to reflect, play with ideas 
worries a lot 41. has few artistic interests 
has an active imagination 42. likes to cooperate with others 
tends to be quiet 43. is easily distracted 
is generally trusting 44. is sophisticated in art, music, or 
literature 
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Appendix C. 7: Study 2 Pre-manipulation Meta-stereotype Measures 
(a) meta-stereotype of self as individual 
To what extent do Blacks view you to favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
I 2 3 4 5 
(b) meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member 
6 7 8 9 
Based on your membership in the group, Whites, to what extent do Blacks view you to 
favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
I 2 3 4 
(c) meta-stereotype ofingroup (percent) 
5 6 7 8 
What percentage of Whites do Blacks believe favour Whites over Blacks? (0-
100%) % 
(d.) meta-stereotype ofingroup (degree) . 
9 
To what extent do Blacks view Whites in general to favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
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Appendix e.8: Study 2 Pre-manipulation Other-stereotype Measures 
(a) Other-stereotype (percent) 
What percentage of Black people favour Blacks over Whites? (0-100%) % 
(b) Other-stereotype ( degree) 
To what extent do Blacks favour Blacks over Whites? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(Note: These measures were also used to measure outgroup's ingroup favouritism; they 
were not measured twice). 
10 
Very 
much 
Appendix C.9: Study 2 Manipulation Phase Messages 
Note: all messages received by participants are printed in italics, text not in italics is 
provided for ease of interpretation. 
After pre-manipulation measures: 
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Please wait while the computer tabulates your scores on several constructs based on the 
information you just provided. 
Delay, then: 
This is a study regarding interpersonal interaction. Each participant will be having a 
brief 5 minute discussion on a pre-arranged topic (i.e., current movies, etc.) with another 
participant. First, you and your partner will be given some information about 
yourselves, and then you will be asked to respond to some questions. Afterwards, the 
interaction with your partner can begin. 
Participants then received demographic information from their apparent partner: 
An interaction partner has been selected for you from the students participating in the 
study. 
Based on the information your partner gave us, your partner (Participant #) is a Black 
(man or woman), age 20. Your partner's hobbies include: hanging out with/riends and 
watching TV. 
Delay, then: 
You have been randomly assigned to a condition in which: 
Participants received only ONE of the messages from each list below. Those in the 
Personal Self-Stereotype condition received the 'a' messages, those in the Group Self-
Stereotype condition received the 'b' messages, those in the Personal Other-stereotype 
condition received the 'c' messages, those in the Group Other-Stereotype condition 
received the 'd' messages, those in the Personal Meta-Stereotype condition received the 
'e' messages, and those in the Group Meta-Stereotype condition received the 'f 
messages. 
(a) You will be givenfeedback regarding the tasks you completed at the beginning of the 
study 
(b) You will be given feedback regarding the tasks completed by the average of the 
WHITE participants who have completed the study prior to today 
(c) you will be givenfeedback regarding the tasks your partner completed at the 
beginning of the study 
(d) You will be given feedback regarding the tasks completed by BLACKparticipants 
who have completed the study prior to today 
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(e) your partner has been givenfeedback regarding tasks you completed at the beginning 
of this study 
(f) your partner has been given feedback regarding the tasks completed by the WHITE 
participants who have completed the study prior to today 
Then participants received information corresponding with their condition: 
(a)From this information(your completion of the preliminary measures, which included a 
highly sensitive unconscious measure of White/ Black preferences), the computer 
algorithm system has determined that you strongly favour Whites over Blacks 
(b) From this information(Whites ' completion of the preliminary measures, which 
included a highly sensitive unconscious measure of White/ Black preferences), the 
computer algorithm system has determined that the White Brock students tested before 
today strongly favour Whites over Blacks 
(c)From this information (your partner's completion of the preliminary measures, which 
included a highly sensitive unconscious measure of White/ Black preferences), the 
computer algorithm system has determined that your partner strongly favours Blacks 
over Whites 
(d)From this information, (Blacks' completion of the preliminary measures, which 
included a highly sensitive unconscious measure of White/ Black preferences), the 
computer algorithm system has determined that the Black Brock students tested before 
today strongly favour Blacks over Whites 
(e) Based on the information, (your completion of the preliminary measures, which 
included a highly sensitive unconscious measure of White/ Black preferences), your 
partner has rated you as someone who strongly favours Whites over Blacks 
(f)Based on this information, (Whites' completion of the preliminary measures, which 
included a highly sensitive unconscious measure of White/ Black preferences), your 
partner has rated the White Brock students tested before today as people who strongly 
favour Whites over Blacks 
Delay, then participants then received the following message: 
Keeping in mind the information you just received, you will now be asked to answer some 
questions regarding your upcoming interaction. 
Participants then responded to Post-manipulation measures. 
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Appendix C.l 0: Study 2 Post-manipulation Contact Specific Intergroup Anxiety and 
Contact Specific Outgroup A voidance Scales 
(a) anxiety 
To what extent do you expect to feel the following during the upcoming interaction with your 
partner? 
Not at all 
-3 -2 -1 0 
(i) I will feel awkward -3 -2 -1 0 
(ii) I will feel self-conscious -3 -2 -1 0 
(iii) I will feel hrumY -3 -2 -1 0 
(iv) I will feel accepted (R) -3 -2 -1 0 
(v) I will feel confident (R) -3 -2 -1 0 
(vi) I will feel irritated (R) -3 -2 -1 0 
(vii) I will feel impatient -3 -2 -1 0 
(ix) I will feel defensive -3 -2 -1 0 
(x) I will feel suspicious -3 -2 -1 0 
(xi) I will feel careful -3 -2 -1 0 
(b) avoidance 
To what extent do you wish to avoid the interaction with your partner? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at 
all 
To what extent would you rather not interact with your partner? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 
7 
Extremely 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
+1 +2 +3 
8 9 
8 9 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
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Appendix C.ll: Study 2 Post-manipulation Personalized Meta-stereotype Measures 
(a) personalized meta-stereotypes of self as individual 
To what extent will your partner view you to favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(b) Personalized meta-stereotype of self as ingroup member 
8 9 10 
Very 
much 
Based on your membership in the group, White Brock students, to what extent will your 
partner view you to favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(c) personalized meta-stereotype of in group (percent) 
7 8 9 
According to your partner, what percentage of White Brock students favour Whites 
over Blacks? (0-100%) _____ _ 
(d) personalized meta-stereotype of in group (degree) 
To what extent does your partner view White Brock students to favour Whites over 
Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
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Appendix C.I2: Study 2 Post-manipulation Personalized Other-stereotype Measure 
To what extent does your partner favour Blacks over Whites? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
much 
Appendix C.13: Study 2 Post-manipulation Quality ofInteraction Measures 
(a) self-ratings 
To what extent do you expect the interaction with your partner to be: 
(a.) Pleasant 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 
(b.) Cooperative 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 
3 
3 
(c.) Superficial and Insincere 
o 
Not at 
all 
I 2 
(b) partner-ratings 
3 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
8 9 
8 9 
8 9 
To what extent do you think your partner expects the interaction with you to be: 
(a.) Pleasant 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
(b.) Cooperative 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 
(c) Superficial and Insincere 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 
4 
4 
5 6 7 
5 6 7 
8 9 
8 9 
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10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
Appendix C.14: Study 2 Post-manipulation Projection Measures 
(a) dichotomous measure ofingroup favouritism: 
Do you favour Whites over Blacks? (choose one) YES NO 
(b) Ingroup's in group favouritism (percent): 
What percentage of White people favour Whites over Blacks? (0-100%) % 
(c) Outgroup's ingroup favouritism (percent) 
What percentage of Black people favour Blacks over Whites? (0-100%) % 
(d) Ingroup's ingroup favouritism (degree): 
To what extent do Whites favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
10 20 30 40 50 
(e) Outgroup's ingroup favouritism (degree): 
60 
To what extent do Blacks favour Blacks over Whites? 
o 
Not at 
all 
10 20 30 40 50 60 
70 80 
70 80 
(f) self rating of in group favouritism (also used as a measure of prejudice) 
To what extent do you favour Whites over Blacks? 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
90 
90 
9 
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100 
Very 
much 
100 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
Appendix C.15: Study 2 Post-manipulation Ingroup Identification Scale 
Please respond to the following questions: 
a. how important to your self-identity is being White 
o 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
b. To what extent you consider yourself to be similar to other Whites 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at 
aU 
c. How attached are you to the group Whites? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at 
aU 
9 
9 
9 
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10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
10 
Very 
much 
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Appendix C.l6: Study 2 Post-manipulation Prejudice Justification Scale 
1. Do you think that ethnic prejudice is justifiable? 
1 2 3 4 
Not at all Moderately 
2. Do you think that ethnic prejudice is warranted? 
1 2 3 4 
Not at all Moderately 
3. To what extent is ethnic prejudice legitimate? 
1 2 3 4 
Not at all Moderately 
4.To what extent is ethnic prejudice appropriate? 
1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 
Moderately 
5 6 7 
Very 
5 6 7 
Very 
5 6 7 
Very 
5 6 7 
Very much so 
5. To what extent is it understandable that people hold negative attitudes toward members 
of other ethnic groups? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Moderately Very much so 
6. How easy is it to defend ethnic prejudice? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Moderately Very much so 
7. How easy is it to excuse ethnic prejudice? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Moderately Very much so 
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Appendix C.17: Study 2 Post-manipulation Behavioural Avoidance Measure 
Participant receives the following message: 
At this point we may begin the interpersonal interaction part of the study. You will recall 
that your interaction partner is Participant # a Black 20 year old SEX You have a 
choice whether or not you would like to participate in this interaction. You can either 
participate in the 5 minute interaction with your interaction partner, or participate in an 
interaction with a different randomly chosen interaction partner. If you would like to 
participate in the interaction with your assigned partner, Participant # please check YES. 
If you would rather avoid this interaction and interact with a new partner please check 
NO. 
(MUST CHOOSE Yes OR No) 
.. Yes, I would like to interact with my assigned partner 
.. No, I would rather not interact with my assigned partner, and would rather 
interact with a new partner 
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Appendix C.18: Study 2 Suspicion Check Measure 
Can you guess the hypotheses of the study? (i.e., what do you think the study is about?) 
Did anything about the study make you suspicious? (Choose one.) YES 
If YES, please elaborate: 
NO 
Appendix C.19: Study 2 Manipulation Check Measure 
Earlier in the study, you received some information from the computer. From the 
following list, please choose the information you received. 
I received information that: 
(a) I strongly favour Whites over Blacks 
(b) White Brock students strongly favour Whites over Blacks 
(c) My interaction partner strongly favours Blacks over Whites 
(d) Black Brock students strongly favour Blacks over Whites 
(e) My partner determined me to be someone who strongly favours Whites over 
Blacks 
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(f) My partner determined White Brock student study participants to be people who 
strongly favour Whites over Blacks 
(g) I did not receive any of this information 
Appendix C.20: Study 2 Written Debriefing Form 
Project Title: Perceptions of Self and Others 
Principle Investigator: Dr. Gordon Hodson, Brock University Associate Professor 
ghodson@brocku.ca ; 905-688-5550 ext. 5127 
Co-Investigator: Cara MacInnis cm07jh@brocku.ca 
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The purpose of this research is to examine in-group (i.e. own group) perceptions of in-group racial 
attitudes, and perceptions of out-group (i.e. other group) beliefs about in-group racial attitudes. Specifically, 
this research pertains to ingroup-outgroup relations, as a function of perceptions of oneself, one's own group, 
and other racial groups. We are interested in people's perceptions of in groups (the group that one belongs to) 
and outgroups (a group one does not belong to). For example, we could have compared perceptions of 
women and men, old and young, etc. It is important to remember that people fall on a continuum with regard 
to their feelings about outgroups and there is a wide range of feelings people can have toward outgroups. 
Where you fall on this range does not necessarily make you a good or bad person. We hope you understand 
that it was necessary to misinform participants at some points during the study to allow for natural reactions. 
This research program is particularly novel and very important to the field of social psychology. We thank 
you so much for being a part of it 
This research is important as it will help us understand the impact of how "we view others" and 
how we think "others view us" on intergroup relations. This study will build on current research and act as 
a step toward understanding the causes of negative racial attitudes. Weare also investigating the relations 
among perceptions of in-group/ out-group attitudes, several personality variables (e.g., authoritarianism, 
social dominance), intergroup attitudes (e.g., ingroup favouritism), and related beliefs about racial attitudes, 
such as whether they are justified. 
In this study you were told you would be interacting with a partner, however no interaction took 
place for you or any of the participants in the study, and none was intended. For our research purposes we 
needed to study the perceptions in anticipation of an interaction. Therefore, it was not necessary for you to 
actually interact with someone; your responses in anticipation of this interaction will be very useful to our 
research and understanding of psychology. 
In this study, you were given information about your own or others' racial biases. However, in 
reality we have not yet coded participants' responses so we currently have no way of knowing who is high 
or low in biases. Moreover, all data truly is anonymous, and we are interested in the average responses of 
the entire group of participants, so we will never know. It was deemed necessary to give you this fictitious 
information so we could study some very important research questions. 
Because anonymity is very important to this study, we ask that you please do not discuss any part 
ofthis study with your friends, peers, or classmates who are likely to take part in the study. The study will 
be compromised if you discuss its procedures with potential participants. In psychological research, it is 
often very important that participants are unaware of the procedures and hypotheses of a study before they 
participate in it. We hope you have learned something about psychological research processes by taking 
part in this study. However, if you wish to discuss the study with people who have already participated in 
the study, or people who never will participate (e.g., parents, friends who do not attend Brock), that is 
acceptable. 
We hope you will learn something about intergroup relations from participating in this research .. 
For further reading on the topics studied by this research, please see the bottom of this page. 
Please keep in mind this study is completely anonymous and there is no way to match data to 
specific participants. 
209 
If any part of the study has made you feel especially uncomfortable and you wish to seek help in 
dealing with your feelings, please note that the Student Development Center at Brock offers personal 
counseling services to students free of charge for any personal! social concerns or difficulties students may 
have. To make an appointment with a counselor, phone 905-684-6891. If you feel stressed for any reason 
following this study, please take advantage of the following useful websites: 
http://www.stresslesscountry.com/ 
http://www.webmd.comlbalance/stress-managementl default.htrn 
If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a 
participant in research have been violated during the course ofthis project, you may contact the Research 
Ethics Officer at Brock University at 905-688-5550, extension 3035. This project has been reviewed and 
received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics Board, Brock University (File # 08-042). 
Thank you for your time and support in participating in this study! 
Dr. Hodson 
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact any of the 
researchers (see above). 
Further Reading: 
Robbins, 1M. & Krueger, J. (2005). Social projection to ingroups and outgroups. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9,32-47. 
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Appendix C.21: Study 2 Verbal Debriefing Script 
Thank you for participating in the study. I want to let you know a few things about the study you 
just completed. 
First of all, the feedback you were given after the preliminary measures of the study was fictitious. 
You would have received information regarding either your own or others' racial biases. However, 
participants' responses have not yet been coded, and we currently have no way of knowing who is high or 
low in biases. Moreover, all data truly is anonymous, so we will never know. The information you received 
was therefore was not necessarily true. We needed to give participants this potentially false information due 
to some very pressing research questions regarding intergroup perceptions and attitude justifications. There is 
a great need for research where participants are given this type of information, and because we were able to 
do this; this study is likely to be highly influential. Therefore, we thank you for your participation. 
Secondly, you will notice that there was no interaction with a partner. This is because our main 
research questions focus on reactions to anticipated, as opposed tor real, interactions. We appreciate the time 
you've given to the study, and because we know your time is important to you, we did not feel it was 
necessary to have you partake in an interaction that was not of primary interest to us, so we never intended 
for you to have an interaction. The information provided up to this point will be very useful for our research. 
This study was about group differences. We are interested in people's perceptions of ingroups (the 
group that one belongs to) and outgroups (a group one does not belong to). For example, we could have 
compared perceptions of women and men, old and young, etc. It is important to remember that people fall on 
a continuum with regard to their feelings about outgroups and there is a wide range of feelings people can 
have toward outgroups. Where you fall on this range does not necessarily make you a good or bad person. 
We hope you understand that it was necessary to misinform participants at some points during the 
study to allow for natural reactions. This research was particularly novel, and very important to the field of 
social psychology. We thank you so much for being a part of it 
Do you have any questions/ concerns about the study? 
Because anonymity is very important to this study, we ask that you-please do not discuss any part 
of this study with your friends, peers, or classmates who are likely to take part in the study. It is imperative 
you do not discuss the study with such people, for if you do your time will have been wasted. The study 
will be compromised if you discuss its procedures with potential participants. In psychological research, it 
is often very important that participants are unaware of the procedures and hypotheses of a study before 
they participate in it. We hope you have learned something about psychological research processes by 
taking part in this study. If you wish to discuss the study with people who have already participated in the 
study, or people who never will participate (e.g., parents, friends who do not attend Brock), that is 
acceptable. 
If you feel uncomfortable following this study, the debriefmg form will give you resources to deal 
with any potential stress you may have regarding the study. 
This study is completely anonymous. Because of the way the computer has been programmed to 
save data, I don't even have a way to match data with specific participants. Moreover, the interest is in the 
average responses of the entire group of participants, not the responses of specific individuals. 
I will give you this debriefing form which also provides more detail about the study. If you have any 
further questions please do not hesitate to use the contact information on this form. Again, we thank your for 
your time and participation. 
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Appendix D: Effect Coding Scheme 
Table 20 displays the effect coding scheme used in several analyses to compare 
conditions to the grand mean. There are 5 coded predictors, in which the group labeled 1 
was compared to the grand mean. Condition 3 (the Personal Other-Stereotype condition) 
was chosen as the base group and coded -1. The Personal Other-Stereotype condition was 
chosen as it was not of interest at any point to compare group 3 to the grand mean. In E1 
the Personal Self-Stereotype condition was compared to the grand mean, in E2 the Group 
Self-Stereotype condition was compared to Grand mean, in E3 the Group Other-
Stereotype condition was compared to Grand mean, in E4 the Personal Meta-Stereotype 
condition was compared to Grand mean, and in E5 the Group Meta-Stereotype condition 
was compared to Grand mean. 
Table 20. 
Effect Coding Scheme 
Condition E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
Personal Self-Stereotype I 0 0 0 0 
Group Self-Stereotype 0 1 0 0 0 
Personal Other-Stereotype -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Group Other-Stereotype 0 0 1 0 0 
Personal Meta-Stereotype 0 0 0 1 0 
Group Meta-Stereotype 0 0 0 0 1 
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Appendix E: Contrast Coding Schemes 
Table 21 presents the orthogonal contrast coding scheme used to test for support 
of the Perceptual! cognitive overgeneralization and Motivated threat theoretical models. 
In this coding scheme, only predictors CIa and Clb were of interest. The other coded 
predictors did not test specific hypotheses and were included to ensure that the coding 
scheme was orthogonal (see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003, p.31S). Predictor CIa 
compared the Personal Self-Stereotype condition and Personal Meta-Stereotype condition 
to the other four conditions, and predictor Clb compared the Personal Self-Stereotype 
condition to the Personal Meta-Stereotype condition .. 
Table 21. 
Contrast Coding Scheme 1 
Condition CIa Clb Clc Cld Cle 
Personal Self-Stereotype -2 1 0 0 0 
Group Self-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 1 
Personal Other-Stereotype 1 0 1 1 0 
Group Other-Stereotype 1 0 1 -1 0 
Personal Meta-Stereotype -2 -1 0 0 0 
Group Meta-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 -1 
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Table 22 displays the orthogonal contrast coding scheme used to investigate the 
Introjection theoretical model. As with contrast coding scheme 1, not all predictors were 
key for the analyses. Here, only predictor C2a was of interest, which compared 
conditions the Group Self-Stereotype and Group Meta-Stereotype conditions to the other 
conditions. 
Table 22. 
Contrast Coding Scheme 2 
Condition C2a C2b C2c C2d C2e 
Personal Self-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 -1 
Group Self-Stereotype -2 -1 0 0 0 
Personal Other-Stereotype 1 0 1 1 0 
Group Other-Stereotype 1 0 1 -1 0 
Personal Meta-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 1 
Group Meta-Stereotype -2 1 0 0 0 
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Table 23 displays orthogonal contrast coding scheme 3, which was used to test the 
Normative influence theoretical model. Again, only predictor C3a was of interest. This 
predictor compared the Personal Self-Stereotype, Group Self-Stereotype, Personal Meta-
Stereotype, and Personal Other-Stereotype conditions to the Personal and Group Other-
Stereotype conditions. 
Table 23. 
Contrast Coding Scheme 3 
Condition C3a C3b C3c C3d C3e 
Personal Self-Stereotype 1 0 1 1 0 
Group Self-Stereotype 1 0 1 -1 0 
Personal Other-Stereotype -2 1 0 0 0 
Group Other-Stereotype -2 -1 0 0 0 
Personal Meta-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 1 
Group Meta-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 -1 
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Table 24 displays orthogonal contrast coding scheme 4 which was used in several 
analyses to examine differences within conditions regarding anticipated intergroup 
contact reactions. All predictors were meaningful here, but the key predictors were C4a 
and C4c. Predictor C4a was used to compare the Personal Other-Stereotype, Group 
Other-Stereotype, Personal Meta-Stereotype and Group Meta-Stereotype conditions to 
the Personal and Group Self-Stereotype conditions, testing the Meta- and Other-
stereotypes equally dominant model. Predictor C4c compared the Personal and Group 
Other-Stereotype conditions to the Personal and Group Meta-Stereotype conditions, 
testing both the Meta-stereotypes dominant (Model X) and Other-stereotypes dominant 
models (Model Z) (if this predictor were significant examination of means would reveal 
which model was supported). In addition, this coding scheme allowed for the exploratory 
investigation of potential differences between each type of personal and group stereotype 
on anticipated contact expectations. Predictor C4b compared the Personal and Group Self 
Stereotype conditions, predictor C4d compared the Personal and Group Other-Stereotype 
conditions, and predictor C4e compared the Personal and Group Meta-stereotype 
conditions. 
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Table 24. 
Contrast Coding Scheme 4 
Condition C4a C4b C4c C4d C4e 
Personal Self-Stereotype -2 1 0 0 0 
Group Self-Stereotype -2 -1 0 0 0 
Personal Other-Stereotype 1 0 1 1 0 
Group Other-Stereotype 1 0 1 -1 0 
Personal Meta-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 1 
Group Meta-Stereotype 1 0 -1 0 -1 
